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FROM THE EDITORS
The reemergence in recent years of high-end naval competitors has raised some 
difficult questions for the U.S. Navy in assessing priorities in fleet design. In 
“Posture versus Presence: The Relationship between Global Naval Engagement 
and Naval War-Fighting Posture,” Robert C. Rubel makes the case that the too-
common assumption that “war fighting” should enjoy absolute priority over the 
requirements of peacetime global presence or engagement fails to appreciate 
the important contribution the presence mission actually makes to the fleet’s 
war-fighting effectiveness. He argues in particular that the latest iteration of the 
Navy’s maritime strategy overcorrects for the emphasis on cooperative naval 
engagement in the original 2007 strategy document, and that the Navy needs 
to take steps to reaffirm its commitment to that collaborative vision. Robert C. 
“Barney” Rubel is the former dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the 
Naval War College.
At the forefront of the concerns of our sea services today is the challenge of 
confronting and defeating increasingly effective antiaccess/area-denial capa-
bilities in various parts of the world. Robert C. Owen, in “Distributed STOVL 
Operations and Air-Mobility Support: Addressing the Mismatch between Re-
quirements and Capabilities,” explores options for improving logistic support for 
Marine Corps F-35B strike fighters in such an environment through the creative 
employment of air-mobility assets of the U.S. Air Force. Robert C. Owen, a re-
tired USAF colonel, is a professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.
In “When Robots Rule the Waves?,” Robert Sparrow and George Lucas tackle a 
topic of great current interest from the unusual perspective of military ethics. Af-
ter presenting an overview of unmanned and autonomous surface and undersea 
vehicles currently in the inventory or under development in the U.S. Navy, they 
identify and discuss a range of questions that the employment of these vehicles 
might raise within the framework of traditional just war theory. While acknowl-
edging that many issues remain to be investigated and resolved regarding the 
legal and ethical ramifications of unmanned naval systems, they argue that it is 
time to begin to incorporate ethical considerations into the operational concepts 
and even the design of such systems. George Lucas is currently a visiting fellow 
at the Naval War College; Robert Sparrow is a professor at Monash University in 
Australia and a co-chair of the IEEE Technical Committee on Robot Ethics.
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Another area of intense current interest for the U.S. Navy is the potential 
challenge that Chinese antiship cruise missiles pose to the Navy in the western 
Pacific. In “A Thousand Splendid Guns: Chinese ASCMs in Competitive Con-
trol,” Lieutenant Alan Cummings, USN, lays out the nature of this challenge and 
discusses the developing American response, now commonly described by the 
label “distributed lethality.” He particularly emphasizes the need to develop new 
offensive antiship capabilities in close collaboration with our regional allies. Lieu-
tenant Cummings is currently a staff officer at U.S. Southern Command.
The U.S. Navy is in the process of reevaluating at a fundamental level how it 
develops its leaders. It seems to be widely agreed that the Navy has paid insuffi-
cient attention in the past to the ethical or character component of leadership and 
that ways need to be found to foster this component throughout the fleet—other 
than merely promulgating bumper-sticker terms and punishing deviations from 
legalistically formulated regulations. In “Cultivating Sailor Ethical Fitness,” Com-
mander Michael Hallett, USNR, echoes this view and suggests a way to think 
about what might be done. He argues that the phrase “ethical fitness” captures the 
essence of an approach based on the unique demands of the military environment 
—especially in crisis and combat situations—as well as the need to embed such 
a training regime in everyday practice. Commander Hallett is currently a staff 
officer in the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s Maritime Operations Center.
In the spirit of a historian’s “what if?” exercise, Stephen Turnbull, in “Wars and 
Rumours of War: Japanese Plans to Invade the Philippines, 1593–1637,” describes 
a virtually forgotten moment in early modern Asian history, but one with poten-
tially large ramifications for Japan’s relationship with Asia and indeed the West. 
Stephen Turnbull is professor emeritus of Japanese studies at Akita International 
University.
Finally, in recognition of the centennial of the battle of Jutland in 1916, David 
Kohnen, in collaboration with Nicholas Jellicoe and Nathaniel Sims, provides a 
provocative analysis of the effects of the battle and the events of the six ensuing 
months on the future of the U.S. Navy in “The U.S. Navy Won the Battle of Jut-
land.” David Kohnen is a historian in the Maritime History Department at the 
Naval War College.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College 
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 
335, 309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at 
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-
841-2236).
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Address by Vice Admiral Frank C. Pandolfe to the Naval Strategy Sym-
posium, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 13 June 2016
THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN U.S. NAVAL 
STRATEGY
 Good morning, everyone. It’s a pleasure to be back in Newport, the home of naval strategic thought for well over a hundred years. Thanks to this 
school—and to the thousands of military officers and civilian strategists who 
have worked here over the years—our Navy has benefited from farsighted and 
rigorous thinking about how best to apply maritime power to achieve our nation’s 
goals in ever-changing security environments.
Today we sometimes hear laments about how our nation lacks effective mili-
tary strategies and strategists. Yet in this room today there are nearly seventy-five 
naval officers representing a vibrant community of strategic thinking that is 
growing every year. And when we include civilian members of our strategy com-
munity and retired officers, we can appreciate a family that numbers many more.
So, my first message to you today is to take heart regarding the state of our 
strategic thinking. It is robust, and I predict it will remain so. Why do I say that? 
Because our Navy has regularly produced timely and innovative strategies over 
the past thirty years. Let’s take a look.
Modern Naval Strategy: An Overview
Let’s start with the Maritime Strategy of 1986. I was a junior officer when it came 
out. I well remember the excitement generated by publication of that unclassified 
version of our war plan for taking the fight to the enemy at sea and ashore. In 
a confrontational era, it was a confrontational document. Inside its covers were 
three complementary essays by the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], CMC 
[Commandant of the Marine Corps], and SecNav [Secretary of the Navy]. The 
Maritime Strategy focused on how we would defeat the Soviet fleet, detailed how 
the Marines would take the fight ashore, and called for six hundred ships to fulfill 
the strategy.
Critics said the Maritime Strategy was nothing more than a marketing tool to 
justify an expanded Navy and Marine Corps. They were wrong. The Maritime 
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Strategy galvanized the fleet. It provided a strategic context for developing 
war-fighting instructions and executing bold and innovative tactics that were 
practiced from the High North to the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific Ocean. 
Above all, it was a powerful signal from our leadership that maritime power 
would play a leading role should global war be unleashed on us.
The Maritime Strategy, like all strategies, had to make choices. Its horizon was 
relatively near term. Specifics of how the services would integrate capabilities 
largely were left for others to work out. And the fiscal challenges of sustaining 
such a large fleet were not fully addressed.
Nevertheless, the Maritime Strategy succeeded brilliantly in communicating 
the challenges we faced and our unalterable goal of victory at sea, to be achieved 
by the simultaneous application of decisive operations in multiple theaters. It 
called for action by way of an ambitious construction program that would create 
the instrument of supreme sea power in the late twentieth century and into the 
twenty-first. It was a strategy that dreamed big and, in doing so, generated strong 
support to build hundreds of ships, some of which still sail in the fleet today.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the naval services shifted gears 
and unveiled . . . From the Sea in 1992. Today it is easy to underestimate how 
much emotion went into writing that document. The world had fundamentally 
changed, and a new strategy was needed to address emergent challenges. To be 
effective, that strategy had to address hard choices, recommending that some 
capabilities be emphasized going forward and others downsized.
In the absence of the Soviet Union, American sea control was assumed as a 
fact; an open-ocean fight would not be necessary. Power projection ashore was 
king. Henceforth, naval forces would focus their efforts in the littorals, ensuring 
the flow ashore of military capabilities by way of sequential joint operations.
As a result of this shift in naval strategic thinking, a number of submarines and 
maritime patrol aircraft were cut from the fleet while strike assets and amphibi-
ous shipping were prioritized. Adversaries were viewed as regional in nature and 
with limited reach. Addressing humanitarian concerns emerged as a key mis-
sion area, rivaling war fighting in competing for institutional attention. Political 
theorists spoke of great-power convergence, working toward an increasingly free, 
prosperous, and peaceful world order. A terrible day in September 2001 ended 
such utopian dreams.
In October 2002, our Navy unveiled its Sea Power 21 strategy. Sea Power 21 
described the capabilities needed to meet nation-state challenges but also to ad-
dress growing transregional threats posed by substate actors employing terror to 
undermine established political orders.
Sea Power 21 emphasized the centrality of networked information in generat-
ing joint effects. It moved beyond the sequential prescriptions of . . . From the 
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Sea to envision a unified battle space within which the oceans would be a vast 
maneuver area from which to deliver offensive fires and—for the first time— 
defensive protection deep inland. It stated that in the future the positioning of 
BMD [ballistic-missile defense] ships would rival that of aircraft carriers, while 
computer network defenses would be as important as missiles in ensuring mis-
sion success. It directed radical change in how we managed the fleet, implement-
ed innovation, and trained our people.
Sea Power 21, like its predecessors, emphasized some things over others. It 
largely spoke to exploiting U.S. unilateral advantages, stressing the development 
of advanced capabilities that would widen the gap between America and its 
partners. If the heart of the Maritime Strategy was an operational war plan, Sea 
Power 21 fundamentally was a vision document. Both, to be fully implemented, 
required significant increases in naval funding.
Sea Power 21 served us well. It set the course for our Navy’s capability develop-
ment. Today, nearly fourteen years later, most of the programs it recommended 
are present or arriving in the fleet; we are implementing increasingly responsive, 
transparent, and tailored training and assignment processes; and we continue our 
efforts to capture institutional efficiencies.
In 2007, the naval services updated our strategic guidance yet again by un-
veiling A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. CS-21, as it became 
known, was a hopeful strategy. It emphasized the collective strength to be derived 
from leveraging a global coalition of like-minded nations. It foresaw the possibil-
ity of creating, in effect, a “thousand-ship navy” dedicated to patrolling the sea-
lanes, policing up international outliers, and providing humanitarian assistance 
and disaster response (HA/DR).
While the Maritime Strategy emphasized war fighting at sea, . . . From the Sea 
stressed enabling sequential joint power projection, and Sea Power 21 envisioned 
networked capabilities generating joint effects across a unified battle space, CS-
21 highlighted the value to our nation of time-tested maritime core capabilities: 
forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, 
HA/DR.
CS-21 proved right for its time, as well. It demonstrated immense international 
appeal owing to its inclusive nature and relatively modest capability demands. 
It was the perfect vehicle for rallying broad efforts to combat piracy, which had 
emerged as a significant problem for international commerce. It came to life as 
an array of navies from around the globe worked together to shepherd merchant 
ships through dangerous waters. And it fostered navy-to-navy cooperation in 
other ways. For example, at various times both Russian and Chinese senior of-
ficers attended the International Seapower Symposium in Newport.
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CS-21 also had its critics. It struck some as overly optimistic in implying that 
growing economic integration would lead to political convergence. It also was 
accused of de-emphasizing war fighting. But such issues did not compromise its 
effectiveness. In the end, CS-21 was remarkably successful in inspiring greater 
international naval cooperation.
More recently, as international tensions have increased from the Baltic to the 
South China Sea, our strategy has been revised yet again. Introduced just last 
year, CS-21 Revised (2015) has a sharper edge than its predecessor. It emphasizes 
five essential functions, the first of which is all-domain access to counter grow-
ing antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) threats, followed by deterrence, sea control, 
power projection, and maritime security. The previous emphasis on coalition 
efforts is balanced with the need to develop higher-end war-fighting capabilities. 
HA/DR is dropped as a major focus area. Russia and China are named as growing 
sources of international instability. CNO [Admiral John] Richardson underlines 
this evolving challenge in his Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, writ-
ing that “[f]or the first time in 25 years, the United States is facing a return to 
great power competition.”
Lessons Learned
What lessons can we take away from this brief review of the evolution of naval 
strategy over the past three decades?
First, naval strategic thinking is not on holiday today and never has been. To 
the contrary, the naval services have compiled an impressive record of updating 
their strategic guidance documents on a regular basis to reflect an ever-changing 
world.
Also, all these documents emphasized time-tested maritime strengths, includ-
ing the importance of being forward to reassure allies, deter adversaries, and 
respond to crises. They prescribed the application of both sea-control and power-
projection capabilities, adjusting the balance between them to reflect the prevail-
ing threat environment. And they conveyed an appreciation for the importance 
of allies and partners while illuminating the need to develop and, when necessary, 
to employ unilateral capabilities. They built on one another—they evolved—in 
recommending actions required to meet changing threats. And they conveyed an 
appreciation for the importance of teamwork within and among services, depart-
ments, agencies, and nations.
Yet each of these documents was distinct in how it emphasized the three pillars 
of strategy: ends, ways, and means. For example, Sea Power 21’s strength was its 
vision of a future fleet, illustrating the ends of strategy. The Maritime Strategy of 
1986, on the other hand, was most effective in detailing how the United States 
would destroy the Soviet fleet and project power ashore, a brilliant illustration of 
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strategic ways. And CS-21 was unique in emphasizing the power of partnering, 
placing an emphasis on employing shared means toward common purpose.
As times changed, so did our strategic guidance. Yet when looking across these 
documents, are there lessons to be learned? I believe there are. In drafting future 
strategies, I recommend employing the following principles:
1. Address the main challenge. A successful strategy must focus on the most 
pressing challenge facing our Navy at the time. Defeat the Soviets, enable 
joint operations ashore, envision the future, leverage cooperative action—
each naval strategy in its own way addressed the most immediate need 
before us.
2. Call for action. An effective strategy must inspire change. The Maritime 
Strategy galvanized support to build a six-hundred-ship Navy. . . . From 
the Sea led to tough choices that had far-reaching impact. Sea Power 21 
called for leveraging networked information to improve everything from 
war fighting to personnel processes. And CS-21 recommended building 
innovative coalitions to generate presence beyond the capacity of any one 
navy.
3. Feasibility first. To be effective, a strategy must be achievable. When 
debating strategic options, the first question to be asked should be “Can 
we do this?” rather than “Should we do this?” Clausewitz wrote that if the 
ends of a strategy are beyond its means before the start of conflict, they 
likely will remain so. Shaping ends to match ways and means is central to 
developing a solid strategy. Only after the strategy is properly scoped may 
decision makers answer the policy question: Should we do this?
4. Keep it short. American strategy during World War II remains the gold 
standard for succinctness: Germany first. Two words. That’s it. Those two 
words conveyed the end state we were pursuing, the sequence of major 
operations, the priority of resourcing and logistics, and the order by 
which we would begin to rebuild the badly fractured structure of world 
order. When writing a strategy, plain English is best, keep it unclassified if 
possible, and be ready to answer concisely the first question always asked: 
What’s new here?
5. Communicate, communicate, communicate. For any strategy to be 
effective, it must be driven home by way of a robust communication plan: 
many voices singing one song. Never underestimate how difficult it will 
be to penetrate target audiences with a clear message. Today that is harder 
than ever before because there is so much competition in the information 
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space. Everyone is wired, attention spans are short, and there is endless 
hype out there to steer attention away from your message.
6. Be generous. No strategy is “all new.” Each of the strategies reviewed here 
built on its predecessors while introducing fresh thoughts. In writing your 
contribution, I urge you to consult with those who came before you. At 
the end of the day, you will want your fellow strategists supporting your 
efforts.
What does all that amount to in practice? It means this: the most impactful 
strategies drive change—they cast the line far out in the water, seeking big fish; 
the best strategies are feasible and tightly written; the most effective strategies are 
hammered home relentlessly; and the best supported strategies leverage the col-
lective wisdom of our strategy family.
All Ahead Flank!
So, where do we go from here? For naval strategists today, there are many rich 
areas to explore. In writing the next strategy, here are some questions to consider: 
• What is the key challenge facing our Navy today? Where do we most need 
fresh guidance?
• Should we more strongly emphasize sea control, given the rise of A2/AD 
threats? Should we go even further and invest more fully in sea-denial  
capabilities?
• Should nonkinetic effects become our primary area of focus? Given the num-
ber of incoming threats we are likely to face, is it time to rely more heavily on 
nonkinetic effects?
• Should we concentrate the fleet in one region? Is that even possible, given 
today’s transregional threats?
• Should we focus on restoring readiness by reducing forward presence, or 
would doing so invite aggression and drive up demand?
• Should we shift funding among communities? We did so effectively to ad-
dress the challenges of the post–Cold War era. Is it time to do so again, to 
counter the threats of a globalized era?
• Should we emphasize the value of partners to the degree that we have in 
recent strategy documents? Or is it time, once again, to focus primarily on 
advancing American capabilities?
Those are just a few of the many vital questions to ponder as you begin writing 
the next chapter in our strategic story. I urge you to explore them fully. I hope 
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you will fire up impassioned debates about the future of our Navy, ultimately 
positioning it to keep our nation safe and to shape the world to be a better place. 
That is your challenge, and I wish you every success on your journey!
Thank you.
VICE ADMIRAL FRANK C. PANDOLFE, USN
Vice Admiral Pandolfe serves as assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, representing the chairman in interagency matters, focusing on international 
relations and political-military concerns and acting as military representative to the 
Secretary of State. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1980 (with dis-
tinction) and was awarded a doctorate in international relations from the Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in 1987. At sea, he has served in 
USS David R. Ray (DD 971), USS John Hancock (DD 981), USS Hué City (CG 
66), and USS Forrestal (CV 59) and commanded USS Mitscher (DDG 57). He 
commanded Destroyer Squadron 18 from 2003 to 2004, operating as sea combat 
commander for the Enterprise carrier strike group in support of Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM. From 2008 to 2009, he led the Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group 
on a combat deployment in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghani-
stan. Ashore, he was assigned to the Navy Staff as executive assistant to the Chief of 
Naval Operations, the Joint Staff as deputy director for strategy and policy, and the 
White House staff as military aide and adviser to the vice president of the United 
States. He also was Director, Surface Warfare Division, OPNAV N86, and Com-
mander, Sixth Fleet / Striking and Support Forces NATO. Most recently, he served 
as director for strategic plans and policy (J5) on the Joint Staff.
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degrees from the Naval War College and the Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. 
Additionally, he served as a military fellow at the 
Council on Foreign Relations in New York and is a 
member of the council.
Admiral Harley is a career surface warfare officer 
whose sea-duty assignments have included com-
mand of USS Milius (DDG 69), Destroyer Squadron 
9, and Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet. Addition-
ally, he has served as Director, White House Situa-
tion Room; Vice Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy 
(J5) at U.S. Central Command; President, Board of 
Inspection and Survey; and, most recently, Assistant 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, 
Plans, and Strategy.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
YOUR U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE continues to be the premier 
institution of its kind in the world. It is truly the Navy’s “home 
of thought,” and it quite simply excels at educating and preparing the national 
security leaders of today and tomorrow.
I was blessed and humbled to assume duties as the fifty-sixth President of the 
College this summer, and it brought to mind Admiral Chester Nimitz’s note of 17 
December 1941 upon assignment as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, in 
which he wrote, “It is a great responsibility but I shall do my utmost to meet it.” I 
share this sentiment, and will strive to help make this great institution even better.
I am also humbled by the extraordinary history of the College and the need to 
maintain our hard-earned reputation for excellence, while maintaining the flex-
ibility to adapt to the unrelenting change of our dynamic world. The international 
security environment is not only dynamic but complex, and the need for strategic 
thinking about the full range of challenges of our time is more critical than ever. 
At the same time, globalization and information technologies have made our 
world smaller and, some would argue, even more dangerous. Our military forces 
must understand and embrace the promises of emerging technologies and apply 
them to the new perils on the horizon, or we may find ourselves competing from 
a position of weakness rather than the overwhelming power we possess today.
To keep ahead of the changes and risks we face as a Navy and a nation, the 
College is embarking on a series of modest course changes to enhance the institu-
tion’s contributions. The College will continue to evolve to meet the specific needs 
of our student body while simultaneously addressing the higher-order needs of 
leaders and organizations across the global security arena. Our critical missions 
The Past Is Prologue
Change—continual unremitting change—it is the law of the universe. 
It’s not enough for us to keep abreast of times. This College must be in 
the very front rank of the advancement of progress.
REAR ADMIRAL STEPHEN B. LUCE
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remain the same: to educate and develop leaders, to help define our future Navy, 
to support combat readiness, and to strengthen global maritime relations.
To stay abreast of the changes in our strategic environment and best fulfill our 
mission, the College will do the following:
• Continue to operationalize our efforts to optimize support to the fleet. In
particular, the College will provide greater focus on understanding today’s
emerging threats while further enhancing combat readiness through expand-
ed teaching of maritime warfare.
• Expand the navalization of our curriculum to balance joint warfare concepts
with an increased understanding of what sea control means in the modern
era. The strategic environment of today presents access challenges that make
sea control more critical than ever before.
• Inculcate an understanding of future technologies through “futurization.” We
must continue to prepare our students for the extraordinary, dynamic, and
ever-increasing pace of change.
With these efforts—whether they be labeled “back to the future,” “revolution-
ary,” or merely “keeping pace with rapid change”—we will always contribute to 
the national and naval dialogue about how to fight and win our nation’s wars. The 
strength of our military forces has always been an important deterrent to war—
and we must be ready to answer the clarion call to duty. At the same time, we will 
honor Admiral Stephen Luce’s foundational guidance to be a place of original 
research on all questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected to war 
or the prevention of war. These continuing efforts reflect the remarkable heritage 
of this great College and will help us to run in step with the future.
As I return to the College, I find that my perspective on life here from the 
vantage point of the President’s office is a bit different, but I am just as energized 
by the gravitas of the institution and the intellectual buzz of the scholars in resi-
dence as I was when I arrived as a curious young lieutenant commander in 1995. 
A great deal has happened to the world in the twenty-one years between my two 
sets of orders to the College, but I believe these global changes have made the 
work being done on the shores of Narragansett Bay more important than ever. I 
look forward to the journey ahead!
JEFFREY A. HARLEY
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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commanded Strike Fighter Squadron 131 and served 
as the inspector general of U.S. Southern Command. 
He attended the Spanish Naval War College and the 
U.S. Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, 
where he served on the faculty and as chairman of 
the War Gaming Department in the Center for Naval 
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a bachelor’s degree from the University of Illinois; a 
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 There has occurred of late a controversy of sorts regarding the vector of investment by the U.S. Navy. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter overruled 
certain aspects of the Navy’s fiscal year 2016 budget, directing funds away from 
presence-related items such as the littoral combat ship (LCS) and toward high-
end combat capabilities such as the F-35.1 Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
Admiral John Richardson categorized the ensuing debate about the functions of 
presence versus high-end military posture as a “false choice,” asserting that the 
Navy must provide both in a balanced manner.2 However, in an era of budget 
squeezes, marginal trade-offs meant to solve the problem, such as Carter’s Navy 
budget alterations, could result in a Navy that will be able to provide neither to 
a sufficient degree. Decisions on “fleet design” should be informed by an under-
standing of the relationship between forward engagement, in all its forms, and 
combat posture.3 Regarding these two functional elements of the Navy’s mission 
as either mutually exclusive or having a primary/collateral relationship is a recipe 
for strategic error.
Naval officers traditionally have viewed war-fighting readiness and dispersed 
presence as conflicting strategic functions. This view goes all the way back to 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, who wrote:
Police duty, it was called, and quite accurately, for the distribution was that of police, 
not that of a military organization calculated for military use. So American ships, and 
those of other nations, were dotted singly around the world, in separate ports; with 
single beats, like that of a policeman.
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How changed present conditions, how entirely concentration—which is military—
has taken the place of dispersion, it is needless to insist. This is the effect of Naval 
Strategy, adapted to changes in conditions.4
For most of the post–World War II history of the U.S. Navy, the issue of war-
fighting readiness versus presence essentially was moot because fleet size was 
large enough and geopolitical conditions were such that the two functions were 
carried out adequately and appropriately by the array of large combatants that 
constituted the fleet. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, fleet size 
began to shrink as a result of the “peace dividend,” and after the 9/11 attacks the 
geopolitical character of the world changed.
These were tectonic shifts for the Navy, and the previously mooted question 
of presence versus war-fighting posture became relevant again. The tension was 
illustrated by a disagreement that arose in 2005 between the Commander, Fleet 
Forces, Admiral John Nathman, and the Deputy CNO for Operations and Strat-
egy, Vice Admiral John Morgan.5 At the time, two Middle East wars, the require-
ment to secure the homeland from terrorist attack, and a progressively shrinking 
fleet were putting enormous pressure on the Navy. CNO Admiral Mike Mullen 
was searching for some new strategic recipe to reconcile and accommodate all 
the demands.
Admiral Morgan devised what he called the “3/1” strategy, which was really 
a template for fleet design. He depicted it as a sort of Venn diagram, with a large 
circle labeled “Major Contingency Operations” representing war-fighting readi-
ness. On the perimeter of the circle he positioned three smaller circles, labeled 
“Global War on Terror,” “Shaping,” and “Homeland Defense.” These circles only 
partly overlaid the big circle, implying that these missions required forces that 
were not suitable for high-end combat—smaller, cheaper, and thus more numer-
ous units that could generate more widespread presence, among other things.
Admiral Nathman disagreed with the depiction, and in his subsequent brief-
ings showed a slide that moved the smaller circles completely within the large 
one, implying that the forces designed for combat could perform these other mis-
sions as a collateral duty. Nathman’s logic was that if the Navy’s budget is tightly 
constrained, such that a choice between presence and war-fighting capability is 
forced, then war fighting gets the priority. Secretary Carter’s modification of the 
Navy’s budget indicates that this outlook is still held by at least some leaders in 
the Department of Defense, if not by many in the Navy itself.
However, that logic is a bit too simplistic for today’s world. The United States 
does not face a single global competitor as it did during the Cold War, and threats 
to both the homeland and American strategic interests around the world are far 
more diverse and varied than at any time in the past. Conventional forces are 
neither numerous enough nor suitable for addressing all the different threats that 
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confront the nation. The United States needs help from other countries if it is to 
maintain a favorable world order—help at almost all levels of conflict. Constrict-
ing the Navy to a unilateral conventional combat design will compromise its 
ability to conduct the global engagement necessary to create the interoperability 
as well as the trust and confidence needed to obtain that help.
THE ENGAGEMENT LAYER CAKE
The premise of this article is that there is a positive relationship between interna-
tional naval engagement and a robust war-fighting posture. That relationship is 
neither simple nor easy nor straightforward. However, the framework for it can 
be depicted with some clarity via the metaphor of a multitiered cake, each higher 
layer having a smaller diameter than the one below, with diameter denoting the 
number of nations participating. Our cake will consist of five layers, as shown in 
the figure, starting at the top and working down.
The first thing to note is that the prospects for wide international cooperation 
decrease at each higher level of conflict, with war fighting that involves major 
powers featuring either few or no allies. The Navy’s 2007 strategy document en-
titled “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” or CS21, established 
the lowest layer—routine maritime security in defense of the global system of 
commerce and security—as a universal mission.6 However, it also said that in 
times of crisis trust and confidence cannot be surged; they must be built progres-
sively day by day. If the United States and its Navy do this well, then the hoped-
for effect is that the diameter of the upper layers will expand: the United States 
will have more potential coalition partners available. Of course, not every nation 
has the means to join in major naval operations, but this is not necessary to ex-
pand the layer. Supporting functions such as allowing overflights or providing 
basing or simply political support 
can improve the Navy’s prospects 
in combat significantly. These are 
national policy issues, but a strong 
naval relationship can have a posi-
tive influence.
The 9/11 attacks demonstrated 
that terrorists can do serious dam-
age to the nation; the economic and 
political disruptions of the 2001 at-
tacks are being felt still. Whereas in 
the past the threat to the homeland 
was from either nuclear or conven-
tional military forces of another 
Routine Maritime Security Operations
Disaster Response and Peacekeeping
Crisis among Major Powers
Regional Crisis among Small States
High-End
War Fighting
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nation, now terrorism constitutes the main worry. However, whatever the mili-
tary outcomes achieved in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other places, there still 
exists the inherent danger of some previously unknown terrorist organization 
mounting a 9/11-style attack. The air transportation system has been substan-
tially secured, but the nation’s coastline is extensive and the continued flow of 
illegal drugs into the country via the sea serves notice that maritime security 
requires continuing attention. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks the Navy and Coast 
Guard engaged in considerable planning and gaming to concoct a strategy for 
securing America’s coastline. It quickly became clear to both services that there 
were not enough forces to adopt a patrolling strategy. After several years of work-
ing the issue, the only solution that presented itself was a global partnership for 
maritime security among as many world navies as possible. Information sharing, 
lubricated by trust and confidence built through routine and repeated peacetime 
engagement, was key to its effectiveness. However, the invasion of Iraq generated 
a lot of international discomfort with and resentment toward the United States, 
making the securing of such cooperation problematic.
The 2007 CS21, while pitched as a comprehensive new national maritime 
strategy, had an underlying purpose (intended or not) that was relatively narrow: 
to help engender a global maritime partnership that would reduce the chances 
that terrorists could use the seas as avenues of attack on the homeland of the 
United States or those of friendly nations.7 The document called for concentrat-
ing “combat credible” forces in the Middle East and Far East, and distributing 
“mission tailored” forces around the world to conduct engagement and cultivate 
the global maritime security partnership. A key tenet of the document was that, 
as mentioned above, trust and confidence among navies must be built patiently 
day by day and cannot be “surged” in times of crisis.
During the Cold War, U.S. membership in NATO provided the U.S. Navy a 
built-in alliance with European navies, supported by a formalized command 
structure and set doctrine and procedures. In the post–Cold War era, NATO 
nations have reduced their defense spending and have reduced their naval forces 
significantly. Moreover, the locus of potential major-power conflict has shifted 
to the Middle East and East Asia. Outside of defense pacts with Japan, with its 
growing navy, and South Korea and Australia, the United States has little in the 
way of formal arrangements that would underpin joint naval operations. How-
ever, nations such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and even Vietnam possess small 
but potentially significant navies and strategic geography that could be valuable 
to the United States in the event of conflict with China. Similarly, a variety of na-
tions in the Persian Gulf region possess both navies and geography of potential 
utility to the United States if war with Iran breaks out. However, without an alli-
ance structure like NATO’s, the framework for and details of cooperation either 
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must be ad-libbed in crisis (surging trust and confidence) or, preferably, worked 
out deliberately in peacetime.
Most nations not bound into an alliance, while happy to conduct joint training 
with the U.S. Navy, are not anxious to commit to an a priori anti-Iran or anti-
China alliance. However, as Iranian and Chinese aggressiveness build over time, 
the United States needs to weave together as many threads of a naval coalition 
as possible, both to enhance deterrence and to complicate potential opponents’ 
military operations. This fabric must be woven, per the logic of the 2007 CS21, 
gradually over time. Familiarity and confidence that would lead to close coop-
eration in the event of war are never givens; each state will act according to its 
sovereign interests. However, routine and iterative engagement on peacetime 
missions such as maritime security helps increase the odds that effective coopera-
tion at higher levels on the spectrum of conflict will emerge more effectively and 
in a more timely manner.
ENGAGEMENT AS A COMPONENT OF FLEET DESIGN
There are various reasons for a navy to want as many ships as it can get. The tra-
ditional and obvious reason is to outnumber a potential enemy in whatever class 
of ship is regarded as the “counting unit” of seapower. This increases the odds of 
victory in case of war, and thus also presumably enhances deterrence. However, 
if fewer ships can be had, then each one, under this logic, ought to be as powerful 
as possible. This approach makes perfect sense if the key to national security is 
the ability to win a decisive naval battle. Alfred Thayer Mahan advocated such a 
strategy, and in the geopolitical conditions of his day it made sense. It also makes 
sense if one’s ships individually decisively outclass any capability any potential 
enemy could bring to bear. This has been the case with American aircraft carri-
ers up until the last decade or so. They could approach virtually any shore with 
impunity and use their embarked airpower to deter or defeat local aggression. 
However, as they have become fewer in number and threats to them have become 
more credible, the logic of trading numbers for capability is starting to fray.
Another reason for having numerous ships is to be able to bring power and 
influence to bear in multiple locations at the same time. Since its founding, the 
United States routinely has dispersed naval forces around the globe to protect its 
commercial and political interests. Most often, this aspect of naval strategy has 
not required powerful forces, only individual ships or small squadrons. On the 
other hand, during the Cold War, the United States needed powerful forces for 
routine forward presence at multiple locations around Eurasia, and so maintained 
at least fifteen carrier battle groups. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the 
compelling reason to have so many groups, and the number has shrunk gradu-
ally to eleven. There are still reasons to have powerful groups forward, but eleven 
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carriers is not enough to use them as the default presence platform in a strategi-
cally comprehensive manner.
The 9/11 attacks produced a new kind of naval dispersion requirement: global 
maritime security. To protect America’s homeland and those of allies and friends 
from terrorist smuggling via the sea, the entire maritime environment has to be 
secured. As previously stated, the 2007 CS21 provided the basis for securing the 
international naval cooperation needed to attain comprehensive maritime secu-
rity. Beyond the interaction of individuals in symposia such as the International 
Seapower Symposium (ISS) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, interna-
tional war games, and personnel exchanges, the Navy found itself conducting 
large numbers of port visits in areas it normally had not frequented, such as the 
littoral of Africa, to increase the capabilities of smaller navies and reinforce com-
mitment and resolve. Initially the Navy conducted such engagements with its 
combatants and amphibious ships, but experience indicated that these smaller 
navies felt intimidated by such ships, so the Navy took to using smaller vessels, 
such as the catamaran high-speed vessel (HSV). This was at least a partial valida-
tion of Vice Admiral Morgan’s “3/1” strategy.
While Al Qaeda may have been crippled over the past fifteen years, it still 
maintains some capability. The rise of the Islamic State and the continuing vi-
ability of the Taliban indicate that maritime security is a strategic naval mission 
that cannot be taken for granted. While enormous gains in the development of a 
global maritime security partnership have been made, the structure is informal 
and voluntary, and so requires continuous effort to keep it going; and because it 
is not yet globally comprehensive, work is needed to bring more navies into the 
framework. While individual and organizational engagement constitutes a large 
part of the effort, ship visits and joint exercises are still required, and these mis-
sions demand a fleet of vessels tailored to the job, in both character and number. 
Given the potential strategic damage that an attack—say, a biological one—from 
the sea could cause, or the impact on the economy of shutting down air traffic 
after an airliner has been brought down by a smuggled man-portable surface-to-
air missile, maritime security is an inherent and critical component of the Navy’s 
strategic mission portfolio, and therefore a necessary component of fleet design.
Cooperation on maritime security is based on a shared unity of purpose 
among nations. As former Colombian CNO Admiral Guillermo Barrera has said, 
“Any nation that benefits from the sea has a responsibility to help secure it.”8 That 
unity of purpose is based on the notion that globalization has created a world 
economic system in which every nation has a stake. But the system is subject to 
any number of threats and disruptions, ranging from maritime piracy to major-
power war. In theory, missions involving defense of the system that occur at any 
level of the layer cake become a responsibility of all nations, contributing as each 
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is able. Such an attitude is strategically important to the United States in its efforts 
both to secure its coasts and to deter aggression by “rogues” and near peers. This 
attitude was evinced to some extent during the Korean War, when twenty-two na-
tions joined the United Nations Command in one way or another. The argument 
advanced by this article is that such cooperation can be made more likely and 
more widespread in the maritime realm by constant engagement and coopera-
tion on maritime security, disaster relief, and a host of other peacetime missions.
The linkage between routine maritime security work and higher levels of con-
flict can be illustrated by a notional example. In the South China Sea there are 
numerous overlapping territorial claims. Currently China is building artificial 
islands to create military bases to back up its extensive—and illegal—claims. 
Southeast Asian nations mostly have small coastal navies that are unable to oper-
ate very far out at sea for very long. One method of maritime security cooperation 
in the capacity-building realm would be for the U.S. Navy to configure one of its 
San Antonio–class amphibious transport docks (LPDs) to function as a mother 
ship or sea base for Philippine, Vietnamese, Bruneian, and other navies’ patrol 
craft to build experience and confidence operating to the limit of their claimed 
exclusive economic zones. Routine operations by a number of nations inside 
contested waters could complicate the politics for China; China’s scope for easy 
expansionism would become more limited if such operations stimulated the 
confidence of Southeast Asian nations and resulted in their developing greater 
war-at-sea capabilities.
A governing concept of engagement is to avoid the perception that the United 
States simply is attempting to drag other nations into its own quarrels or to ad-
vance its own parochial strategic interests. This was a perception problem for 
the Navy in 2003–2006 as it attempted to secure international maritime security 
cooperation in the wake of the Iraq invasion. The United States was seen as an in-
terventionist power pursuing its own agenda, and this interfered with the ability 
of international naval leaders to develop closer ties with the U.S. Navy or to buy 
into the notion of global maritime security cooperation. The 2007 CS21 was able 
to reverse that perception both by involving a range of international navies in its 
development and through its inclusion of (1) the key concepts of defense of the 
global system; (2) the statement that preventing wars is as important as winning 
them; and (3) the framework of globally deployed, mission-tailored forces for 
engagement.9 Efforts such as Secretary Carter’s to curtail engagement capability 
(through reducing the buy of LCSs) to enhance war-fighting posture run counter 
to that concept.
The U.S. Navy’s latest strategy document, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready” (CS21R), is supposed to be a “re-
fresh” to the 2007 CS21. However, in this writer’s view, it is a completely different 
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document with different purposes. Whatever the new document’s virtues with 
respect to its intended purpose (and there are many), some of its language is at 
cross-purposes with the intent of its predecessor and could undermine the Navy’s 
efforts to engender increased levels of international naval cooperation. This con-
cern will not be readily apparent to most who read the new document, as it does 
contain language that calls for such cooperation.10 However, several sections of 
the document contain statements such as “Enhance the ability to command and 
control operations to project power from the sea in contested environments, 
including interoperability with partner nations.”11 There is good reason for the 
U.S. Navy to try to achieve interoperability with other navies for high-end combat 
operations, but CS21R does not distinguish clearly between cooperation for mar-
itime security and cooperation in combat. Other navies will parse the document 
closely, looking for hidden agendas. Conflating all naval cooperation functions 
from low end to high end will spark suspicions that the United States will try to 
drag international navies into wars in which their nations do not want to partici-
pate. This was precisely the problem Admiral Mullen faced back in 2005–2006 
as he attempted to put together the “thousand-ship navy” for maritime security 
purposes. It took the indirect approach of the 2007 CS21 to allay those fears.
This article contends that expanded engagement at lower levels of the engage-
ment layer cake will enhance, over time, the prospects for wider participation in 
higher-tiered missions. However, the process requires patience, commitment, 
and continuity over time to generate trust and confidence. Establishing a sense 
of unity of purpose is critical, and focus on the lower tiers is the most promising 
way to get that process started. As it evolves, work on training and equipping for 
higher-tiered missions can be undertaken as other countries and their navies be-
come politically ready for such moves. Of course, the U.S. Navy already conducts 
extensive engagement activities around the world; the issue is how future fleet 
design will affect the process.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is, of course, simply not the case that the Navy’s high-end power should be de-
signed on the basis of a bottom-up application of the global naval layer cake con-
cept. However, as the Navy gets smaller even as its global commitments remain 
constant or even increase, and as the cost of high-end combat units escalates, the 
Navy has to find relief somewhere. Forward-basing schemes and blue/gold crew-
ing concepts require various regional nations to agree to allow the U.S. Navy to 
establish at least temporary facilities in their territories. At the very least, applica-
tion of the naval engagement layer cake theory could facilitate the statesmanship 
needed to obtain such permission. Success along this line of effort would result 
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in more forward combat power at key locations. But this is more in the way of 
expressing a desired outcome than a recipe for implementation.
An obvious first step is for the Navy, via some new strategy document, to ac-
knowledge the importance of engagement work and to counteract any suspicions 
raised by CS21R. This would be not so much a sop to foreign navies as a course 
change to the internal culture of the Navy. Here again, quite obviously, the foun-
dation of the Navy ethos is war fighting and the warrior. However, given the long, 
glorious history of the Navy executing both strategic functions, the ethos of the 
naval warrior and that of the naval diplomat can exist side by side, with neither 
diluting the other. A new document must be developed with a clear understand-
ing of its purpose and its intended audience. It should distinguish clearly among 
the levels of naval cooperation and avoid language that could be interpreted as 
default U.S. presumptions of other nations’ policies in particular sets of circum-
stances. Despite its many strengths, CS21R contains such language.
As a midshipman and junior officer, I was taught that a naval officer is ca-
pable of performing literally any task that might come along—sort of a glorious 
amateur, in the Royal Navy tradition. And in fact, I have witnessed naval officers 
of all designators performing brilliantly in positions and situations way outside 
their backgrounds and training. That said, if the Navy is to take the engagement 
function seriously, it should have a cadre of personnel who can build progressive 
professional experience over time, allowing them to perform in a more sophisti-
cated manner than would be possible on a one-tour basis. It does not seem neces-
sary to establish a new designator when the Navy has at its disposal the existing 
foreign area officer (FAO) program. This program could be modified to include 
enlisted personnel and involve progressive assignments that would include mis-
sion command of partnership stations and perhaps command of HSVs or other 
ships that are most appropriate for engagement missions. A full definition of the 
engagement function could include designated flag billets, providing a viable 
promotion path for FAOs.
The big question in the minds of many is whether the Navy ought to divert 
shipbuilding and other programmatic resources to the engagement mission. 
The fear of those who regard such work as collateral is that any such diversion 
of resources will reduce unwisely the number of combatants the Navy has—a 
legitimate fear in a highly constrained budget environment. There are two ways 
of addressing this concern. First, as it happens, the Navy already has made a pro-
gram decision to procure a number of HSVs for logistic work, and already they 
have proved useful as platforms for various partnership station initiatives in Latin 
America and Africa. They are relatively cheap and the Navy is getting double use 
from them, as both a useful logistic platform and a useful engagement platform. 
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In the future, the Navy might get an additional use from them if a variety of anti-
ship and other missiles are containerized. The HSVs could become lethal com-
batants for specific purposes in specific areas under the emerging “distributed 
lethality” concept.12
There is also the matter of day-to-day execution of the layer cake theory. All 
the sea services must work together to make the process yield results. Wide dis-
persion of forces is necessary to conduct the engagement that widens the lower 
layers, but even with full Navy buy-in of the engagement function, ships and other 
resources still will be relatively scarce. A strategy must be developed for focusing 
resources where they will do the most good on a global basis. Not long after the 
issuance of the 2007 CS21, the Navy established the Global Engagement Strategy 
Division (N52), which was supposed to do that very thing. However, despite a 
good start, it was populated subsequently with desk officers whose purpose was 
to prepare the CNO for foreign engagements, thus changing the division’s focus 
from planning to execution. The Navy’s current force-distribution strategy is to 
“satisfice” combatant commander (COCOM) demands as best it can, but there is 
no global vision behind this, since each COCOM is interested almost exclusively 
in conditions in his theater. Most recently, the Navy’s “supply side” deployment 
scheme is based on availability of forces rather than strategy, and is receiv-
ing pushback from the COCOMs.13 The Navy must rehabilitate the strategy- 
development function of N52 so it can arm the CNO with arguments for force 
distribution that may not accord with COCOM requests for forces.
Normally, engagement is regarded as what forward-deployed forces do on a 
day-to-day peacetime basis. However, there is more to it. Foreign naval officers 
attend U.S. Navy education and training courses, and any number of naval train-
ing and education activities are undertaken in foreign countries. These are rela-
tively inexpensive measures compared with ship visits and exercises. The Navy 
ought to take more advantage of its shore establishment, especially by including 
such activities in its global engagement strategy. Clearly, such activities must be 
coordinated with COCOM theater security cooperation plans and policies, but—
unlike the distribution of forces afloat—the Navy has near-definitive authority 
for planning and executing them. Part of this branch of global naval engagement 
is the biennial ISS held at the Naval War College. Increasing attendance since 
the issuance of the 2007 CS21 has been an indicator of the health of the global 
maritime security partnership. In 2009–11, then-CNO Gary Roughead linked 
international war gaming conducted by the Naval War College to the ISS, with 
significant benefit. This linkage ought to be renewed, and a strategy for using the 
ISS to advance maritime security cooperation developed.
Finally, even if the Navy leverages the FAO corps for leadership in the en-
gagement function, the operant element of Navy culture is that diplomacy and 
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engagement are everybody’s business, from seaman to admiral. In the day-to-
day process of honing the Navy’s combat prowess, care should be taken to avoid 
presumptions that foreign navies might construe as arrogance. This is part and 
parcel of Theodore Roosevelt’s admonition that the United States should speak 
softly but carry a big stick. The Navy is precisely the big stick Roosevelt had in 
mind, but without deft international statesmanship on the part of all naval of-
ficers and sailors, that stick becomes increasingly brittle. To secure maximum 
international cooperation in times of crisis and war, patient, steady attention to 
the engagement function in peacetime will pay dividends. This is the connection 
between maritime security and naval war fighting.
N O T E S
 1. Secretary of Defense, “Navy Program Bal-
ance,” memorandum for the Secretary of the 
Navy, 14 December 2015, available at news 
.usni.org/.
 2. Adm. John Richardson, “A Navy in Balance? 
A Conversation with Chief of Naval Opera-
tions Admiral John Richardson,” American 
Enterprise Institute, 12 February 2016, www 
.aei.org/.
 3. For fleet design, see Adm. John Richardson, 
“A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superi-
ority,” January 2016, available at www.navy 
.mil/.
 4. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Strategy 
Compared and Contrasted with the Principles 
and Practice of Military Operations on Land: 
Lectures Delivered at U.S. Naval War College, 
Newport, R.I., between the Years 1887 and 
1911 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1911), p. 5.
 5. The description of this disagreement is 
based on personal observation by the author, 
who was then chairman of the War Gaming 
Department and later dean of the Center for 
Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War  
College.
 6. J. T. Conway, G. Roughead, and T. W. Allen, 
“A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower,” October 2007, available at www 
.navy.mil/; repr. Naval War College Review 61, 
no. 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 7–19.
 7. For a more extensive account of the develop-
ment of CS21 and a strategic analysis of its 
logic, see Robert C. Rubel, The Home Fleet: 
Pivot of Maritime Strategy, Corbett Centre 
Paper 16 (London: King’s College London, 
May 2015), available at www.kcl.ac.uk/.
 8. Adm. Guillermo Barrera, discussion with the 
author, Bogotá, Colombia, ca. 2009.
 9. The author directed the Naval War College 
research and gaming effort that underpinned 
development of the 2007 CS21. At subsequent 
International Seapower Symposia, a number 
of foreign heads of navies told the author that 
the document provided top cover with their 
respective governments, allowing them more 
easily and fully to cooperate with the U.S. Navy.
 10. J. F. Dunford, J. W. Greenert, and P. F. Zukunft, 
“A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready,” March 
2015, pp. 13–18, available at www.navy.mil/.
 11. Ibid., p. 34. See also statements on pp. 8, 9, 33.
 12. See Vice Adm. Thomas Rowden, Rear Adm. 
Peter Gumataotao, and Rear Adm. Peter 
Fanta, “Distributed Lethality,” U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings 141/1/1,343 (January 
2015), available at www.usni.org/.
 13. Megan Eckstein, “Navy Stands Firm on 
Supply-Based Carrier Presence Model, Joint 
Forces Will Cover Gaps,” USNI News, 10 
September 2015, news.usni.org/.
NWC_Autumn2016Review.indb   29 9/15/16   12:47 PM
35
Naval War College: Autumn 2016 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
Addressing the Mismatch between Requirements and  
Capabilities
Robert C. Owen
Robert C. Owen is a retired U.S. Air Force colonel 
and current professor in the Department of Aero-
nautical Science at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University–Daytona Beach. In this position, he 
teaches courses in manned and unmanned aviation 
operations, law, and history and conducts research 
in national defense policy issues. Professor Owen’s 
military career included operational assignments as 
a C-130 pilot, Air Force and Air Mobility Command 
staff assignments, and educational assignments as 
an assistant professor of history at the U.S. Air Force 
Academy and as dean of the School of Advanced 
Airpower Studies. In addition to numerous articles 
and monographs, his publications include the Chro-
nology volume of the Gulf War Air Power Survey 
(1995), Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective 
Air Campaigning (2000), and Air Mobility: A Brief 
History of the American Experience (2013).
© 2016 by Robert C. Owen
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2016, Vol. 69, No. 4
DISTRIBUTED STOVL OPERATIONS AND  
AIR-MOBILITY SUPPORT
 This article examines the logistical support requirements of distributed short-takeoff–vertical-landing (STOVL) operations (DSOs) by U.S. Marine Corps 
F-35B Lightning II fighters, and alternative solutions to fulfilling those require-
ments. As presently envisioned by Marine planners, DSOs will improve the op-
erational flexibility, survivability, and lethality of F-35Bs by operating them from 
constantly shifting networks of mobile forward arming and refueling points (M-
FARPs). Current Marine Corps planning calls for deployed Marine expeditionary 
brigades (MEBs) to support DSOs both from the 
ships comprising their sea bases and by using their 
organic ground and aviation transportation assets. 
Studies show that this “organic” support concept is 
viable up to a multisquadron scale of operations.
However, this article suggests that a joint lo-
gistics approach based on U.S. Air Force (USAF) 
air-mobility assets can offer significant advantages 
in the flexibility and sustainability of DSOs and 
in reducing their risks, particularly in the face 
of enemies possessing sophisticated antiaccess/
area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. This article 
also assesses that the addition of a medium-sized 
tanker/transport aircraft would greatly enhance 
the capability of the current and planned USAF 
air-mobility fleet to support DSOs at the widest 
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possible range of places that Marine Corps and combatant commanders might 
want to establish M-FARPs. Given the possibility that DSOs may offer the best, 
or even the only, opportunity to base fifth-generation fighters forward in strong 
A2/AD environments, the value of assessing these logistical alternatives is clear.
From an operational and logistical perspective, it is important to understand 
that sustained and successful DSOs will draw on the support of other Marine 
and joint forces and operations. Deception operations in the form of decoy fa-
cilities, along with counterintelligence signals and misinformation, will degrade 
and delay enemy efforts to locate and target active DSO elements with enough 
certainty to justify releases against them of high-value, short-supply weapons 
systems. Marine and host-nation security, combat-engineering, and logistics sup-
port will be needed to defend and sustain DSO units in the presence of differing 
combinations of enemy air and ground threats. F-35Bs operating from M-FARPs 
will often achieve their best successes as elements of broader air-component 
information, surveillance, reconnaissance, counterair and air-defense missile, 
and counterair operations. Although operating F-35Bs from M-FARPs could 
reduce demands on air-refueling (AR) forces, tanker support also can enhance 
the operational advantages of forward basing. Thus, while this article focuses on 
M-FARP logistics, logistical and operational planners should be aware of the full 
contexts and costs of such operations.
CONCEPT AND OPERATIONAL VIABILITY
Marine Corps planners expect DSOs to enhance the depth and power of F-35B 
operations through frequent and unpredictable relocation of their bases. More 
specifically, the 2015 Marine Aviation Plan explains that “DSO asymmetrically 
moves inside of the enemy targeting cycle by using multiple mobile forward 
arming and refueling points . . . [u]sing existing infrastructure (multi-lane roads, 
small airfields, damaged main bases) . . . [to provide] strategic depth and op-
erational resiliency to the joint force . . . [and provide] the Marine Air-Ground 
Task Force (MAGTF) with game-changing strategic access inside of the enemy 
weapons engagement zone.”1 The success of the concept, therefore, rests on the 
ability of Marine commanders to shift force elements among networks of austere 
bases faster than enemies can locate, target, and release attacks against them.2 
These MAGTF assets may include actual and decoy M-FARPs, sea bases, mobile 
distribution sites (MDSs) linking sea bases to M-FARPs logistically, and the full 
range of MAGTF air transport, amphibious craft, and trucks to maintain robust 
supply flows.3
Consider a conflict with China in the western Pacific as a potential—although 
one hopes an unlikely—worst case. This scenario offers insight into the viability 
of the DSO concept. Most importantly, China’s capacity to launch long-range 
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strikes against fleeting targets decreases significantly over distance. (1) Out to 
about four hundred nautical miles (nm) from its land bases, China can launch 
powerful, robust, all-capabilities (cyber, space, air, naval, and special-operations) 
“gorilla” strikes.4 These capabilities draw on magazines of about twelve hundred 
short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), several hundred medium-range ballistic 
missiles (MRBMs), hundreds of cruise missiles, and around 2,100 (six hundred 
modern) combat aircraft. (2) Beyond the “gorilla ring,” however, China’s strike 
capabilities shrink to its MRBMs and cruise missiles, a few squadrons of me-
dium bombers, and whatever fighter forces its limited AR fleet can project. (3) 
Beyond a thousand miles from the homeland, China’s standoff strike capabilities 
are limited to cruise missiles carried by surface ships, submarines, and handfuls 
of air-refueled bombers, all operating at great risk in contested battle zones and 
generally far from their weapons-reload facilities.
China’s ability to provide timely targeting data for M-FARP attacks also de-
creases quickly with increased distance from the homeland. Within the range of 
gorilla strikes, for example, China could search for DSO forces with a layered and 
robust network of information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. 
These would include satellite-borne radar, optical, and other sensors; seaborne 
and airborne line-of-sight radar and optical systems; special operations forces 
(SOF); local fifth columnists; and even news reporters looking for scoops. Al-
though some or all of these capabilities would be vulnerable to degradation or 
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destruction by U.S. and allied attacks, they could for some periods provide near-
continual, although not always detailed, surveillance of selected areas of interest.
Beyond the gorilla ring, however, China’s ISR capabilities would reside in a 
less-complete array of systems. These would consist of space and airborne sys-
tems, which would be sporadic, limited, or both in their ability to detect small 
and fleeting targets and subject to interference or interdiction; over-the-horizon, 
high-frequency radars, which are limited in their locational accuracy and target 
discrimination; and perhaps SOF and fifth-column elements, which would op-
erate under significant limitations on their movements and communications.5 
Even in the face of an enemy possessing a strong suite of these capabilities, such 
as China, the Marine DSO study anticipates that the daily shifting of actual and 
decoy M-FARPs could allow them to evade detection for six to nine hours from 
the time they set up for a new day’s operations.6 Given the frequent relocations of 
these FARPs, the short ti me spans for which aircraft would occupy them, and the 
ability of M-FARP ground crews to disperse aircraft service points at random, in-
formation that was six to nine hours old would be stale and unusable for targeting 
long-range systems at M-FARPs with any confidence of actually hitting anything 
of value. Under such circumstances, DSO forces could do their jobs and survive.
Finally, some assessments of China’s decision-making and command-and-
control (C2) cultures offer additional hope for the success of DSOs. Given the 
limited supply and strategic importance of China’s long-range missile and aircraft- 
attack systems, there is good reason to anticipate that the country’s leaders would 
be reluctant to expend them on elusive M-FARPs that might or might not have 
aircraft on them when their warheads struck. They might think it better to hold 
back those weapons for use against targets of greater operational and strategic 
value, such as C2 centers, major air bases, aircraft carriers, supply ships, and 
fixed surface-to-air missile sites. Also, a number of experts on Chinese strategic 
issues recognize significant disconnects in trust, understanding, goals, and coor-
dination between and within Chinese civil and military elites. These disconnects 
could delay or block weapons-release decisions against difficult or lesser-value 
targets.7 For instance, civil leaders determined to preserve the deterrent value of 
the few hundred DF-21 MRBMs in their arsenal might refuse military requests 
to use them in speculative attacks against troublesome M-FARPs. In a major 
conflict, these weapon-management and civil-military disconnects probably 
would not provide reliable sanctuary for DSO units, but they might help delay or 
minimize the frequency, weight, and timeliness of attacks against them.
LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES
Given reasonable expectations that DSOs can be executed successfully, logistics 
emerges as a critical challenge to the concept’s viability. DSOs involve a lot of 
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moving parts, substantial supply requirements, and shifting lines of communica-
tion. The recent Marine Corps study of the organic transportation assets available 
to a MEB to support DSOs reveals just how big and complex the logistical chal-
lenge can be (see figure 2).
The study was based on a reinforced complement of thirty-six F-35Bs op-
erating from a MEB sea base or an expeditionary airfield and supported by an 
onshore network of three MDSs, each supporting an operational M-FARP, plus 
one setting up and another breaking down.8 For logistics-planning purposes, the 
study postulated that the air-combat element would launch twenty-eight aircraft 
daily, each flying an initial combat air patrol sortie, refueling and rearming at an 
M-FARP, flying another sortie, resetting again at an M-FARP, flying a third sortie, 
and then recovering to the sea base. Each F-35 would load missiles and six tons of 
fuel after each sortie. Together, then, the three M-FARPs would require resupply 
of 336 tons of fuel and up to 280 tons of containerized munitions each day.
Depending on the number of transportation and other vehicles deployed 
ashore to connect the MDSs to their M-FARPs, and on whether the F-35s bed-
ded down on the sea base or an expeditionary airfield ashore, the total tonnage 
of fuel required to support the ground and air elements of DSOs would range 
from 544 to 1,337 tons per day, plus the nonfuel sustainment requirements of 
shore complements ranging from eight hundred to eighteen hundred personnel.9 
Zone 1               Zone 2         
Zone 3                     
 
M-FARP Team (normally 
two supporting ongoing 
operations and two 
moving, resting, or 





Robert C. Owen, 2015 
Figure 2: Air mobility-supported 
M-FARP laydown map 
FIGURE 2
AIR MOBILITY–SUPPORTED M-FARP LAYDOWN MAP
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Whatever the basing model, satisfying these requirements likely would consume 
the lift capacity of almost all of a MEB’s rotary-wing transport aircraft (CH-53Ks 
and MV-22s), amphibious craft, and trucks.10
Consequently, relying on MEB organic transportation assets to support DSOs 
could pose significant operational risks for Marine and joint commanders. Most 
importantly, tying DSOs to organic capabilities could limit the operational flex-
ibility and overall responsiveness of the MAGTF in an unfolding campaign. 
Tailoring the MAGTF to support such an unusually large complement of F-35s 
likely would require leaving some of its normal complements of air- and ground-
combat and support assets and personnel ashore to make room for additional 
F-35Bs and their support equipment and personnel. That, and the debarkation 
of so many vehicles and personnel ashore, could increase the time needed for the 
MAGTF to reconfigure and deploy for other missions elsewhere in a theater of 
operations.
An “organic” approach to DSO support also would increase the vulnerability 
of sea bases and transportation connectors to detection and attack. Trucks driv-
ing perhaps hundreds of miles between MDSs and shifting M-FARPs would be 
subject to the normal hazards of travel on sometimes primitive road systems, 
and vulnerable to long-range attacks at choke points and to harassment by SOF 
and locals sympathetic or beholden to the enemy. The short operating ranges of 
amphibious craft and CH-53 and MV-22 rotary-wing aircraft carrying externally 
slung loads of fuel bladders and missile containers would restrict the maneuver 
space available to ships in the sea base to within twenty-five to fifty nautical miles 
of their supported MDSs.11 Thus, enemies detecting the presence of M-FARPs in 
an area would not have very far to look for their support ships, MDSs, and choke 
points along surface lines of communication. Reasonably, they would realize 
that striking those relatively fixed and thus vulnerable targets would be a more 
remunerative strategy for shutting down DSOs than expending precious ISR and 
long-range strike assets to snipe at elusive M-FARPs.
OPTIONS FOR MITIGATING LOGISTICAL RISKS
There are at least three options for reducing the logistical risks inherent in DSOs.
First, the Marine Corps could increase the size of supporting sea bases. For 
example, adding the twenty-aircraft capacity of an America-class amphibious 
FIGURE 3
NOTIONAL F-35B COMBAT AIR PATROL SCHEDULE 
CAP CAP CAP
Ship ShipFARP FARP
Source: System Planning and Analysis, “STOVL Operations,” p. 37.
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assault ship (LHA) to a sea base could allow a MEB to support expanded F-35B 
operations with minimal reconfiguration of its other ships. The MEB, conse-
quently, would remain ready for quick application to other missions.
Second, the Marines could allocate KC-130Js to carry some or all aviation 
sustainment supplies directly into supported M-FARPs. The KC-130s’ ability to 
operate on multilane highways, damaged air bases, or unpaved airstrips would 
allow them to deliver support directly to or very near almost any location em-
ployed by F-35Bs. The advantages of this approach would be a reduction in shore 
complements and the risks associated with surface transportation between MDSs 
and M-FARPs.
The third option would be for Marines to draw on Air Force air-mobility as-
sets to provide direct or near-direct support to the M-FARPs. The obvious advan-
tage of this is that the air component’s tanker and transport forces have greater 
range and capacity than organic Marine lift assets.
Each of these options offers significant advantages to DSO planners; but they 
also present significant concerns.
Expanding sea bases to support F-35B operations would present commanders 
with several operational and risk challenges. The first is finding a “spare” LHA 
and supporting ships somewhere in the world that could arrive on the scene of 
DSOs in a timely manner without imposing offsetting risks on the readiness of 
other MAGTFs. However, even presuming that operational urgency justified 
such a move, expanding a sea base would not mitigate the vulnerability of its 
ships or of the MEB’s transportation assets ashore to long-range attack. In short, 
bringing in additional ships would be more about preserving the flexibility and 
responsiveness of the MAGTF than about improving the viability of DSOs.
FIGURE 4
Two J-35Bs prepare to refuel from a Marine KC-130J 
USMC photo
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Although applying Marine KC-130Js to M-FARP support could both enhance 
MAGTF readiness and reduce risks, the Marine airlift fleet generally is inadequate 
to the task. C-130J payload-distance characteristics often will fall short of need 
in theaters that are geographically expansive, such as the Asia-Pacific and Africa. 
For illustration, “Js” flying unrefueled, 2,800 nm round-trip missions between 
Tinian, an island outside the range of China’s current MRBMs and land-based 
cruise missiles, and M-FARPs on the Philippine island of Luzon could deliver a 
maximum load of fifteen tons per sortie. C-130s operating from expeditionary 
bases outside the range of Chinese gorilla strikes but within range of heavy mis-
sile attacks—say, over the 1,380 nm round-trip between General Santos Airport 
in southern Mindanao and the Luzon M-FARPs—could deliver twenty-two tons 
per sortie. From a conservative estimate that air transports would have to deliver 
about 666 tons of cargo per day (336 for aviation fuel, 280 for munitions, fifty 
for all else), the impact of the distances involved and the C-130’s payload-range 
performance becomes clear. On the basis of the data in table 1, a presumption of 
only one sortie per day per aircraft, and an 80 percent aircraft availability rate, the 
Marines would have to deploy fifty-six of their worldwide fleet of around sixty 
KC-130Js to support the Luzon M-FARPs. Assuming the same data, except now 
a two-sortie-per-day rate, twenty-eight C-130s would be needed to support the 
mission from Mindanao. Moreover, those C-130 units probably would have to 
conduct their own version of DSOs to survive operations within the enemy mis-
sile ring, with all the logistical burdens that would imply.12
It is also worth considering that, while the cargo decks of KC-130s would be 
capable of accommodating all the sustainment supplies and most of the vehicles 
M-FARPs would need, they would not be capable of handling some critical as-
sets. These would include LVSR SIXCON refuelers (critical for getting fuel across 
rough terrain), fully assembled seven-ton trucks, and all-terrain forklifts. They 
also could not carry slat-armored light assault vehicles and some civil engineer-
ing equipment that might be needed to open and defend M-FARPs and lines 
of communication. The reality is that the Marine C-130 fleet is too small and 
limited in its cargo-handling features to deploy and sustain DSOs fully under the 
circumstances discussed above.
At first glance, the big transports and tanker/transports in the Air Force’s 
global fleet appear to be a ready solution to the problem of reducing risks to 
sea bases and personnel during DSOs. Consisting of around 220 C-17 and 350 
C-130 transports and fifty-nine KC-10 and four hundred KC-135 tankers, with 
KC-46 tankers to be added soon, the gross capacity of the mobility fleet dwarfs 
the most ambitious DSO requirements. Ten KC-46s flying 1.5 missions per day 
out of Tinian, for instance, could satisfy the 666-ton logistical requirements of 
the notional Luzon M-FARPs, and offer the added flexibility of aerial refueling.13 
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Flying the same profiles, seven C-17s could do the job, although without offer-
ing the AR option. In combination, then, relatively small numbers of Air Force 
air-mobility aircraft could obviate the need to keep sea bases close to shore and 
to put hundreds of Marines at risk driving and protecting trucks between MDSs 
and M-FARPs.
Unfortunately, the interplay of the payload-range and airfield infrastructure 
requirements of the Air Force’s current and planned air-mobility fleet would 
limit its ability to support directly the austere M-FARP clusters favored by DSO 
planners. The big C-17s in the fleet can bring a lot of fuel and supplies into 
short and unsurfaced or weakly paved runways; however, just a few landing and 
takeoff passes will render such airstrips unusable through rutting and gouging.14 
Air Force C-130s could get into most M-FARPs, but they would suffer the same 
range, payload, and cargo-dimension limitations as their Marine cousins. Even 
worse, from a DSO perspective, all Air Force long-range tankers are modified 
airliners. As such, they are efficient load carriers, but capable of operating only 
from first-class airfields possessing long, hard-surfaced runways, taxiways, and 
parking areas. In many cases, therefore, joint air components will not be capable 
of transporting adequate amounts of cargo and fuel over theater distances and de-
livering them directly into M-FARPs. To the extent that these shortfalls in direct 
delivery capacity oblige MAGTF commanders still to put people and vehicles on 
the ground to move supplies from MDSs and big airfields to M-FARPs, the op-
portunities offered by air mobility to enhance operational flexibility and reduce 
risks will be lost.
MITIGATING THE AIR-MOBILITY SHORTFALL
Despite its present limitations, the potential of air-mobility support to mitigate 
the operational and logistical risks of DSOs justifies a search for ways to mitigate 
its inadequacies in support of M-FARPs. Of course, to be useful in the current 
financial environment, any opportunity considered must prima facie promise to 
improve operational capabilities significantly while imposing minimal or even 
reduced burdens on defense budgets.
These considerations suggest at least two courses of action worth pursuing.
First, Marine and Air Force logistical and operational experts must figure 
out how to get the most from the existing air-mobility fleet in the DSO context. 
This effort must include studies, discussions, and exercises that examine the full 
operational, logistical, and threat contexts of DSOs in the presence of moderate-
to-high A2/AD threats. Such a learning process would improve the ability of all 
parties to use creative combinations of Marine and Air Force lift assets to conduct 
DSOs in a wider range of places than currently possible, and burden the budget 
only with the costs of thinking and training.
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Second, the joint community should consider adjusting the air-mobility fleet 
to include an increment of aircraft better suited to support DSOs. At minimum, 
such an aircraft should have payload-range and cargo cabin dimensions suitable 
for transporting all DSO logistical requirements over strategic distances (mean-
ing from bases outside the range of all, or at least most, enemy missile and aircraft 
strikes) and delivering them directly to or very near M-FARPs. Support from 
such an aircraft would allow Marine commanders to conduct maximal DSOs 
from the widest range of locations. Such aircraft also would improve the mobility 
fleet’s capacity to support other operations requiring logistical throughput di-
rectly to points of need/employment, such as Army and Marine deep-maneuver 
operations, and resupply of air bases damaged or under the threat of damage by 
enemy A2/AD operations.15 The utility and survivability of such a system would 
be further enhanced if it also possessed AR capabilities.
CASE STUDY
This section presents a case study to illustrate the leverage provided by a medium-
weight, austere airfield–capable tanker/transport aircraft to DSOs. It is simplistic; 
clearly a full analysis of all the relevant mobility options available is beyond the 
scope of this article. But by providing an analysis of the effect of integrating Air-
bus A400Ms into DSOs, it should at least illustrate the value of this type of aircraft 
to operations in regions characterized by sparse airfield infrastructures.
The A400M is an “outsize” military transport/tanker aircraft capable of oper-
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In airlift parlance, outsize 
refers to an aircraft that 
has larger cargo deck 
cross-section dimen-
sions than a standard 
m i l i t ar y  4 6 3 L  c argo 
pallet. In this case, the 
A400’s cabin, includ-
ing the loading ramp, is 
74ʹ length × 13ʹ width 
× 12.6 ʹ  height (mini-
mum), while a standard-
length Marine Corps 
C-130J’s similar dimen-
sions are 50ʹ × 10ʹ × 9ʹ, including the loading ramp. The A400M’s greater internal 
volume and up to forty-one-ton payload enable it to carry all the logistic vehicles, 
engineering equipment, and combat vehicles that DSOs are likely to require.
A400s provide a valid—and, realistically speaking, an unavoidable—baseline 
for this analysis, not because it is impossible to imagine a better design for DSO 
support, but because A400s offer the only option in this class of aircraft likely to 
be available to the U.S. Air Force for the next twenty or more years. The mori-
bund Antonov AN-70 and the developmental Xian Y-20 are in the same class as 
the A400M, but are not likely candidates for the United States to acquire. For its 
part, the Air Force abandoned successful programs to develop outsize, short-
takeoff-or-landing transports, the YC-14 and YC-15, in the late 1970s in favor of 
developing the C-17, a design that represented a greater trade-off of short-field 
capabilities for increased range and payload. While the service has studied the 
issue numerous times since, it has taken no concrete action to develop a new 
type of theater airlifter. Similarly, tanker aircraft based on repurposed airliner 
designs are not suitable. Importantly, one of the Air Force’s most recent assess-
ments of options for acquiring a new theater airlifter found that even a modest 
acquisition program carried thirty-year life-cycle costs of $62–$128 billion. The 
Air Force’s study also found that purchasing an outsize “conventional takeoff and 
landing” aircraft (one possessing performance characteristics similar to those of 
the A400M) was the least expensive near-term option for enhancing support for 
Army deep-maneuver forces, apart from simply buying more C-17s and C-130s.16 
So, the analysis below is based on the A400M, in full awareness that the other 
option—building a new aircraft—remains on the table, although the experience 
of acquiring the C-17 suggests it could take ten to fifteen or more years from 
program approval to get the first squadron operationally ready.
FIGURE 6
A400M refueling F-18s 
Airbus Defense and Space 2015; Photo by Master Films / A. Doumenjou, used with permission
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The case examined here is postulated on an escalating conflict over Chinese 
base building and oil drilling in the South China Sea, and efforts by the com-
mander of U.S. Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM) to deter Chinese action. 
In such a situation, if deterrence fails, CDRUSPACOM will want to have forces 
postured to seize the operational initiative anywhere along the Pacific Rim. Ac-
cordingly, CDRUSPACOM orders his Marine component commander to posture 
his on-scene MEB to support a reinforced component of thirty-six F-35Bs for 
high-intensity DSOs from a network of M-FARPs (see figure 2) on the island 
of Luzon. These operations could range from presence patrols over the central 
South China Sea to strike operations on its periphery. The PACOM commander 
further orders that the F-35Bs available be deployed as rapidly as possible, even as 
the MEB continues its organization and embarkation activities at Guam. Seeking 
further to preserve the readiness of the MEB for rapid movements in response 
to unfolding events, CDRUSPACOM directs his air-component commander to 
deploy an expeditionary group of A400Ms to an agile base complex around the 
Bohol Sea area to deploy and sustain DSO units and operations to the north.17 
As part of this commitment, the A400M force also will conduct AR operations in 
the vicinity of refueling track 1 (RT 1), west of the F-35B FARP complex. As soon 
as possible, the MEB and its sea base position themselves in a relatively secure 
maneuver area east of the central Philippines, from where rotary-wing assets can 
move relief personnel, fresh food, aircraft parts, and other light items to and from 
the M-FARPs.
Given this complex set of requirements, the Marines would posture their DSO 
force to reflect the robust air-mobility support available. Accordingly, the force 
laydown does not include MDSs and long road lines of communication between 
them and the M-FARPs. Few or no dedicated long-haul transportation assets go 
ashore. Instead, the Marine commander plans on air-deploying four complete 
M-FARP teams from Guam to Luzon, each postured to support up to twenty-
four F-35B sorties per day from highway airstrips, and possessing the organic 
transportation assets needed to be fully mobile, including rolling storage of a 
day’s supply of fuel and munitions. With all assets and supplies on vehicles, each 
M-FARP team is capable of breaking down and departing an M-FARP site in one 
hour, driving up to twenty miles to a new site in another hour, and setting back up 
for operations in a third hour. Thus, each M-FARP is expected to shift locations at 
least daily. Generally, any two M-FARP teams can support the pace of sustained 
F-35B patrol operations while the others are in motion or resting their personnel. 
All might be required to support offensive and defensive surges, but only for a few 
hours per day. The general complement of each M-FARP team is 150–60 person-
nel, four heavy LVSR SIXCON refueling trucks, sixteen seven-ton cargo trucks, 
eight MK970 five-thousand-gallon refueling trailers, thirty-three vehicles of the 
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high-mobility multipurpose vehicle type, a large all-terrain forklift, and about a 
dozen miscellaneous trailers.18
The A400Ms working out of the Bohol Sea area turn out to be well suited to 
the mission of supporting DSOs. About twenty-eight A400M sorties suffice to 
move the 750 tons or so of vehicles and supplies needed to put an M-FARP in 
place and ready for the first day’s operation.19 A modest commitment of twenty 
A400Ms based around the Bohol Sea area could transport the first M-FARP team 
from Guam to Luzon in twenty-four hours, and move all four teams in just over 
three days. Once full-scale operations began, as few as ten to twelve A400M sor-
ties per day could deliver the 666 tons of daily replenishment supplies needed by 
the M-FARP teams to support a combined daily tempo of twenty-eight F-35B 
missions, each stopping twice at an M-FARP to pick up full loads of fuel and mu-
nitions (see figure 3). Further, since these aircraft deliver their loads directly to, 
or very near to, the FARPs, their use eliminates the need to keep sea bases close 
inshore for their short-range amphibious and rotary-wing connectors to supple-
ment the bulk logistics flow, and they eliminate the need for long, potentially 
vulnerable overland supply routes.
In comparison with the scenario laid out above, an effort to move and sustain 
this force by a combination of C-17s and C-130s would be more complex, would 
involve more sorties, and would increase operational risk. Moving the four M-
FARP teams from Guam directly to their initial operational locations would 
require approximately 176 KC-130 sorties, plus a significant number of A400Ms 
or C-17s to move vehicles too large or too heavy to fit into a C-130.20 Relying on 
C-17s to deploy the M-FARP teams and their daily supply requirements would 
greatly reduce the required sorties for the mission; but there are only eight devel-
oped airfields on Luzon capable of handling C-17s on a sustained basis; all are in 
or near major cities; and most have limited parking areas.21 So aircraft flying into 
them on a repetitive basis would be visible to hundreds of thousands of people 
with cell phones, including many enemy nationals, and they would park at easily 
predicted and targeted spots.22 Conducting sustained resupply operations into 
those airfields would undermine the flexibility and security of the MAGTF and 
its sea base by obliging it to debark substantial numbers of vehicles and person-
nel to transport supplies out to M-FARPs that could be a hundred miles or more 
away from an active aerial port of debarkation. A DSO logistics concept based 
on even minimal use of major airfields, therefore, might force sea bases back 
inshore to support the increased supply flows incumbent in the enlarged ground 
transportation effort, or drastically increase the amount of airlift required. In 
either case, much of the logistical, operational, and security benefits to be gained 
by bringing Air Force air-mobility aircraft into the picture would be lost.
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An additional benefit of operating out-
size transport/tankers from the agile base 
network around the Bohol Sea would be the 
availability of AR support for the F-35Bs. 
Presuming, as an example, a sequence of 
three four-plane formations taking off at 
one-hour intervals to provide continu-
ous coverage in one area, and potentially 
expending their advanced medium-range 
air-to-air missiles (i.e., AMRAAMs) on each 
sortie, the operational profile could look like 
this: each formation would depart the sea 
base, top off its fuel from A400Ms at RT 1 
(see figure 7), patrol for one hour, proceed 
to an M-FARP for fuel and reloads, proceed 
back to its patrol area for an hour, return 
again to the M-FARP, patrol again for forty-
five minutes, top off at RT 1, and then fly 
back to the sea base. Flying this pattern, the 
three formations would produce 2.8 hours 
of on-station time for each flight and cover the patrol area for 8.5 hours. For their 
part, the tankers would land at the M-FARPs as necessary to off-load munitions 
and recharge fuels-support vehicles. The basic logistics effort would be as follows.
Using the data in table 1, the chart below reflects the comparative capabili-









Figure 7: FARP scenario map FIGURE 7
FARP SCENARIO MAP
Munitions required at M-FARPs 117 tons
Fuel required at M-FARPs 106 tons
AR fuel required (before first orbit and after last) 77 tons
Aircraft A400M KC-130J
Sorties required  9  18
Aircraft required  7  15
Fuel consumed by tanker/transport aircraft (thousand lbs.)  333  384
Ratio of fuel consumed / delivered to F-35Bs  .86  1.06
Required tanker/transport parking spots at each M-FARP  1  2
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LIGHTNING RAIDS
Before summarizing the implications of this discussion of the integration of 
common-user air-mobility support into the DSO concept, it will be valuable 
to consider an important variation on that theme: the raid. There is a long his-
tory of air forces extending the practical depth of their offensive operations by 
teaming transports and tactical aircraft to establish temporary operating loca-
tions from which to conduct small-scale raids deep into enemy territories. The 
Marines, of course, are zealous practitioners of the art. Recently, the U.S. Air 
Force and Royal Air Force (RAF) have revived their interests in this concept. 
USAF experiments with the “Rapid-X” concept involve pairing two to four 
fighters with a single C-17 carrying the personnel, equipment, fuel, and muni-
tions needed to generate sorties from isolated locations. Often this team would 
conduct operations in a “flex basing” mode: sitting at a particular airfield just 
long enough to launch a few sorties, then moving on to another location— 
always a step ahead of an enemy’s targeting cycle.23 Similarly, the RAF has re-
ceived briefings from Airbus Defense and Space Corporation on using A400Ms 
to support forward fighter operations. In the Airbus scenario, an individual 
A400M or teams of them would deploy to austere, forward airfields, each with 
enough fuel and munitions to regenerate two to four fighters for an additional 
strike sortie. By eliminating return trips to distant main bases for rearming, this 
concept can nearly double the number of strike sorties available from a given 
force of F-35Bs over given spans of time, while nearly halving the amount of fuel 
burned.24
Once again, medium-weight, short-field tanker/transport aircraft offer at-
tractive opportunities to exploit these linked transport-fighter and forward-
operating-location concepts. Teams of A400M-equivalent aircraft and F-35Bs 
could operate into and from asphalt and concrete runways and highway strips of 
four thousand feet in length or less, presuming the fighters used vertical-rolling-
takeoff-and-landing (VRL) procedures.25 A pairing of C-17s and conventional- 
takeoff-and-landing F-35As and Cs, in comparison, would need runways ap-
proximately seven thousand feet in length for conventional fighter takeoffs and 
landings, and with high load-bearing capacities to accommodate the heavy trans-
ports. C-130s can match the airfield performance of the A400M, of course, but 
their operational radii generally would be smaller in support of DSOs, and they 
would require more sorties to support a given effort.
IMPLICATIONS
Particularly if they are augmented by medium-weight, austere airfield–capable 
tanker/transports, the potential benefits of using Air Force air-mobility forces to 
support DSOs include these:
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1. Providing a flexible and reliable option for supporting DSOs in a wide 
range of situations
2. Preserving the operational readiness of an embarked MEB by substantially 
reducing the size of the onshore forces needed to support DSOs
3. Reducing the vulnerability of the sea base and onshore forces to A2/AD 
threats
4. Reducing the need to move carrier battle groups into forward threat zones 
to extend their strike range, contribute to extended deterrence, or protect 
Marines ashore
5. Facilitating flexible deterrence by permitting the placement of strong 
and survivable air forces inside enemy threat rings; indeed, air mobility–
supported deployments of DSO forces may in many cases be the only 
effective means to exploit the short windows of opportunity available to 
deter enemy actions that might convert confrontations into wars
6. Improving the effectiveness of the overall air-mobility fleet in support of 
DSOs and other important missions, such as supporting land force deep-
maneuver and battle-damaged air bases
The way forward seems clear. For a start, Marine DSO and Air Force mobility 
planners need to meet, learn each other’s “language” and operational issues, and 
then rigorously examine the ability of the program-of-record fleet to support 
DSOs in a resilient and operationally effective manner. This discussion should 
include Marine and Army ground-warfare experts, since the final answer on 
whether the Department of Defense should acquire a new transport aircraft will 
rest in part on its relative value to requirements in addition to DSOs.26 Finally—
and particularly if an international design comes into the spotlight—it would not 
hurt to involve interested congressional, Defense Department, and civil experts 
in the discussion from the start. In the quest for offsets and trade-offs to finance 
a new fleet segment, the support of those experts will be important to the out-
come of the unavoidable political fights with the stakeholders and proponents 
of existing aircraft programs. In other words, this is a big issue, but one that is 
strategically important to the warfighting capabilities of the Marines and, indeed, 
all the service components.
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WHEN ROBOTS RULE THE WAVES?
 Robotic weapons are widely believed to be the future of war.1 Dramatic prog-ress in the science and engineering of robotics, alongside the perceived suc-
cess of the U.S. Predator and Reaper drones in Iraq and Afghanistan, has led many 
commentators to conclude that the wars of the twenty-first century increasingly 
will be fought, by industrialized nations at least, using remotely piloted and au-
tonomous weapon systems (AWSs).2 This belief also is playing an important role 
in shaping the thinking and practice of militaries around the world, which are 
scrambling to purchase drones and to develop and deploy robots for both combat 
and combat-support roles. Thus, for instance, all 
the U.S. armed services have published “roadmap” 
documents detailing ambitious plans to integrate 
unmanned systems (UMSs) into their forces.3
The new enthusiasm for robots in military and 
policy circles has led to philosophers and ethicists 
paying increased attention to issues surrounding 
the military uses of robots. In particular, there is 
now a flourishing literature on the ethics of drone 
warfare and an emerging literature on the ethics of 
the development and deployment of autonomous 
weapon systems.4 However, the high profile of 
aerial drones in the public eye—along with the 
fact that these are the systems that have seen most 
active service—has led to the latter literature fo-
cusing almost entirely on the ethical issues raised 
by autonomous uninhabited aerial vehicles and 
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uninhabited combat aerial vehicles. To date there has been comparatively little 
discussion of the ethical issues raised by the prospect of autonomous submers-
ibles or autonomous surface vessels.5
We believe it is high time that philosophers and military ethicists begin to 
address this lacuna, especially given the rapid development and military po-
tential of autonomous unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned 
surface vehicles (USVs).6 Moreover, we believe that there are a number of ethical 
dilemmas specific to these technologies by virtue of the distinctive character of 
war at sea. This paper represents its two authors’ initial attempt to collaborate 
—from somewhat contrasting ideological perspectives—in surveying and dis-
cussing these issues. We suggest that a number of unique and complex ethical 
questions are likely to arise regarding the applications of autonomous UUVs and 
USVs, including the following: 
1. Should armed autonomous UUVs and USVs be understood (as the 
comparatively modest body of legal literature to date has posed the 
problem) as “vessels” or as “weapons”?
2. With what sorts of operations might autonomous UUVs and USVs 
legitimately be tasked in international, as opposed to territorial, waters?
3. Is the operation of armed autonomous systems compatible with freedom 
of navigation in international waters?
4. What is the capacity of future maritime and underwater autonomous 
systems, when weaponized, to abide by the requirements of distinction 
and proportionality in naval warfare?
5. What are the implications, with regard to the design and the ethics of the 
use of autonomous UUVs and USVs, of customary maritime duties, e.g., 
toward persons lost at sea?
Several of these issues may stand as significant barriers to the ethical deploy-
ment of autonomous UUVs and USVs, in some roles at least, for the foreseeable 
future.7
Our investigation of these questions proceeds through eight sections. In sec-
tion 1, we provide a brief account of our reasons for believing that unmanned 
systems will come to play an increasingly vital role in future naval combat, and, 
by way of illustration, we introduce briefly a number of UUVs and USVs already 
deployed by the U.S. Navy or currently under development. In section 2, we argue 
that war at sea has a distinctive ethical character. Consequently, the use of un-
manned—and especially autonomous—systems in this context may generate eth-
ical issues that the larger discussion of the ethics of unmanned systems may have 
missed. Section 3 highlights the importance of a question about the appropriate 
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way to conceptualize armed USVs and UUVs. We suggest that whether we think 
of particular systems as “vessels” or “weapons” will have implications for our 
understanding of the ethics of their applications, beyond merely the distinct le-
gal regimes that apply to each, which we explore further in subsequent sections. 
Section 4 examines a range of issues that will arise about the operations of UUVs 
and USVs in different sorts of waters (e.g., territorial, international). In particu-
lar, we examine at length the implications of the operations of armed AWSs for 
freedom of navigation on the high seas. We then turn, in section 5, to discuss-
ing the ethical issues raised by the requirements of the principle of distinction 
for the operation of AWSs. While there are a number of reasons to believe that 
distinction poses fewer problems for AWSs on and under the seas than in other 
domains of warfare, we highlight the existence of four different cases in which it 
nevertheless remains a profound challenge. Section 6 considers the question of 
proportionality. As was the case with distinction, there are some reasons to ex-
pect proportionality calculations regarding civilian casualties to be easier in the 
context of war at sea than in other forms of warfare. However, once we acknowl-
edge that both damage to the environment and enemy combatant casualties are 
relevant to the ethical (if not the legal) requirement of proportionality, even at 
sea proportionality also looks very difficult for machines. Section 7 complexi-
fies the discussion of the preceding two sections by considering the standard of 
compliance with the principles of distinction and proportionality that we should 
require of AWSs; the possibility that maintaining a human being “in the loop” 
(or perhaps “on the loop”) could prevent attacks on illegitimate targets; and the 
implications of the UMS for the requirement of “precautions in attack.” In section 
8 we discuss the implications of the duty of rescue that exists in the context of war 
at sea for the design and applications of UUVs and USVs. We suggest that the 
fact that coming to the rescue of combatants lost at sea would not risk the lives 
of the crew in the case of UMSs means that the duty of rescue may be especially 
stringent on such systems; on the other hand, unless they are designed to pos-
sess the capacity to rescue, they may have no such obligation. It will be especially 
important therefore to think through the question of the obligations on UMSs in 
war at sea when it comes to rescue before many (more) such systems are designed 
and deployed. Finally, by way of a conclusion, we offer some brief remarks about 
the overall nature of our discussion and some suggestions for productive lines of 
inquiry for further research.
SECTION 1: ROBOTIC WEAPONS FOR WAR ON AND  
UNDER THE SEA
While aerial drones may have been hogging the limelight thus far when it comes 
to the military uses of robotics, there is currently an enormous amount of interest 
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in the development and application of remotely piloted, semiautonomous and 
autonomous weapons to fight wars on and under the sea.8
The existence of waves, currents, tides, and submerged obstacles and the dif-
ficulties of maintaining reliable communications through water in some ways 
make the oceans a more difficult environment for robots than the air. However, 
remaining afloat or submerged at a given depth is less technically demanding 
than remaining airborne, and surface vessels need to move in only two di-
mensions rather than the three required of aerial vehicles. The relatively small 
number of terrain types in war at sea and the virtual nonexistence of legitimate 
commercial traffic beneath the sea, as well as the fact that blue-water operations 
often may proceed without regard to concerns about running aground, also mean 
that for robots the oceans are a more tractable environment in which to conduct 
warfare than is the land.
Moreover, the results that might be achieved through the further development 
and deployment of UUVs and USVs are substantial. Operations at sea—especially 
underwater—are always dangerous, often dull, and often dirty, at least in the 
sense of being uncomfortable for and wearing on those involved. As such, many 
missions at sea are well suited to being assigned to robots. As we discuss further 
below, the military advantages to be secured by the development of autonomous 
systems for war on and under the seas, in particular, are enormous.9
For all these reasons, we expect that naval operations will be the next frontier 
for the development and deployment of robotic weapons in the coming decade(s). 
As we are most familiar with the U.S. UUV and USV programs, we will support 
and illustrate this claim with a brief discussion of the U.S. Navy’s progress in this 
area. However, a number of countries currently are developing such systems.10
A graphical overview of the U.S. Navy’s inventory of systems at the time of 
writing may be found in Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013–38.
Surface Vessels
Unmanned surface vehicles have enormous potential in naval operations, al-
though this potential is just beginning to be explored. The fact that these UMSs 
operate on the surface means that maintaining a human being in (or on) the 
loop is more feasible than it is for submersibles. Nevertheless, as in the case of 
UMSs more generally, there are still powerful military and economic dynamics 
pushing toward the development of systems that are capable of fully autonomous 
operations.
The U.S. USV inventory already includes a number of systems of different 
sizes and intended for different roles, with more under development. Navy sci-
entists are using self-propelled, self-guided, and self-sufficient “wave gliders” 
(essentially modified solar- and wave-powered surfboards) manufactured by 
Liquid Robotics to gather meteorological and oceanographic data; in the future 
NWC_Autumn2016Review.indb   52 9/15/16   12:47 PM
58
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/1
S PA R R O W  &  LU C A S  5 3
these systems might be used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) missions.11 The U.S. Navy has trialed USVs for maritime security and fleet 
protection. The Spartan Scout is a rigid-hull (aluminum) inflatable boat that is 
capable of remote-controlled and semiautonomous operations. Software called 
CARACaS (for “Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command and Sens-
ing”), which allows one human supervisor to oversee the operations of a num-
ber of USVs, has been used to provide USVs with the capacity for swarming to 
intercept enemy vessels.12 Of course, the same systems might serve as weapons 
platforms that could be deployed in aggressive forward postures without placing 
crews at risk. The U.S. Navy tested a version of Spartan Scout armed with .50 
caliber machine guns as early as 2002 and successfully demonstrated the fir-
ing of missiles from it in 2012.13 The technology that makes possible defensive 
swarming also enables unmanned craft to swarm offensively, with the aim of 
overwhelming enemy ship-based defenses.
The U.S. Navy is also actively interested in developing an antisubmarine war-
fare (ASW) capability using USVs. The Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) has responded to the threat posed to U.S. vessels by the new 
generation of quiet diesel submarines by initiating a program to build and test 
an autonomous trimaran capable of tracking submerged enemy submarines for 
extended periods.14 The Anti-submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned 
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Vessel, or “Sea Hunter,” is currently scheduled for trials beginning in 2016; the 
key navigational and collision-avoidance systems for this vessel underwent suc-
cessful trials using a test boat in January 2015.15 Should this project come to 
fruition, we would expect to see extended-range autonomous navigation and 
collision-avoidance capabilities rolled out to any number of other surface vessels.
Submersibles
Submarine operations are notoriously dangerous, so removing human crews 
from submersibles wherever possible is arguably a moral imperative; it also has a 
number of other benefits. Because unmanned systems carry no crew, they can be 
significantly smaller than the manned systems required to carry out similar oper-
ations. This permits UUVs to operate more quietly, for longer periods, and with 
a longer range. Autonomous UUVs, in particular, show enormous potential for 
operating for very long periods without needing to surface to replenish oxygen 
or fuel supplies or to return to base to rotate crews. This renders them ideal for 
roles in which the capacity to loiter undetected is an advantage. Indeed, because 
any emissions risk giving away two of the most vital secrets of a submersible—its 
presence and its location—the capacity to operate autonomously is a requirement 
for an effective unmanned submersible.
It is therefore no surprise that the U.S. Navy has an ambitious program of 
research and development of UUVs, especially autonomous UUVs, as well as a 
number of existing systems already deployed. For reasons of space, we will dis-
cuss only a few of these.16
UUVs’ capacities for stealth and for use in circumstances in which it might be 
too expensive or dangerous to deploy a manned vessel make them ideal for ISR. 
Almost every UUV we have seen discussed in the literature is advertised as hav-
ing a valuable role to play in ISR. For instance, the Sea Maverick and Sea Stalker 
UUVs (see the figure) are small(ish) semiautonomous submarines intended to 
carry out reconnaissance missions in depths of up to one thousand feet.17 The 
Littoral Battlespace Sensing-Glider uses an innovative propulsion system involv-
ing changes of buoyancy to travel the oceans for up to a month at a time and 
return oceanographic data useful for submarine warfare.18 The U.S. Navy also 
is experimenting with more-speculative systems such as the Cyro jellyfish, with 
the thought that a network of small, submersible, low-cost but hard-to-detect 
systems could provide valuable intelligence on enemy activities in contested 
waters.19
Similarly, UUVs have an obvious utility in countermine warfare, which role 
can be especially dangerous for manned vehicles. The U.S. Navy possesses a num-
ber of systems intended to perform this function, including the Mark 18 (Mod 
1) Swordfish, the Mark 18 (Mod 2) Kingfish, and the Littoral Battlespace Sensing 
autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV), all derived from variants of the Remote 
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Environmental Monitoring Unit System (known as REMUS) AUV manufactured 
by Hydroid, as well as the AN/BLQ-11 autonomous unmanned underwater vehi-
cle (formerly called the Long-Term Mine Reconnaissance System), which may be 
launched from the torpedo tubes of Los Angeles– and Virginia-class submarines.20 
The mine countermeasures package for the littoral combat ship is based around 
an autonomous remote multimission vehicle (RMMV) that detects mines with a 
variable-depth, towed-array sonar.21
Importantly, as we discuss further below, armed UUVs themselves share much 
in common with naval mines (what is an autonomous torpedo but a “swimming” 
mine?) and may be used in a similar role. Indeed, mine warfare is on the verge 
of a profound revolution, made possible by the capacity to separate the sensor 
packages that detect enemy vessels from the submerged ordnance that is tasked 
with destroying them. While the U.S. Mk 60 encapsulated torpedo (CAPTOR) 
deepwater mine already had provided proof-in-principle of this possibility, re-
cent innovations in sensors, marine propulsion, and autonomous navigation have 
expanded the prospects for development of such systems radically. In the future, 
nations may defend themselves—or deny the sea to others—using large arrays of 
networked sensors that communicate targeting information directly to a smaller 
number of autonomous armed UUVs lurking in the depths nearby.22
Finally, perhaps the most ambitious set of roles anticipated for any UUV con-
sists of those the large-displacement unmanned underwater vehicle (LDUUV) is 
supposed to fulfill. The LDUUV is an experimental autonomous submarine in-
tended to be able to navigate and operate under water for extended periods after 
being launched from a shore-based facility, an appropriately equipped nuclear 
submarine, or a surface vessel. The tasks envisioned for it include underwater 
reconnaissance and mine countermeasures, but extend to carrying and deploying 
smaller UUVs, or even to launching aerial drones for surface reconnaissance.23 
The U.S. Department of Defense recently announced a tender process to provide 
LDUUVs with an ASW capability.24
It is clear that the ultimate conclusion of the technology trajectory being ex-
plored in this system is a fully autonomous submersible capable of the same range 
of operations as a manned submarine.25 In the discussion that follows, it is often 
the LDUUV, including future developments thereof, that we have in mind when 
we discuss the issues raised by the prospect of armed autonomous UUVs.
SECTION 2: THE DISTINCTIVE ETHICAL CHARACTER OF  
WAR AT SEA
There has been a small but productive discussion in the literature concerning the 
legal status of UUVs and USVs.26 However, to date there has been little discus-
sion of the ethical issues these systems raise. Our concern here is primarily with 
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the latter topic. Insofar as legal instruments reflect, at least in part, the existing 
consensus on the duties and obligations of those whose activities they govern, we 
sometimes will refer to legal texts and precedents in the course of our argument. 
Nevertheless, we write in the conviction that the law does not exhaust ethics. 
Not only do provisions of the law fail to address ethical concerns, but those very 
legal constraints may pose moral dilemmas that will need to be addressed in 
operational policy and naval warfare strategy. In addition, there may be obvious 
ethical demands on warfighters that are yet to be codified in law. Indeed, there 
may be activities that are legally permitted but morally impermissible.27 Ethical 
principles may provide useful guidance to warfighters where current law is silent 
or lacking. They also may motivate and inform attempts to revise, extend, or 
supplement existing law.
One reason to believe that the development of robotic weapons for naval war-
fare might raise new ethical issues is that war at sea differs in important respects 
from war in (most) other environments.28 As a result, the moral norms and 
customs that have evolved to regulate naval warfare are arguably more demand-
ing than those regulating warfare elsewhere, are more deeply entrenched in the 
consciousness of warfighters, and have distinctive elements.
A full investigation of what is ethically distinctive about naval warfare is be-
yond the scope of this article. However, a brief excursion into this topic will prove 
useful to frame our subsequent discussion. We believe that four features of war at 
sea play a key role in shaping the ethical (and legal) codes that regulate the activ-
ity of naval combatants.29
(1) In wartime as in peacetime, the sea itself is a deadly adversary of those who 
travel on or under it. Even in peacetime, hazards—in the form of strong winds, 
rough seas, and hidden reefs—abound, while shipwreck and drowning are ever-
present dangers. In wartime, seafarers who are forced to abandon ship after an 
enemy attack may find themselves facing nearly certain doom: alone in freezing 
waters or floating in a small life raft, and thousands of miles from land.
(2) Because of the hostile nature of the marine environment, life at sea is pri-
marily a collective life, one in which men (and increasingly women) are thrown 
together in a mutual endeavor framed by the possibility of misadventure.30 Few 
people go to sea by themselves. Rather, people go to sea together in vessels, and 
therein form miniature—or, on modern capital ships, quite large—societies in 
the midst of a hostile environment.
These first two facts already have two important consequences for ethical 
understandings regarding war at sea.
First, the collective nature of life at sea and the shared vulnerability of all sea-
farers to misadventure and drowning mean that a strong expectation of mutual 
aid has grown up among those who go to sea. In particular, all those who go 
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to sea are understood to have a duty to come to the aid of those who are lost at 
sea, whenever it is possible to do so without serious danger to themselves. This 
duty transcends ordinary national loyalties and has no direct analogue in land 
warfare.31 The development of this expectation may be accounted for as a func-
tion of the need for a form of social insurance for this risky endeavor; each and 
every person at sea is safer if there is an expectation that everyone will come to 
the rescue of anyone as required, and consequently it is in each and every indi-
vidual’s interest if this expectation is promulgated widely and failures to live up 
to it are subject to sanctions, both formal and informal. Obviously, war—and the 
dehumanization of the enemy that often accompanies it—places this expectation 
under stress. Nevertheless, because enemy sailors in the water are no longer com-
batants, by virtue of being hors de combat, and because the risk of being in need 
of rescue is higher for all seamen during wartime, the expectation remains that 
vessels will render aid to, and will attempt to rescue, individuals lost at sea regard-
less of their nationality when they have the capacity to do so and as long as doing 
so would not jeopardize the safety of the vessel and those on board.32 Moreover, the 
extent to which all those who go to sea share a distinct way of life compared with 
those who remain on land—and the solidarity that this encourages—along with 
the constant danger posed by the sea to all combatants ensures that this duty of 
rescue remains central to maritime culture, even in wartime.33
Second, the ethical and legal codes that govern war at sea are primarily con-
cerned with the activities and fates of “vessels.” As the operations of a ship are the 
result of a cooperative activity, it is often not possible to distinguish between the 
intentions of the commanding officer and that of his or her crew. Nor is it usually 
possible to attack some persons on board a vessel without targeting the vessel as 
a whole and thus risking the lives of everyone aboard. For these reasons, seamen 
literally sink or swim together. Thus, it is both natural and appropriate that the 
vessel be the primary locus of attention in ethical (as well as legal) deliberation 
about naval warfare.
Two other features of war at sea are important to bear in mind when think-
ing about ethics in that context. These concern the unique relationship between 
combatants and noncombatants in naval combat.
(3) The sea is more sparsely populated than the land, and in wartime the ves-
sels that sail on or under it divide more or less naturally into those that are par-
ticipating actively in the conflict and those that are not.34 That is to say, especially 
with the benefits of modern sensor packages, military vessels are distinguished 
more easily from civilian vessels than groups of armed men are distinguished 
from civilians in land warfare, and it is more difficult for combatants to hide 
among the noncombatant population. Thus, with the exception of merchant 
vessels (of which, more below), which might have been pressed into service to 
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carry cargo or personnel for military purposes, it is generally much easier to 
distinguish legitimate from illegitimate targets at sea than it is in other forms of 
warfare.35
On the other hand, (4) the comparatively featureless nature of the oceans and 
the lack of local geographical references for national and other relevant political 
boundaries mean that it is harder to separate combatants and noncombatants 
geographically. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that oceangoing com-
merce is essential to the flourishing—and even to the survival—of modern na-
tions, with the consequence that, even during wartime, merchants will continue 
to ply the seas with their goods and passenger ships and ferries will continue to 
transport civilians.36 At least partly in recognition of this fact, the high seas re-
main a “commons,” owned by no one and available for use by everyone.
These latter two features of war at sea have led to the development of a so-
phisticated set of practices and agreements around the activities of belligerent 
and neutral parties intended to allow neutral parties to continue to navigate the 
seas peacefully even when wars are being fought. Customary international law 
relating to naval warfare attempts to balance the competing demands of national 
sovereignty and freedom of navigation, and distinguishes among belligerent 
and neutral nations’ internal waters, territorial waters, and exclusive economic 
zones (EEZs) as well as the high seas, and places limits on the sorts of activities 
that legitimately may be pursued in each.37 As we shall see below, understanding 
the competing considerations informing these treaties also will prove useful to 
resolving ethical issues relating to the areas and roles in which UUVs and USVs 
legitimately may be deployed.
We do not want to exaggerate the extent to which the ethics of war at sea dif-
fers from the ethics of fighting wars in other environments. The fundamental 
moral framework for naval warfare, as for land or air warfare, is outlined in just 
war theory. The special features we have highlighted here may be accounted for 
as consequences of the application of just war theory to the peculiar character 
of war at sea. Moreover, each of the various features of war at sea highlighted 
above may have some counterparts in other domains of warfare.38 Nevertheless, 
drawing attention to the way in which the ethics of war at sea is structured by its 
special contextual circumstances may productively inform deliberation about the 
ethics of the development and deployment of robotic weapons in this context.
SECTION 3: THE STATUS OF ARMED USVS AND UUVS—VESSELS 
OR WEAPONS?
As noted above, the legal and ethical codes that govern war at sea are mostly 
concerned with the activities of ships and submarines and place demands on 
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individuals primarily—although not exclusively—through their roles on these 
vessels.
A number of legal authorities already have begun to consider whether or 
when UUVs and USVs should be considered “vessels” under the law of the sea. 
The emerging consensus seems to be that autonomous UUVs and USVs, at least 
above a certain size, should be classed as vessels.39 While remotely piloted vehicles 
plausibly might be held to be extensions of the vessel(s) from which they are 
operated, systems capable of extended autonomous operations should be under-
stood as vessels in their own right.40
As we shall see below, the question of how we understand USVs and UUVs 
is also central to the ethics of their design and application. The more we think 
of these systems as autonomous and controlled by an onboard computer, and 
the more roles they become capable of fulfilling, the more natural it is to think 
of them as vessels. However, as the discussion below highlights, understanding 
them as vessels appears to impose demanding ethical requirements on their 
capacities and operations, especially relating to distinction, proportionality, and 
the duty of rescue.
An alternative way of addressing these requirements, in the light of such co-
nundrums, is to think of armed autonomous USVs and UUVs themselves instead 
as weapons, which may be deployed by warfighters, who then become responsible 
for ensuring that the use of the weapon meets the requirements of distinction, 
proportionality, and so on.41 Yet as we shall see, this way of proceeding generates 
its own challenges. An important early finding of our research, then, is that much 
work remains to be done to clarify the best way of understanding the status of 
armed UUVs and USVs in the context of the larger ethical framework governing 
war at sea (as opposed merely to their current legal status).
SECTION 4: DEPLOYMENT—WHERE, WHEN, AND WHY?
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) attempts to balance the 
competing claims of national sovereignty and freedom of navigation in peacetime 
by distinguishing among different sorts of waters regarding their statuses and the 
permissibility of different sorts of activities therein. Customary international law 
relating to naval warfare extends this to regulate the relations between belliger-
ent and neutral parties insofar as possible. The research and analysis required to 
assess the operations of USVs and UUVs within these frameworks are beginning 
to be undertaken now, and some initial results are starting to emerge.42 Thus, for 
instance, Andrew Henderson suggests that “UUVs may operate freely in both the 
high seas and the EEZ while exercising the requisite due regard for the interests of 
other vessels and posing no threat to the territorial integrity of the coastal state” 
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and remain submerged while exercising transit passage in international straits 
and archipelagic-sea-lanes passage in archipelagic sea-lanes. In territorial seas, he 
suggests, UUVs must operate on the surface to exercise the right of innocent pas-
sage and display appropriate lights and make sound signals to facilitate safety of 
navigation.43 Brendan Gogarty and Meredith Hagger also suggest that USVs and 
UUVs would be restricted in the activities they can undertake while exercising 
the right of innocent passage.44 Rob McLaughlin emphasizes that USVs and 
UUVs are clearly subject to the Convention on the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) and must be capable of avoiding colli-
sions to such a degree that they could be said to maintain what he paraphrases 
as a “proper and sufficient lookout.” He also allows that the presence of a foreign 
submerged UUV within a nation’s territorial waters might constitute a sovereign 
affront justifying the use of armed force.45
We leave the task of settling the legal questions raised by the deployment of 
UUVs and USVs in various sorts of waters to others qualified to complete it. 
However, some discussion of the deeper ethical questions underpinning and sur-
rounding the relevant legal frameworks is appropriate here, and we hope it will 
inform the ongoing legal debate usefully.
It does seem reasonable, for instance, that the moral right nations have over 
their territorial waters, and to a lesser extent their continental shelves and EEZs, 
should allow them to exclude USVs and UUVs conducting—or perhaps just 
capable of conducting—certain sorts of operations. If nations have a right to pre-
vent other nations from conducting mining or survey operations in their EEZs 
or carrying out operations injurious to their security in their territorial waters, 
this right surely would carry over consistently to exclude unmanned vessels just 
as much as manned vessels. Indeed, arguably the fact that UUVs and USVs are 
unmanned makes their use in these sorts of waters more suspicious and threat-
ening to the interests of sovereign governments, on the assumption that other 
nations will be more likely to deploy such vessels in hazardous environments that 
might generate a military response, given that doing so will not place a human 
crew at risk of death or capture. Requiring such systems to confine themselves 
to innocent passage through territorial waters is at least a partial solution to this 
problem.
The ethics of the use of autonomous UUVs and USVs on the high seas remains 
an open—and controversial—matter. At first sight at least, the right to freedom of 
navigation in international waters appears to extend to inclusion of these systems, 
presuming that they do not pose too much of a navigational hazard to other ves-
sels. However, interestingly, this presumption rests on an understanding of them 
as vessels and may be unsettled when we start to consider the prospect of armed 
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autonomous UUVs and USVs and whether such systems should be thought of, 
instead, as weapons.
Roughly speaking, the operations of vessels in international waters are per-
missible as long as they are compatible with the right of free navigation of other 
vessels through the same waters. Thus, if they are to operate on the high seas, 
UUVs and USVs must have the capacity reliably to avoid posing a hazard to other 
vessels. At a bare minimum, this requires taking the appropriate measures to 
minimize the risk of collision. While the COLREGs spell this out as requiring all 
vessels “at all times [to] maintain a proper lookout by sight and hearing”—phras-
ing that encourages the reader to presume a human being will be on board, or at 
least supervising remotely—we can see no reason why a fully autonomous system 
that proved equally capable of avoiding collision with other vessels without hu-
man supervision should not be judged to meet the appropriate standard.46
Of course, armed UUVs and USVs operating on the high seas would appear to 
pose risks to commercial shipping and to the warships of neutral nations beyond 
simply the risk of collision; they might (accidentally) fire on them, for example. 
Their significance for the right of freedom of navigation is therefore likely to de-
pend on their capacity to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets 
of attack, as discussed in sections 5 and 6 below.
A key question in the larger debate about the ethics of autonomous weapons 
concerns whether—by analogy to what we suggested was the case with regard 
to the capacity to avoid collision—it would be sufficient to render the use of 
such weapons permissible if they were capable of achieving results similar to the 
standard required of human beings with respect to compliance with the moral 
principles of distinction and proportionality. Those inclined to understand the 
principles of jus in bello as grounded primarily in a concern for the rights of 
noncombatants are likely to believe that this would be sufficient to render the use 
of AWSs permissible—and indeed may be tempted to the conclusion that their 
use will be mandatory once such weapons become capable of exceeding human 
performance in this regard.47 On the other hand, a number of authors have sug-
gested that if we think of the requirements of jus in bello fundamentally as ethical 
demands on the human being making the decision to use lethal force, we may 
conclude that the absence of a human will at the moment the attack is carried out 
means that autonomous weapons cannot be said to comply with these principles 
at all.48 Insofar as our concern is with the compatibility of the operations of AWSs 
with the right to freedom of navigation rather than with the wider conceptual 
debate concerning the ethics of autonomous targeting, though, it appears that 
the relevant standard of discrimination is just that required of human beings in 
similar circumstances.
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However, there is another reason to worry that achieving a high standard 
when it comes to the capacity to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate 
targets may not be sufficient to render the use of AWSs ethical on the high seas. 
The presence of AWSs operating in particular waters might exercise a “chilling” 
effect on commercial shipping over a wide area—and thus impinge on the right 
of freedom of navigation—even if the chance of an accidental attack by AWSs 
was extremely remote, given the capacities of these systems. This possibility 
seems especially likely if we think of autonomous UUVs and USVs as weapons 
rather than vessels. Indeed, one well might argue that armed autonomous UUVs 
at least should be understood as sophisticated versions of free-floating mines, 
and consequently should be prohibited.49 The use of drifting mines that do not 
disarm themselves within an hour is prohibited under international law because 
of the threat they pose to freedom of navigation.50 The fact that the chance of 
any particular ship being struck by any particular drifting mine is small does not 
seem to affect the force of this concern.
An important point of reference for our intuitions here is CAPTOR, which is a 
moored torpedo-launch system capable of detecting the acoustic signature of ap-
proaching enemy submarines and firing a torpedo to destroy them.51 This system 
is arguably already autonomous insofar as the “decision” to launch a torpedo is 
made without direct human input at the time. Versions of the system have been 
in use since 1979 without causing significant international outcry, which suggests 
that concerns about freedom of navigation in open waters need not rule out the 
deployment of autonomous weapon systems.
However, there are at least three reasons to be cautious about this conclu-
sion. First, because the CAPTOR itself is fixed—even if its range of operations is 
extended—the system would appear to pose less of a danger to navigation than 
hypothetical free-ranging AWSs.52 Second, insofar as this weapon is advertised 
as an antisubmarine system, those plying the surface of the waters may feel they 
have little to fear from it. International opinion might be very different should 
it become common knowledge that similar systems were being tasked with de-
stroying surface vessels. Finally, the absence of any outcry against CAPTOR and 
similar systems needs to be understood in the context of a history over which 
they have not been responsible—to date—for any noncombatant casualties. The 
first time an AWS deployed at sea attacks a commercial—or, worse, a passenger—
vessel, we might expect public and international opinion about their legitimacy 
to change dramatically.
Even very reliable AWSs therefore may jeopardize freedom of navigation if 
vessels are unwilling to put to sea in waters in which AWSs are known to be op-
erating. While fear of (accidental) attack by an AWS might appear to be irrational 
when compared with the risks that manned systems pose, beliefs about risk are 
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notoriously complex and difficult to assess because they often contain hidden 
value judgments. In this case, a reluctance to risk attack by an AWS may express 
the value judgment that human beings alone should be responsible for decisions 
to take human lives. Insofar as the right of freedom of navigation exists to protect 
and sustain international commerce, what matters is the willingness of ships to 
ply the oceans. Subjective judgments of risk may be just as significant for the ex-
istence of freedom of navigation as—indeed, may be more so than—the objective 
risks that ships actually take when they leave port.
Therefore, it may turn out that the international community will be required 
to adjudicate on the balance of the interests of states in deploying AWSs and the 
desire of operators of civilian vessels not to be at risk of attack by an autonomous 
weapon. Any attempts to embed this judgment in legislation also will need 
to consider what is realistically achievable in this regard, especially given the 
military advantages associated with unmanned systems and the force of the logic 
driving their uptake. In many ways, such a debate would hark back to that which 
took place with the advent of submarine warfare, which effectively was resolved 
in favor of permitting the operations of military submersibles. We suspect that 
this is the most likely outcome with regard to armed autonomous UUVs and 
USVs as well. However, it is important to acknowledge the competing consider-
ations in this debate, summarized above.
A number of further questions may arise concerning the operations of armed 
autonomous UUVs and USVs in various waters, but space limitations permit 
mere mention of them here. The difficulty in imagining autonomous weapons 
having the capacity to capture enemy or neutral vessels suggests that they could 
play at most a limited role in naval blockades or taking neutral merchant vessels 
as prizes.53 The requirement to record the locations of mines so that they can be 
removed or rendered harmless after the cessation of conflict would appear to 
be moot, when “mines” are themselves mobile and autonomous.54 However, the 
considerations motivating this requirement—reducing the subsequent hazards to 
shipping postconflict—imply that autonomous weapons must be able reliably to 
render themselves harmless on instruction or after some defined period. There 
undoubtedly are other issues that require further investigation.
SECTION 5: DISTINCTION
Perhaps the most fundamental ethical requirement in wartime is to confine one’s 
attacks to enemy combatants, and as much as possible to try to avoid civilian 
casualties. Thus the jus in bello principle of distinction requires that warfighters 
refrain from targeting noncombatants and take appropriate care to minimize the 
noncombatant casualties caused by attacks targeted at combatants.
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Much of the current criticism of AWSs proceeds from the claim that robotic 
weapons are unlikely to be capable of meeting the requirements of distinction 
for the foreseeable future. In counterinsurgency warfare in particular, identify-
ing whether someone is a combatant requires a complex set of contextual judg-
ments that probably will be beyond the capacity of machines for the foreseeable 
future.55 Whether this problem is insurmountable or exists in all roles in which 
we might imagine AWSs being used is a controversial question that is larger than 
we can resolve here. In this context we will settle for observing that the problem 
of distinction is arguably less demanding in naval warfare because there are fewer 
potential targets and because sonar and radar are more capable of distinguishing 
between military and civilian vessels than image recognition, radar, and lidar 
(light detection and ranging—“laser radar”) are at distinguishing among targets 
in land warfare.56 Indeed, one reason advanced for favoring the use of autono-
mous systems on or under the sea, especially in blue-water missions, is that, in 
comparison with on the land or in the air, on the high seas the “civilian footprint” 
is comparatively small, even allowing for commercial shipping and recreational 
boating. Moreover, the problem of distinction looks especially tractable in the 
context of ASW, given the relative paucity of civilian submarines with tonnages 
or acoustic signatures comparable to those of military submarines, and the fact 
that those few civilian systems that do exist tend to operate in a limited range of 
roles and locations (primarily around oil rigs and submarine cables). Therefore 
we might expect that if robots are to become capable of distinction in any context, 
they will become capable of it in war on and under the sea.
Nevertheless, there are at least four sorts of cases in which the requirements of 
distinction pose a formidable challenge to the ethical operation of autonomous 
weapons in naval warfare.
First, to avoid attacks on military ships of neutral nations, AWSs will need to 
be able to identify the nature and the nationality of potential targets, not just to 
determine that they are warships. In some cases, in which ships of the enemy’s 
fleet are easily distinguishable from those of other nations because of distinctive 
radar or acoustic profiles, this problem may not arise. However, in some circum-
stances identifying that a ship carries guns or torpedoes, is of a certain tonnage 
or class, or both will not be sufficient to establish that it is an enemy warship. 
Instead, making this identification will require the ability to form reasonable 
conclusions about its identity on the basis of its historical pattern of activity and 
its threat posture within the battle space. One obvious way to solve this problem 
would be to program autonomous UUVs and USVs to confine their attacks to 
targets that are themselves firing weapons.57 However, this would reduce sig-
nificantly the military utility of AWSs, especially in strike and area-denial roles. 
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Whether computers ever will be able to make the necessary judgments to avoid 
the need for this restriction remains an open question.
Second, as enemy vessels that have clearly indicated their surrender are no 
longer legitimate targets under the Geneva Convention, AWSs must be able to 
recognize surrender.58 It is possible that in the future warships may be expected 
to carry a “surrender beacon” capable of communicating to any AWS operating 
in the area that in fact they have surrendered. Until that day, however, AWSs will 
need to have the capacity to recognize and respond to the communication of 
surrender under existing conventions, i.e., through changes in threat posture and 
display of signal lights or flags. Again, at this stage it is unclear whether robots 
ever will be able to do this reliably.
Third, AWSs must be able to identify when an enemy ship is hors de combat by 
virtue of being so badly damaged as to be incapable of posing any military threat. 
In rare circumstances it may not be possible for a badly damaged and listing ship 
to signal surrender. Thus, morally, if not legally, speaking, even an enemy warship 
that has not indicated surrender is not necessarily a legitimate target if it is no 
longer capable of engaging in hostilities.59 Human beings are (sometimes) able to 
discern when this circumstance applies, using their rich knowledge of the world 
and of the motivations and likely actions of people in various situations. Before 
the use of AWSs would be ethical, they would need to be at least as capable as 
human beings of making such discriminations.
Importantly, these last two issues appear in a different light depending 
on whether we think of AWSs as vessels or as weapons. If an enemy warship 
surrenders after a torpedo is launched from a manned submarine, for instance, 
the ship’s destruction would be a tragedy but not a crime. However, if a ship fires 
on an enemy vessel that clearly has indicated surrender, that is a war crime. If we 
think of an AWS as a weapon, therefore, then as long as the officer who deploys 
it does not do so knowing the intended targets have surrendered or otherwise 
become hors de combat, its use will be legitimate even if there is some chance 
that the status of its targets may change after it is deployed. On the other hand, if 
we think of the USV or UUV as a vessel, then it seems it must have the capacity 
to detect whether a potential target has surrendered or otherwise become hors 
de combat to avoid attacks in such circumstances. Of course, if the delay between 
deploying an AWS understood as a weapon and its carrying out an attack is too 
long—a matter of days rather than hours, for instance—this might shake our 
conviction that it is sufficiently discriminating to be ethical.60
Fourth, when it comes to operations to interdict or attack merchant shipping, 
the problem of distinction is especially challenging just because it is so sensi-
tive to context. AWSs would seem to be poorly suited, for instance, to making 
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judgments about whether merchant vessels are carrying enemy troops or “other-
wise making an effective contribution to military action.”61 The fact that AWSs 
are unlikely to be capable of searching or capturing merchant ships also limits 
their utility in making this discrimination.
SECTION 6: PROPORTIONALITY
The ethical requirements of proportionality under jus in bello ask whether the 
military advantage to be gained by an attack on a military target is sufficient 
to justify the death and destruction the attack reasonably might be expected 
to cause. Importantly, while the legal requirement of proportionality usually is 
understood to require only that the noncombatant casualties (“collateral dam-
age”) that it is reasonable to expect an attack on a military target to cause are not 
excessive in relation to the military advantage the attack seeks to secure, the ethi-
cal principle grants weight to the lives of combatants in this calculation as well.62 
Thus, for instance, a deliberate attack on an enemy military installation housing a 
large number of enemy warfighters who posed no immediate threat, when it was 
already known that the enemy had signed an agreement to surrender effective the 
next day, would be unethical by virtue of being disproportionate.
One of us (Sparrow) previously has argued elsewhere that the requirements 
of proportionality stand as a profound barrier to the ethical use of AWSs.63 The 
calculations of military advantage required to assess whether a given number of 
civilian (or military) casualties is proportionate are extremely complex and con-
text sensitive. They require a detailed understanding of the way the world works 
that is, Sparrow has argued, likely to remain beyond the capacities of autonomous 
systems for the foreseeable future.64 The other of us (Lucas) is less pessimistic, 
believing that AWSs’ potential to exceed the limited abilities of human beings 
when it comes to making judgments of proportionality is an important part of 
their promise.65
Regardless, there are reasons to believe that these sorts of calculations of pro-
portionality are likely to be easier in the context of war at sea. To begin with, as 
noted above, the relative lack of civilian “clutter” on the oceans means that the 
risk of civilian casualties in attacks on legitimate military targets in naval engage-
ments is much lower than in land warfare, reducing the number of circumstances 
in which a judgment of the proportionality of anticipated civilian casualties is 
required. There are also typically fewer units involved in naval engagements 
than in land warfare and the scope of operations available to individual units is 
less, which makes it more plausible to think that a computer could calculate the 
military advantage associated with a particular attack and thus whether a given 
number of military deaths would be justified.66
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On the other hand, there is another proportionality calculation that is espe-
cially difficult in the context of war at sea. Military operations may have signifi-
cant and long-term implications for civilian life via their impact on the environ-
ment.67 Consequently, combatants now are also held to be under an obligation to 
consider and, where possible, to minimize the damage to the environment their 
activities cause. These obligations must be balanced against considerations of 
military necessity. In practice, then, combatants are required to make a calcula-
tion of proportionality when contemplating an attack to determine whether the 
military advantage the attack will achieve justifies the environmental damage 
it is likely to cause. However, the role played by wind, waves, and tides in dis-
tributing the debris resulting from war at sea and the complex nature of marine 
ecosystems make calculations of the environmental impacts of naval operations 
especially difficult. Determination of the intrinsic value of significant features of 
the environment (such as, for instance, clean rivers, coral reefs, or the spawning 
grounds of fish) is controversial, as is assessment of the instrumental value they 
have in terms of their contribution to human well-being. Judgments about such 
matters inevitably involve balancing a range of complex considerations as well as 
arguments about matters of (moral) value. For both these reasons, calculations 
of proportionality in attack in relation to damage to the environment seem likely 
to remain beyond the capacity of computers for many years yet.
Thus, once we admit that the marine environment and enemy combatant 
casualties are relevant to the proportionality calculation (in ethics, if not in law) 
and we take the broader strategic context into account, as well as the possible 
interactions of naval, ground, and air forces, it once more appears that making 
judgments of proportionality is fiendishly difficult and requires knowledge of the 
world and reasoning capacities that computer systems currently lack and seem 
likely to continue to lack for the foreseeable future.68 Thus, at the very least, pro-
portionality appears to remain a more difficult issue for AWSs in naval warfare 
than distinction.
SECTION 7: AWSS, “SUPERVISED AUTONOMY,” AND  
PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK
Of course, human beings also have significant limitations when it comes to 
their capacity to achieve distinction and make judgments of proportionality, so 
it might be argued that machines eventually will be able to perform at least as 
well as humans at these tasks.69 This is an empirical matter. However, there is 
also a deeper philosophical question involved regarding the nature and force 
of the ethical imperatives underpinning the requirements of jus in bello. While 
human beings often fail to behave ethically, when it comes to the duty to avoid 
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taking human life unnecessarily, morality demands perfection. Consequently, it 
might be argued that there is something troubling about justifying the use of an 
autonomous weapon solely on the basis that it makes as few mistakes as or fewer 
mistakes than the alternative.70
We cannot hope to settle these questions here. Indeed, the authors well may 
disagree upon them.71 A partial solution to both the problem of distinction and 
proportionality might be achieved by requiring AWSs to seek input from a human 
supervisor whenever the risks of attacking an illegitimate target exceed some 
predetermined threshold. A number of authorities already advocate “supervised 
autonomy” as a way of attempting to combine the benefits of autonomous opera-
tions and human decision making in complex environments.72 Yet this proposal 
has obvious limitations. To begin with, it presumes that the task of accurately 
assessing the risk of inadvertently attacking an illegitimate target is easier than 
identifying a potential target as legitimate or not in the first place, which may 
not be the case. Perhaps more importantly, relying on human supervision to 
carry out combat operations ethically would sacrifice two of the key benefits of 
autonomous operations. It would require maintaining a robust communications 
infrastructure sufficient to allow the AWS to transmit the relevant data to a base 
station and receive instructions from the human operator, which is especially 
challenging in the context of operations under water. It also would jeopardize 
the capacity of autonomous systems to conduct stealthy operations. In particular, 
submersibles would need to transmit and receive signals in real time—and thus 
risk giving away their locations—to allow a human supervisor to provide input 
to their decisions. While supervised autonomy may be a solution in the context 
of operations against technologically unsophisticated adversaries without the 
capacity to contest the electronic battle space or launch kinetic attacks against 
communications infrastructure, it seems unlikely to be an attractive solution in 
the longer term.
There is, however, a further complexity here. The jus in bello principles of 
distinction and proportionality not only distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate targets but also demand that warfighters make all feasible efforts 
to avoid attacking illegitimate targets in circumstances in which, for various 
reasons, it is difficult for them to distinguish between the two. Thus, as the San 
Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea notes, 
warfighters “must take all feasible measures to gather information which will 
assist in determining whether or not objects which are not military objectives 
are present in an area of attack” and “take all feasible precautions in the choice 
of methods and means to avoid or minimize collateral casualties or damage.”73 
While the question of what sorts of measures or precautions are “feasible” in a 
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given context is obviously complex and often controversial, the level of risk to 
warfighters involved in the various options available to them is clearly relevant: 
there must be some limit to the amount of risk that we can reasonably expect 
warfighters to take on to achieve any given degree of confidence about the nature 
of the targets they intend to attack. The fact that no human lives would be placed 
at risk—directly (see below)—by requiring autonomous UUVs and USVs to take 
any given sort of actions to minimize the chance of inadvertently attacking civil-
ian targets or causing disproportionate casualties suggests that the requirements 
to take “all feasible measures” and “all feasible precautions” might be significantly 
more demanding for these systems.
Thus, for instance, unmanned submersibles might be required to launch sen-
sor buoys, use active sonar, or even surface to facilitate identification of targets. 
Indeed, AWSs might even be required to await authorization from a human 
supervisor before carrying out an attack.74 According to the strongest version of 
this line of argument, fully autonomous operations of a UUV or USV (or, one 
suspects, any AWS) would be unethical.
There are two obvious ways in which this conclusion might be resisted. First, 
given the military utility of unmanned systems—and an argument from military 
necessity—it might be argued that the risk to the “vessel,” regardless of the ab-
sence of any crew on board, is properly relevant to judgments about feasibility: 
it would be unreasonable to include in the range of “feasible” precautions those 
that likely would result in the destruction of the system if carried out during an 
engagement. Second (in addition), while exposing an unmanned system to risk 
may not threaten any lives directly, the destruction of the vessel would jeopardize 
the safety of friendly forces who might have been relying on it to carry out its mis-
sion. Thus, human lives may well be at stake when we risk the safety of a UMS. 
These two considerations speak in favor of allowing autonomous systems to 
prioritize their own “safety” over the safety of those whose lives they potentially 
threaten through their targeting decisions.
The capacity of UMSs to take more precautions prior to launching an attack 
often is cited as an argument in favor of developing and deploying them.75 The 
fact that they are unmanned means that they plausibly might be used in more-
risky operations to try to achieve any worthwhile goal. Perversely, when the goal 
is the preservation of the lives of noncombatants, this might even mean placing 
(what would otherwise be) autonomous systems at risk by requiring them to 
seek authorization for each attack from a human operator. Yet this would vitiate 
many of the military advantages of autonomous operations, including the extent 
to which the use of UMSs reduces the risk to the lives of friendly forces.76 The 
advent of armed autonomous systems therefore will require a potentially difficult 
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conversation within the international community about the balance to be struck 
between military necessity and humanitarian considerations and about the role 
of human supervision of autonomous systems in securing this balance.77
SECTION 8: RESCUE
While the details of what is needed to satisfy the requirements of discrimination 
and proportionality may differ somewhat in naval warfare from war on land or 
in the air, these principles themselves apply to all warfare by virtue of their place 
at the heart of the doctrine of jus in bello. However, the duty of rescue that exists 
in the context of war at sea is especially stringent in, if not entirely unique to, 
naval warfare.78
We have suggested that, even in wartime, all vessels are ethically required to 
render aid to and attempt to rescue individuals lost at sea, regardless of their 
nationality, when they have the capacity to do so and as long as doing so would not 
jeopardize the safety of the vessel and those on board. Both clauses in the italicized 
caveat merit some discussion in the context of the operations of UUVs and USVs.
Whether this duty of assistance will impinge on the operations of USVs and 
UUVs will depend on whether we think these systems have, or should have, the 
capacity to conduct rescue operations. For instance, the fact that cruise missiles 
have no capacity to rescue those rendered helpless in the water after an attack is 
not thought to rule out their use in attacks on ships. It therefore seems likely that 
some AWSs—particularly those that we are inclined to classify as weapons, such 
as “smart” long-loiter-time torpedoes—will be excused from any obligation in 
this regard. However, when it comes to the operations of (currently hypothetical) 
larger autonomous USVs and UUVs, themselves armed with weapons—those it 
would be more natural to regard as vessels—the question will arise whether they 
should be required to have at least some capacity to conduct rescue operations. 
Even if such vessels were, as seems likely, incapable of taking prisoners on board, 
they might be provided with the capacity to launch inflatable life rafts or deploy 
emergency locator beacons to draw the attention of other vessels to the presence 
of people requiring rescue. In all likelihood, the costs associated with fitting such 
systems would be significant in terms of the military utility of the vessel, not least 
because deploying them might give away the location of a submersible. What 
seems clear, though, is that vessels without this capacity would be significantly 
less capable of achieving proportionality in attack. It might even be argued that 
the deployment of armed autonomous vessels without the ability to contribute to 
rescue operations would be unethical on this basis.79
Like the concepts of “feasible precautions” and “feasible measures” in attack, 
the duty of rescue is qualified with reference to the risk involved in attempting to 
provide assistance. Thus, because any attempt to provide assistance while combat 
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is ongoing in the area would expose a vessel to a high risk of destruction by other 
enemy ships, in wartime this duty is understood to exist only “after an engage-
ment.”80 However if UUVs or—more plausibly—USVs did have the capacity to 
conduct rescue operations, they might be held to be under a stronger obligation 
to do so than manned vessels simply because doing so, even in the course of a 
military engagement, would not endanger any human lives directly. Acknowledg-
ing this fact may even strengthen the intuition that AWSs should be provided with 
the capacity to conduct rescue operations.
Again, focusing on the safety of the vessel rather than that of its (nonexistent) 
crew, the lives of friendly combatants elsewhere (which might be threatened if 
the UUV or USV was destroyed), or both might provide grounds to resist this 
conclusion. We certainly expect that states deploying armed autonomous ves-
sels will be reluctant to risk those vessels’ destruction by programming them to 
provide assistance to enemy combatants lost at sea. Nevertheless, we expect it 
will be tough to sell the international community on prioritizing the “safety” of a 
machine over the lives of human beings lost at sea. Whether autonomous UUVs 
and USVs should be required to have some capacity to provide assistance to those 
lost at sea and the extent of their obligation to provide this assistance when they 
do have the capacity to do so are key questions to be answered by further research 
on this topic.
We are conscious that our deliberations have raised more questions than they 
have answered. We cannot claim that this survey of the main issues is exhaustive; 
there are undoubtedly further issues to be considered than those we have had the 
opportunity to discuss here.
Nevertheless, our investigations suggest that the distinctive ethical character 
of war at sea generates a number of novel ethical dilemmas regarding the design 
and use of UUVs and USVs, dilemmas that do not arise for unmanned systems 
operating in the air or on land. In particular, the importance of freedom of navi-
gation on the high seas and the obligation to come to the aid of those shipwrecked 
or lost at sea pose difficult challenges for the ethical operation of UUVs and 
USVs, especially armed and autonomous systems. Moreover, some of the ethical 
issues that do arise regarding the (hypothetical) operations of armed autonomous 
systems more generally are differently inflected in the context of war on and 
under the seas, including the implications of the requirements of proportionality 
and distinction for the operations of these systems.
Finally, what seems clear to both authors, despite specific differences, is that 
much more work remains to be done to resolve the question whether—or per-
haps which—UUVs and USVs should be conceptualized as vessels or weapons, 
and to settle the role that should be accorded to legal conventions and historical 
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debates about mine warfare in shaping future practice regarding UUVs. The fact 
that such systems blur the lines between weapons platforms and weapons means 
that ethical as well as legal frameworks may need to be rethought and refined in 
the pursuit of an appropriate balance between the demands of military necessity 
and humanitarian concerns in the naval warfare of the future.
We hope that our discussion of these issues here will prove a useful starting 
point for future research into these questions.
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A THOUSAND SPLENDID GUNS
n Out of the Mountains, David Kilcullen provides a framework for his “theory 
of competitive control.” His work focuses on irregular warfare, and in general 
he addresses nonstate armed groups as one increment along a spectrum of ac-
tors competing to control a population. He theorizes that the competitor who 
can impose predictable norms through persuasive, administrative, and coercive 
means will succeed. The members of the target audience, for their part, need 
consistency, and will adhere to this normative system regardless of whether they 
inherently agree with it or with the competitor’s values.1 What do we learn when 
we apply Kilcullen’s core principles to China and its conduct in the wider western 
Pacific as a state-level competitor?
China’s overwhelming role in regional trade is certainly persuasive, often caus-
ing regional governments of their own volition to dilute their public response to 
Chinese actions rather than risk economic turmoil. Next, China’s island-building 
campaign coupled with China Coast Guard (CCG) support of aggressive com-
mercial activity demonstrates the regime’s intent to exert administrative control 
over disputed areas, even in the face of dissent from the United Nations and the 
international community in general. Finally, this article examines the presence 
and lethality that China’s surface navy provides as 
a key element of the country’s coercive capacity vis-
à-vis the United States and our regional partners.
WEIGHING THE COMPETITORS
Like infantry units ashore, surface combatants 
are the grunts of naval maneuver. The quickest 
method of comparing U.S. Navy combatants with 
those of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy 
I
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TABLE 1
ALPHABETICAL REFERENCE OF USN AND PLAN SURFACE COMBATANTS 
WITH INVENTORY AND TONNAGE; SEE COMPANION FIGURE 1
Class Displacement (tons) Inventory Force Tonnage (tons)
Arleigh Burke Flt I DDG 8,950  21 187,950
Arleigh Burke Flt II DDG 8,946  7  62,622
Arleigh Burke Flt IIa DDG 9,155  34 311,270
Cyclone PC   354  13  4,602
Freedom LCS 3,089  2  6,178
Independence LCS 2,790  2  5,580
Ticonderoga CG 9,957  22 219,054
USN Total —  101 797,256
Houbei PTG  220  60  13,200
Houjian PGG  520  6  3,120
Houxin PGG  478  20  9,560
Jiangdao FFL 1,500  20  30,000
Jianghu I FF 1,702  9  15,318
Jianghu I (upgrade) FF 1,702  6  10,212
Jianghu III FF 1,924  1  1,924
Jiangkai I FF 3,900  2  7,800
Jiangkai II FFG 3,900  20  78,000
Jiangwei I FF 2,250  4  9,000
Jiangwei II FF 2,250  10  22,500
Luda I DD 3,670  2  7,340
Luda IV DD 3,730  4  14,920
Luhai DD 6,000  1  6,000
Luhu DD 4,600  2  9,200
Luyang I DDG 7,000  2  14,000
Luyang II DDG 7,000  6  42,000
Luyang III DDG 7,258  3  21,774
Luzhou DDG 7,000  2  14,000
Sovremenny I DDG 7,940  2  15,880
Sovremenny II DDG 7,940  2  15,880
PLAN Total — 184 361,628
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(PLAN) is a simple hull count: the United States has 101 in its inventory, while 
China comes to the table with 184. China’s numerical advantage gives it more 
flexibility in distributing its surface forces to contest or exercise sea control while 
maintaining an adequate coastal defense. Taking size (displacement measured by 
tonnage) into account yields a superficial advantage for the United States: nearly 
800,000 tons of warship compared with China’s 362,000 tons. Taken together, 
however, the distribution of greater U.S. tonnage into fewer hulls means a more 
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OUR KNIFE AT THEIR GUNFIGHT
The various vessels’ antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) are the key differentiator 
when comparing their organic lethality. Only fifty of the U.S. Navy’s 101 surface 
combatants are equipped to carry a dedicated ASCM: the Flights I and II Arleigh 
Burke–class destroyers and the Ticonderoga-class cruisers. These ships each carry 
eight 1990s-era RGM-84 Harpoons capable of delivering a 488-pound warhead 
over sixty-seven nautical miles (nm). These ships plus an additional thirty-four 
Flight IIa destroyers also can fire the SM-2 in antisurface mode, but the SM-2 is a 
poor substitute because it was designed for air defense; for surface engagements 
it provides only a small warhead and a limited range. The SM-2 is counted here 
for fidelity purposes, with the assumption that each U.S. vessel would load forty 
of its vertical launch cells with SM-2s.
By comparison, all 184 ships listed for the PLAN have an ASCM capabil-
ity. Most carry the YJ-83, a domestic version of the C-802A that advertises a 
419-pound warhead and a 100 nm range. Some vessels have older missiles, but 
the Luyang II and Luyang III destroyers carry the modern YJ-62 (661-pound 
warhead, 150 nm range) and the YJ-18 (661-pound warhead, 290 nm range). 
These missile capabilities are based on available open-source data, frequently 
meaning the information describes the characteristics of export variants such as 
the C-802A. As the Office of Naval Intelligence states, “It is likely the domestic 
versions of these systems have much longer ranges.”2 Table 2 lists these vessels’ 
ASCM capabilities.
This is prima facie evidence that the U.S. Navy has been outmatched in the 
brute-force lethality of its surface combatants. Applying Commander Phillip 
Pournelle’s strike-mile metric quantifies that evidence.3 His metric (listed first) 
is based on delivery of a one-thousand-pound warhead across a given distance; 
subsequent measurements are derived below:
Strike-mile = warhead weight (pounds/1,000) × range (nm)
Individual vessel lethality = ASCM’s strike-mile × vessel’s ASCM load
Class lethality = vessel lethality × fleet inventory
Type lethality = sum of subordinate classes’ lethality
Applying these formulas leads to table 3 and figure 2.
PLAN surface combatants’ ability to deliver antisurface warfare (ASuW) ord-
nance exceeds the U.S. Navy’s by a factor of three. U.S. regional partners are im-
portant, but add little to our collective ASCM capability since they are equipped 
largely with Exocets, the same RGM-84s as the U.S. Navy’s (or older), and, ironi-
cally, China’s export C-802s—all of which can be generalized as being less capable 
than China’s domestic ASCMs.
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 * The SM-2 is an air-defense missile capable of being employed in a secondary ASuW mode.
Class ASCM Capacity Range (nm) Warhead (lbs)








Arleigh Burke Flt II DDG RGM-84 
SM-2*
 8





Arleigh Burke Flt IIa DDG SM-2*  40 (est.)  13 (est.)  254
Cyclone PC Griffin  8  5  13
Freedom LCS None — — —










Houbei PTG YJ-83  8 100  419
Houjian PGG YJ-83  6 100  419
Houxin PGG YJ-83  4 100  419
Jiangdao FFL YJ-83  4 100  419
Jianghu I FF HY-2  6  43.2 1,131
Jianghu I (upgrade) FF YJ-83  8 100  419
Jianghu III FF YJ-83  8 100  419
Jiangkai I FF YJ-83  8 100  419
Jiangkai II FFG YJ-83  8 100  419
Jiangwei I FF YJ-83  6 100  419
Jiangwei II FF YJ-83  8 100  419
Luda I DD CSS-N-2  6  22 1,000
Luda IV DD YJ-83 16 100  419
Luhai DD YJ-83 16 100  419
Luhu DD YJ-83 16 100  419
Luyang I DDG YJ-83 16 100  419
Luyang II DDG YJ-62  8 150  661
Luyang III DDG YJ-18  32 (est.) 290  661
Luzhou DDG YJ-83  8 100  419
Sovremenny I DDG SS-N-22a  8  87  661
Sovremenny II DDG SS-N-22b  8 130  661
TABLE 2
USN AND PLAN SURFACE COMBATANTS’ ASCM CAPABILITIES
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Class Inventory Single Vessel Lethality (strike-miles)
Class Lethality 
(strike-miles)
Arleigh Burke Flt I DDG  21  261.57  5,492.93
Arleigh Burke Flt II DDG  7  261.57  1,830.98
Arleigh Burke Flt IIa DDG  34  132.08  4,490.72
Cyclone PC  13  .52  6.76
Freedom LCS  2  0  0
Independence LCS  2  0  0
Ticonderoga CG  22  261.57  5,754.50
USN Total 101  — 17,575.89
Houbei PTG  60  335.20  20,112.00
Houjian PGG  6  251.40  1,508.40
Houxin PGG  20  167.60  3,352.00
Jiangdao FFL  20  167.60  3,352.00
Jianghu I FF  9  293.16  2,638.40
Jianghu I (upgrade) FF  6  335.20  2,011.20
Jianghu III FF  1  335.20  335.20
Jiangkai I FF  2  335.20  670.40
Jiangkai II FFG  20  335.20  6,704.00
Jiangwei I FF  4  251.40  1,005.60
Jiangwei II FF  10  335.20  3,352.00
Luda I DD  2  132.00  264.00
Luda IV DD  4  670.40  2,681.60
Luhai DD  1  670.40  670.40
Luhu DD  2  670.40  1,340.80
Luyang I DDG  2  670.40  1,340.80
Luyang II DDG  6  793.20  4,759.20
Luyang III DDG  3 6,134.08  18,402.24
Luzhou DDG  2  335.20  670.40
Sovremenny I DDG  2  460.06  920.11
Sovremenny II DDG  2  687.44  1,374.88
PLAN Total  184  —  77,465.63
TABLE 3
ALPHABETICAL REFERENCE OF USN AND PLAN SURFACE COMBATANTS  
WITH VESSEL AND CLASS LETHALITY; SEE COMPANION FIGURE 2
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This is not surprising, given the U.S. Navy’s neglect of the ASuW mission fol-
lowing the end of the Cold War. The price we pay for this neglect is a surface fleet 
doctrinally focused on air defense but relatively incapable of delivering an offen-
sive punch at sea. China, by contrast, has engineered a credible threat that con-
stitutes the maritime cornerstone of its coercive capability in the western Pacific.
DISTRIBUTED LETHALITY IN ACTION
The magnitude of the ASuW mismatch contributed to the U.S. surface navy’s 
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of old ways, returning the fleet to the premise that every ship should be able to 
contribute to the ASuW fight. While the United States arguably remains ahead 
of China in command and control at sea (a gap that China doubtless is closing), 
the PLAN has been implementing distributed lethality’s underlying weapons 
capability since day one of its modern shipbuilding program. This allows China 
to contest and exercise tactical sea control by using distributed lethality exactly 
as the U.S. Navy envisions it: by operating deadly warships independently and in 
small groups.
An individual warship’s immediate combat influence rests on its ability to de-
liver ordnance (its strike-mile metric). Translating that to control of “real estate” 
at sea depends on the range of the warship’s ASCMs. A single PLAN combatant 
carrying the YJ-83 can influence a 200 nm–wide circle that covers 31,400 nm2 of 
sea space. Any vessel in that circle, warship or otherwise, is subject to engagement 
by the PLAN combatant. This certainly represents a, if not the, coercive force 
acting on any ship captain, commercial company, or fleet commander who is 
considering whether to hazard vessels through an opposed environment picketed 
by PLAN combatants.
Consider a linear one-against-one engagement between the most numerous 
blue-water ships of the U.S. Navy and the PLAN: an Arleigh Burke–class Flight 
IIa destroyer (DDG) and a Jiangkai II–class frigate. At problem start, the two 
vessels are 100 nm apart. The Burke is making thirty knots toward the Jiangkai, 
but the Jiangkai’s simplest option is to exhaust the Burke by making a tactical 
withdrawal at, say, twenty-five knots, yielding a five-knot closure rate. This puts 
the U.S. DDG within enemy weapons range for more than seventeen hours before 
it is able to return fire. The most dangerous time comes around hour 16 when 
air-defense watchstanders are fatigued, the Burke is just outside the SM-2’s ASuW 
range, and the Jiangkai can launch a rapid saturation attack with some or all of its 
YJ-83s. Even when the Burke gets within range, it can engage only by using SM-2s 
that (1) have not been used already in self-defense against the YJ-83s, and (2) are 
fired in a secondary ASuW mode.
Unfortunately, the underlying premise of this theoretical engagement is itself 
a tactical error: sending an air-defense destroyer to run down a surface-warfare 
frigate. That error precisely illustrates the limitations we have imposed on our 
fleet commanders and ourselves. The PLAN has gained the initiative by being 
able to outgun our surface combatants in a kinetic engagement.
Combining three or four PLAN combatants into a surface action group (SAG) 
magnifies their lethality. The SAG gains maneuver and attack-vector options, 
complicates its adversary’s targeting requirements, and increases the combat en-
vironment’s ASCM density—the tenets of Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden, Rear 
Admiral Peter Gumataotao, and Rear Admiral Peter Fanta’s distributed lethality.5 
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The SAG also gains redundancy and the ability to share tasks—for example, by 
sectoring engagement responsibilities or delegating air-defense and antisubma-
rine warfare duties. When it comes to sea control, the commander of a four-ship 
PLAN SAG can turn the coercive influence of a single vessel into a formation 
that provides ASCM coverage over the majority of a 400 × 400 nm box while 
keeping every component vessel within mutual-support range. Today that means 
one SAG can distribute enough firepower to cover the Spratly Islands’ 120,000 
nm2.6 This indeed represents the sharp edge of China’s coercive capability at the 
tactical level.
ON STRATEGY
The specter of a maritime war, more than any other military threat, is the iron 
fist beneath the not-so-velvet glove of Chinese policy assertions in the East and 
South China Seas (the ECS and SCS). China’s current military strategy document 
espouses a policy of “active defense in the new situation,” explained as “adherence 
to the unity [among] strategic defense and operational and tactical offense.” The 
document states more specifically regarding the maritime domain, “The tradi-
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covers trade and diplomacy, China’s military policy appears to advance a limited-
war doctrine focused on the sea. At present, China relies on challengers vividly 
perceiving the tactical implications of its naval presence to provide Kilcullen’s 
coercive component at the national level.
The strategic cohesion of China’s persuasive trade, administrative presence, 
and coercive capability is particularly visible for policy makers in China’s near 
abroad. For instance, trade with China constituted 14.5 percent (U.S.$366.5 
billion) of total trade for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
in 2014—ASEAN’s largest single-country trading partner. The United States 
provided more than one-third less, at 8.4 percent, or U.S.$212.4 billion.8 Even 
Vietnam and the Philippines, which have significant disagreements with China in 
the SCS, list China as their first- and second-largest partner, respectively, in terms 
of total trade.9 Japan, one of the staunchest U.S. allies in the Pacific, lists China as 
its largest overall trading partner as well, and has done so since 2008.10 Yet also in 
2014, China “reclaimed” and militarized thousands of acres in the Spratly Islands 
disputed with the Philippines, used dozens of vessels to escort an oil-prospecting 
platform through Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and enforced a con-
troversial air-defense identification zone above the ECS west of Japan.
Beyond such gross trade metrics, economic analysis in the Asia-Pacific is in-
tensely complicated, with additional factors to be considered that include foreign 
direct investment, labor costs, and capital flows. An aggressive policy by Beijing 
could move China’s economic influence from persuasive to coercive, but this 
likely would result in only a Pyrrhic victory, by smothering regional economies 
under a mercantilist blanket. However, as China’s actions indicate, the country’s 
naval power, especially the lethality of its warships, makes this escalation unnec-
essary. The fact that PLAN combatants fulfill the military (i.e., coercive) element 
of Chinese national power means Beijing can keep the setting of its economic 
throttles squarely on “persuasive.”
It is worth noting that although CCG vessels conducted many of China’s 
more questionable presence activities, PLAN surface combatants were often just 
around the corner. It is reasonable to conclude that these warships take note of 
CCG practices in relation to their own future operations. Herein lies one subtlety 
of the PLAN’s coercive force at the strategic level: it would be equally reasonable 
for a government in the region to infer that China one day could replace the front 
line of CCG vessels with ASCM-armed PLAN ships. That change in presence 
would increase China’s sea control exponentially by allowing it to hold an entire 
region at risk physically and economically—strong incentives to dissuade any 
leader from responding strongly.
Nations with deep economic interests at stake but insufficient military force 
to defend them often feel compelled (1) to seek powerful allies and (2) to make 
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deeper concessions to avoid conflict. This is especially so in the present situa-
tion, in which overwhelming military advantage undergirds China’s position. 
The Philippine government provides one example: it has experienced failure in 
attempts to enforce the sovereignty of the country’s territory (such as the oft-
thwarted efforts to resupply RPS Sierra Madre) and to use its EEZ (its fishing 
vessels frequently are bullied out of the area). This is precisely because the Philip-
pine navy cannot compete against the CCG, let alone the PLAN.11 The Philippine 
government is limited to diplomatic appeals because, in the absence of allies, the 
PLAN easily could defeat the Philippine navy at sea.
Enter the United States. One anonymous senior official from an SCS state told 
Robert Kaplan in 2011, “Plan B is the U.S. Navy. . . . An American military pres-
ence is needed to countervail China, but we won’t vocalize that.”12 The weight of 
U.S. economic diplomacy and the prestige of our military bring balance to the 
western Pacific. For now, we are the partner of choice.
The PLAN’s ASCMs have narrowed that choice, though, and have gained 
strategic influence for China by developing a capability precisely where the U.S. 
Navy is weak. Sea control is vital to the Pacific economy, so when considering 
who is best able to provide a predictable order in peace or war, “a more capable 
PLAN” should be read as “a PLAN more capable of defeating the U.S. Navy.” This 
matters immensely to our regional partners as they weigh U.S. commitment and 
capability against the same traits of the Chinese government, with the added 
consideration of China’s superiority in trade, presence, and proximity.
USING THE RIGHT TOOL
When it comes to sea control, the U.S. Navy by doctrine is centered on aviation 
and the carrier strike group (CSG). Even the authors of distributed lethality refer 
to the U.S. surface navy’s high-value-asset defense as “our core doctrine.”13 First 
and foremost, this doctrine relies on a no-fail premise of carrier survival in com-
bat; the CSG’s lethality is contingent on having a platform from which to launch 
and recover aircraft. Second, a U.S. carrier is an impressive sight, but arguably it 
is an inefficient and expensive way to provide presence at sea anytime there is 
no additional concurrent mission, such as combat, strike, or humanitarian assis-
tance. Third, China’s Dragon Eye shipborne phased-array radar, HHQ-9 surface-
to-air missile, DF-21 antiship ballistic missile, and carrier aviation (the latter un-
der development, with Liaoning) all are eroding the U.S. asymmetric advantage 
of effectively delivering carrier-based ordnance outside enemy weapons range.
The U.S. Navy’s submarine force frequently is cited as a powerful, lethal com-
ponent, and rightly so. But the strength of the silent service lies in its stealth. In 
what China calls the “informationized environment” of the western Pacific, a 
stealthy threat contributes little to public narratives, with the phrase “out of sight, 
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out of mind” applying. Even the current advantages that submarines provide to 
the United States in surveillance and wartime lethality are shrinking as more-
expensive platforms lead to fewer hulls. Our adversaries may take into account 
the superb lethality of a U.S. submarine, but that vessel is not the right tool for re-
assuring our partners when it comes to countering the PLAN’s coercive presence.
{LINE SPACE}
Whether U.S. or Chinese, a fleet of well-armed surface combatants provides the 
most economical, resilient, and visible force in the western Pacific. Such vessels 
are indispensable to sea control—the classic enablers of other activities. The hu-
man security of maritime cultures, their use of natural economic resources, and 
the flow of licit trade require a predictable peacetime environment to thrive. If 
conflict comes, the mobility, defense, and resupply of ground troops, land-based 
aviation assets, and ballistic missile defenses need enduring sea control to be 
effective.
The U.S. Navy cannot let “better” be the enemy of “good” in reinvigorating 
ASuW capabilities. Implementing distributed lethality, developing ASCM pro-
grams, and acquiring affordable small- to medium-sized surface combatants 
must be a priority for the U.S. Navy (especially in the Pacific) because they do 
not constitute mere upgrades to an existing ASuW capability—they are a revival 
from near zero.
Beyond our own, the maritime forces of our Pacific allies are crucial, regard-
less of our collective ASCM shortfalls. The western Pacific is as familiar to Japan 
Maritime Self-Defense Force and Royal Australian Navy vessels as the Virginia 
Capes and Southern California operation areas are to the U.S. Navy. There is no 
reason the United States and these strategic partners should not collaborate to 
close the ASCM gap by sharing technology, employing our platforms together, 
and sharing the burden of development and production costs. After all, history 
has shown that committed allies are greater than the sum of their parts.
However, our collective ASuW gap is symptomatic of a larger strategic issue: 
China’s coercive naval force is already a compelling feature of the western Pacific. 
Our National Security Strategy recognizes China’s “new situation” (its desired 
normative order) in the SCS, stating, “On territorial disputes, particularly in 
Asia, we denounce coercion and assertive behaviors that threaten escalation.”14 
The National Military Strategy cites China more explicitly as “adding tension 
to the Asia-Pacific region,” making claims “inconsistent with international law” 
and undertaking “aggressive land reclamation efforts that will allow it to posi-
tion military forces astride vital international sea lanes.”15 China is succeeding 
in these contentious actions because it has laid the foundations of competitive 
control. It has made its trade persuasive, if not vital, to regional economies; has 
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built a capability to assert administrative control; and, most importantly, has 
underwritten all of this with a coercive force. Finally, China uses these levers in 
the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic ecosystem to spin the situ-
ation for external consumption.
Fortunately, the United States does not need its own coercive force per se; 
many nations in the region want to partner with us, and our diplomatic positions 
comport with the norms of international law. What is needed is the presence of 
a balanced fleet to support the policies laid out in our strategy documents and to 
reassure partner nations of our readiness to oppose coercion while they develop 
their own capabilities. Rebalancing our fleet is not a threat to the sovereignty 
of any country that conducts itself by the rule of law. It most certainly should 
be viewed, though, as a potent counter to every country that makes illegitimate 
claims against our allies and partners.
China and the United States are not yet adversaries—but we are competitors. 
China’s recent devaluation of the yuan is indicative of long-discussed economic 
vulnerabilities that may herald a decline in the country’s persuasive trade influ-
ence. Exploiting that decline with a strategy that unites U.S. economic diplomacy 
and a rule-of-law narrative with a balanced maritime force can counter the com-
ponents of China’s competitive control in the western Pacific. Successful imple-
mentation will incline all parties toward a diplomatic solution that averts armed 
conflict. However, the mismatch between China’s rhetoric and its disregard for 
international standards does not bode well. And intentions change faster than 
capabilities.
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CULTIVATING SAILOR ETHICAL FITNESS
 The Navy’s rollout of its Leader Development Strategy provides an opportu-nity to think about new approaches to sailor training and education on ethi-
cal behavior.1 The current approaches are not entirely satisfactory, as they focus 
predominantly on sanctions for ethical failures, such as misallocation of funds 
and extramarital affairs. As former President of the Naval War College and then–
rear admiral Walter E. Carter Jr. explained in his Ethics in the U.S. Navy in March 
2014, “the current culture for Navy ethics is one based on obeying the rules in 
order to avoid punishment.”2 Admiral Carter called for a new approach to Navy 
ethics training and education, making six recommendations; the third was to 
“[b]uild a culture for Navy ethics beyond compli-
ance.”3 This article weaves multiple philosophical 
threads together into an ethical fitness concept as 
a contribution to practical implementation of this 
recommendation. It is designed for sailors engaged 
in combat, both at sea and on land.
This sketch of an ethical fitness concept aims to 
contribute to a strategic-level Navy ethics program 
that both avoids a legalistic focus on rule break-
ing and moves beyond exhortations to “act with 
integrity” to develop practical, actionable, ethical 
decision-making skills. The goal is a concept of 
ethical competence that is both operationally 
effective in time-constrained, dynamic environ-
ments, including combat, and useful for sailors 
performing their daily tasks. Part 1 argues that 
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adding specific ethics training for warriors is required; relying solely on standard, 
academic, off-the-shelf ethics training will not meet program requirements. Part 
2 introduces the concept of “ethical fitness” as a guiding metaphor, using the Ma-
rine Corps’s creation of the Combat Fitness Test as a model for development of 
a sailor ethical fitness concept. Part 3 describes the advantages of the concept of 
ethical fitness as a way to move beyond compliance. Part 4 explores implementing 
the ethical fitness concept in part by employing senior leaders as coaches.
PART 1: WARRIORS REQUIRE A WARRIOR-FOCUSED ETHICS 
TRAINING AND EDUCATION REGIMEN
Before attempting to offer a concept for sailor-as-warrior ethical competency 
development, we must draw a preliminary distinction between sailors as bureau-
crats and as professionals. As Rear Admiral P. Gardner Howe, President of the 
Naval War College, points out, “Our Navy has a dual character. On one hand, it is 
a military department organized as a bureaucracy. The bureaucratic dimension of 
our organization is unavoidable for any organization of our size and complexity. 
But on the other, it is an organization dedicated to supporting a military profes-
sion. It is this dual nature as both a bureaucracy and a profession that shapes our 
key challenge as Navy leaders.”4
Current Navy ethics training emerged from a legal compliance paradigm and 
often has focused on sailors as they operate within the bureaucratic dimension 
of the Navy. While necessary, such training lacks the content necessary to inspire 
sailors operating in complex, violent, uncertain environments. The Navy Code of 
Ethics provides a list of dos and don’ts and includes the following: 
 • Place loyalty to the Constitution, the laws, and ethical principles above private gain.
 • Act impartially to all groups, persons, and organizations.
 • Give an honest effort in the performance of your duties.
 • Protect and conserve Federal property.
 • Disclose fraud, waste, and abuse, and corruption to appropriate authorities.
 • Fulfill in good faith your obligations as citizens, and pay your Federal, State, and 
local taxes.
 • Comply with all laws providing equal opportunity to all persons, regardless of 
their race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap.5 
Regular civilian ethical decision making, such as that captured in the Navy 
Code of Ethics, is governed by the rules of what Nassim Taleb in his book The 
Black Swan describes as “Mediocristan.” The supreme law of Mediocristan is 
“When your sample is large, no single instance will significantly change the ag-
gregate or the total.”6 In this world, traditional ethical guidance, such as Kant’s 
categorical imperative or utilitarian precepts, is often valid. The exceptional 
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situation generating suboptimal outcomes (e.g., an ax-wielding madman kills an 
innocent person) is so rare as not to require special attention.
Yet the ethical behavior rules in normal society poorly prepare warriors for 
combat. As Karl Marlantes in his book What It Is like to Go to War argues, “Our 
young warriors are raised in possibly the only culture on the planet that thinks 
death is [merely] an option. Given this, it is no surprise that not only they but 
many of their ostensible religious guides . . . enter the temple of Mars unprepared. 
Not only is such comfort too often delusional; it tends to numb one to spiri-
tual reality and growth. Far worse, it has serious psychological and behavioral 
consequences.”7
Today a full range of tools is available to prevent or reduce the moral injuries to 
which sailors become subject while performing the ethical tasks associated with 
combat risks. If we do not use these tools to supplement the existing ethics train-
ing and education (which emphasize compliance), we fail to prepare our sailors 
effectively for what they will face.8 This is important, because warriors reside 
in what Taleb refers to as “Extremistan,” where the consequences of action are 
amplified beyond the normal range. Individual actions, taken or not taken, can 
generate consequences at levels ranging from the individual through the tactical 
to the grand strategic, and do so regularly as part of normal professional activity.9
The normal ethics training is not entirely adequate for comprehensively meet-
ing the ethical training and education needs of the military professional dimen-
sion of the Navy, which includes the sailor as warrior. Sailors require an approach 
to ethics training and education tailored for naval professionals, who are, as Ad-
miral Howe points out, professional warriors who also, but not exclusively, act in 
bureaucratic ways as part of performing their professional functions.
The foundation of warrior ethics is the awareness with which warriors take 
sides and accept the risks associated with that decision. They are cognizant of the 
risk-transference impacts of their actions, internalize the tensions in their deci-
sion making, and do not push the negative externalities onto others. As Marlantes 
puts it,
Choosing sides is the fundamental first choice that a warrior must make. . . . The 
second fundamental choice of the warrior is to be willing to use violence to protect 
someone against even intended or implied violence. This second fundamental choice 
engenders an additional choice, which is accepting the risk of death and maiming 
that usually results from the decision to use violence against violence. To become 
a warrior requires making these two fundamental choices and accepting the risks 
entailed. Doing the above eliminates any need to use the adjective “ethical” in front of 
the noun “warrior.” A warrior, by my definition, acts ethically.10
This tripartite decision bundle places warriors in a position that requires 
meta-ethical principles to guide their application of ethical principles. Ethical 
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principles, while congruent parts of an overarching ethical system, are not always 
identical in formulation and application when applied to combat conditions ver-
sus ordinary life. Informed examination of the principles and how they operate 
in the various domains is necessary. In other words, combat demands a supple-
mental ethical operating system. Think of it as a turbocharger, which adds to an 
engine an additional physical capability for extreme situations. The supplemental 
ethical operating system enables effective ethical decision making across the full 
range of life experiences. Building this “turbocharger” requires additional efforts 
to facilitate the development of sailors’ ethical competence.
Therefore, the bulk of traditional academic, off-the-shelf ethical training 
—based on the Golden Rule and fundamental prohibitions such as “do not 
kill”—is not entirely adequate for the sailor-as-warrior. This training starts from 
the assumption that the subjects of the training are rational actors operating in 
accordance with what Nobel Prize–winning thinker Herbert Simon described in 
Reason in Human Affairs as the Single Expected Utility model of rationality, which 
is characterized by well-ordered conditions and a set of tame, if perhaps complicat-
ed, problems.11 Gary Klein, an expert on recognition-primed decision making, in 
his Streetlights and Shadows, refers to such conditions as “streetlight” situations.12
However, warriors must conduct ethical decision making not only under 
streetlights but in poorly illuminated ethical environments, characterized by cha-
otic situations in which individuals must deal with other impassioned individuals 
through the filters of their own passions. They must engage in activities consid-
ered unethical under normal circumstances. Therefore practical ethical decision 
making requires an understanding of what Benedict de Spinoza in his book Ethics 
designated “human bondage,” within which people are ruled by passions, not the 
clear exercise of reason.13 Warriors’ efforts to manage wicked, complex problems 
in dynamic, agonistic environments therefore demand decision-making tech-
niques different from those provided by traditional, rational actor model–based 
ethics training.14
What qualifies as “common sense” under the streetlight does not apply com-
prehensively to the shadow situations of combat. Carl von Clausewitz, in the 
beginning of his book On War, states that a different ethical framework must be 
used when thinking about war. He writes, “Kind hearted people might of course 
think that there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without 
too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. 
Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous 
business that mistakes which come from kindness are the worst.”15 Within the 
traditional ethical perspectives, such as the Kantian, virtue ethics, or utilitar-
ian, the idea that such things as “mistakes from kindness” exist is at first glance 
amoral and unethical.
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However, as Socrates pointed out, the commonsense answer to a dilemma is 
often wrong. In book 1 of The Republic, Socrates, the combat veteran, points out 
that the simple ethical commands to give people what they are owed and never 
tell a lie are not automatically just. He says, “Everyone would surely agree that if 
a sane man lends weapons to a friend and then asks for them back when he is out 
of his mind, the friend shouldn’t return them, and wouldn’t be acting justly if he 
did. Nor should anyone be willing to tell the whole truth to someone who is out of 
his mind.”16 In his search for a definition of justice, Socrates goes on to reject the 
idea that whatever is done to members of the out-group (enemies) is automati-
cally just. The ethical category applying to another person can shift in an instant 
(for example, from enemy combatant to injured prisoner), changing the appro-
priate set of ethical behaviors that apply to that person. Socrates thus articulates 
the complexity of the warrior’s ethical understanding, which includes awareness 
of the risks associated with both action and inaction, for self and others, and the 
central role that time and context play in the ethical treatment of people. This is 
not to say that ethics are relative, only that ethical behavior in Extremistan must 
attend to what Heraclitus referred to as the concealed logos, which in this context 
of ethical decision making can be understood as constituting the meta-level ethi-
cal principles governing when to apply specific ethical principles.17 Discerning, 
while in the shadows, the ethically appropriate action requires robust compe-
tency development.
This is not to say that the traditional approaches are invalid, only that they are 
not entirely sufficient for military professionals. As Klein explains in discussing 
the need for appropriate action in both the streetlights and the shadows, “The 
way we see in bright light differs from the way we see in shadows. Neither is the 
‘right’ way. We need both. This dual viewpoint of light and shadow affects how we 
make decisions and how we make sense of situations. It affects how we plan and 
how we manage risks and uncertainty. It guides how we develop expertise and 
how we use our intuition.”18 Bureaucrats operate under the streetlights; warriors 
often, but not always, in the shadows.
The warrior’s ethical decision making is different from the normal ethic of 
society. This is so not only because killing, for example, is permissible but because 
the warrior internalizes the full risk-management constellation. The warrior un-
derstands the risk of action and inaction, and takes more risk on him- or herself 
so as to reduce it for others. In other words, the warrior confronts the ax-wielding 
madman if necessary, instead of simply allowing that risk to pass him or her by; 
an example of the latter would be to follow the categorical imperative to tell the 
truth (“Which way did that kid go?!” “That way.”) as a means to avoid making an 
appropriate decision (“Put down the ax.”).
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Thus, warriors require a specific ethics training and education program, in 
addition to but distinct from the conventional programs available. The “ethical 
fitness” concept constitutes a framework for this ethical competency develop-
ment program.
PART 2: THE MARINE CORPS COMBAT FITNESS APPROACH AS A 
MODEL FOR CULTIVATING SAILOR ETHICAL FITNESS
The Marine Corps approach to physical fitness offers a model for an approach 
to cultivating warrior ethical fitness. It demonstrates the necessity to add train-
ing, education, and assessment metrics in order to develop and assess specific 
combat-required capabilities. In 2008 the Marines added a Combat Fitness Test 
(CFT) to their existing Physical Fitness Test. As MCO 6100.13 explained, “As 
professional warrior-athletes, every Marine must be physically fit, regardless 
of age, grade, or duty assignment. . . . The Physical Fitness Test (PFT), Combat 
Fitness Test and Remedial Conditioning Program (RCP) are components of an 
effective organizational Combat Conditioning Program.”19 Why did the Marines 
add another fitness, not wellness, test to the existing PFT? Greg Glassman’s defi-
nition of fitness in his article “What Is Fitness?” provides an answer. Fitness is 
the positive pole of the health continuum demarcated by sickness, wellness, and 
fitness.20 Thus, fitness represents a higher degree of health than wellness, and 
professional warrior-athletes must operate at the higher end of the fitness zone of 
the health continuum if they are to execute their missions effectively. Therefore, 
the Marines deemed a combat-specific test necessary because combat requires a 
bundle of physical competencies not cultivated by traditional athletic activity. It 
is possible to be an effective athlete—say, a runner or football player—and yet not 
possess the physical capabilities required for combat. As a result, normal physical 
fitness tests fail to evaluate these competencies adequately, not because the tests 
are flawed, but because they focus on noncombat-related measures of perfor-
mance and effectiveness. Therefore, the Marines deemed necessary an additional 
set of competencies, training to cultivate those competencies, and an assessment 
mechanism to check both the effectiveness of the training and the individual 
possession of the competency.
Just as the Marines have two approaches to developing and testing physical fit-
ness, the traditional PFT and the CFT, specific ethical competency development 
would benefit from a structured approach consisting of both the traditional and 
warrior-specific applications of traditional ethical systems. While conventional 
ethical training can and does meet many of the warrior ethical competency re-
quirements, providing both principles and guidance for the application of those 
principles, it is insufficient. The addition of training and education on combat-
focused application of principles, in accordance with the concept of ethical 
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fitness for warriors, constitutes a necessary expansion to meet the ethical needs 
of twenty-first-century warriors.
Definition of Ethical Fitness
Borrowing the concept of “fitness” from the physical domain provides a model 
for thinking about enhancing sailor-warriors’ ethical competencies to inform 
their daily decision making in both combat and noncombat conditions. Ethical 
fitness consists of effective orientation, observation, decision, and action; with 
full cognizance of the risks; in accordance with Navy core values; applied in a 
violent, uncertain, extreme world.
Mapping ethics onto an ethical health bell curve, with depravity constituting 
the deficient condition, wellness the normal condition, and fitness the highest 
level of ethical competence, clarifies the distinction between the ethically well 
and the ethically fit. As shown in the figure, most people abide in the “ethically 
well” section, following rules and getting along under the normal conditions 
of everyday life. A few are depraved: intentionally harming others; constantly 
attempting to shift risk from themselves; and lying, cheating, and stealing as a 
normal part of their life practices. At the other pole are the ethically fit. The few 
people at this pole take risks on themselves to reduce the risk to others, while 
operating in extreme conditions such as combat.
Applying Ethical Fitness
John Boyd’s presentation “The Essence of Winning and Losing” lays out the 
observation and orientation steps of his observe—orient—decide—act (OODA) 
loop. An individual warrior is ethically fit when he or she can apply these cog-
nitive skills while operating in the dynamic conditions of Extremistan. Ethical 
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context of engagement space, understand their own observations, and use them 
to inform their decisions and actions. Boyd explains that “[o]rientation is the 
Schwerpunkt [focus point]. It shapes the way we interact with the environment 
—hence orientation shapes the way we observe, the way we decide, the way we 
act. . . . Orientation shapes the character of present observation—orientation—
decision—action loops—while these present loops shape the character of future 
orientation.”21 Ethical principles structure this orientation, and the meta-ethical 
principles informing warrior orientation provide an additional layer of insight 
into their application that helps to make sense of observations and inform deci-
sions and actions across all possible environments.
PART 3: ADVANTAGES OF THE ETHICAL FITNESS CONCEPT
The ethical fitness concept has three major advantages over current ethics train-
ing and education. 
First, the ethical fitness concept provides an overarching training, education, 
and practice paradigm, thereby helping to implement Rear Admiral Carter’s rec-
ommendation to move “beyond compliance” in ethics training and education.22 
Framing ethics training and education as the cultivation of ethical fitness consti-
tutes a positive approach to the sort of life-and-death decision making that is the 
specific task of warriors. It does so in a way that enables the flow of passion and 
enthusiasm to “do the right thing” that is the default setting for sailors. In con-
trast, the current Navy ethics guidance is a list of dos and don’ts for bureaucrats, 
not warriors. By avoiding a focus on the negative “don’ts” and “ought nots” from 
philosophers who have never faced combat, the ethical fitness concept provides 
a way for warriors to take the ethical initiative when they find themselves in a 
conflict. This enables sailors to perceive the ethical components of military deci-
sion making not as restraints (can’t do) but as fertile constraints (must do) that 
enable long-term mission success.
Second, the ethical fitness concept provides a framework for the development 
of ethical decision-making habits. Ethical fitness, like physical fitness, arises from 
habitual exercise of the capability, appropriately guided through training and 
deliberative practice. As Aristotle said, “Thus the virtues arise in us neither by na-
ture nor against nature, but we are by nature able to acquire them, and reach our 
complete perfections through habit.”23 Habitual (regular, repeated) application of 
the desired behavior is necessary for humans actually to possess a competency. 
Aristotle compared the process of acquiring ethical competency to the sort of 
hands-on training that builders receive. Aristotle explained, “Virtues, by contrast, 
we acquire, just as we acquire crafts, by having previously activated them. For we 
learn a craft by producing the same product that we must produce when we have 
learned it, become builders, e.g., by building and harpists by playing the harp: so 
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also, then, we become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate 
actions, brave by doing brave actions.”24 Athletic habituation ingrains appropriate 
movement patterns, just as experience, including imaginative experience gener-
ated through training and education, ingrains ethically fit behavior.
Third, the ethical fitness concept provides a framework for ethical behavior in 
multiple contexts. Warriors engage in activities not obviously justifiable using the 
conventional ethical metrics of Mediocristan. As General James Mattis said in his 
2004 William C. Stutt Ethics Lecture at the U.S. Naval Academy, entitled “Ethical 
Challenges in Contemporary Conflict: The Afghanistan and Iraq Cases,” “Your 
job, my fine young men and women, is to find the enemy that wants to end this 
experiment and kill every one of them until they’re so sick of the killing that they 
leave us and our freedoms intact.”25
However, a warrior is not engaged in killing all the time or in all places, or even 
indiscriminately in any one place or at any given time. Therefore, to act appropri-
ately in multiple contexts, warriors must build, on the foundational ethical habits, 
what the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche referred to as “brief habits.” 
Nietzsche wrote, “I love brief habits and consider them an invaluable means for 
getting to know many things and states down to the bottom of their sweetnesses 
and bitternesses; my nature is designed entirely for brief habits, even in the needs 
of its physical health and generally as far as I can see at all, from the lowest to the 
highest.”26 By extending the range of human experience, and of expertise within 
that experience, brief ethical habits inform individual warrior decisions and 
actions and thus foster the advanced level of ethical development necessary for 
warriors and leaders. A life in which the same ethical habits are applied in all con-
tingencies will fail to correspond appropriately to the demands of an Extremistan 
ethical situation, just as performing the same set of exercises (even with good 
technique) without variation can lead to decreases in physical capability. Training 
and practice consisting of varied stimuli and responses are necessary for ethical 
growth, and challenges stimulate development.27 The warrior requires multiple 
brief habits for ethical decision making to facilitate decision making across the 
full range of life activities.
The employment of the various ethical habit sets can be thought of as corre-
sponding to weapons readiness levels.28 Weapons status readiness levels describe 
the appropriate posture for weapons employment; similarly, the ethical habit set 
articulates the balance of risk (between self and other) and the appropriate level 
of violence available to respond to adversary action. The ethical habit set for com-
bat is different from that for an exercise, just as weapons readiness levels change 
with the situation. Hence, “mere” ethical wellness is insufficient for warriors; they 
require education, training, and practice to become ethically fit to enable them to 
shift rapidly among appropriate ethical habits. 
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The concept of brief habits 
has the advantage of opening 
space for forgiveness, respect 
for the enemy, treatment of the 
dead, etc. He who is an enemy 
in one moment can become a 
prisoner or a fellow human be-
ing whose life has ended in the 
next. In dynamic combat con-
ditions, such a shift can occur 
faster than it can be articulated 
explicitly. The training task is 
therefore to infuse warriors’ 
intuition (their tacit understanding), and thus their decisions and actions, with 
the appropriate ethical operating system. Brief habits, as part of ethical fitness, 
provide a way to think through how to deal with these varying circumstances. 
The ethically fit individual will have ingrained the correct “movement patterns” 
and thus possess the “muscle memory” necessary to decide and act appropriately 
in every situation.
PART 4: CONCEPT IMPLEMENTATION—COACHING THE ETHICAL 
FITNESS WORKOUT
Implementation of the ethical fitness concept requires appropriate training and 
education—in other words, the development of an effective ethical habituation 
process. Indeed, the Navy as an institution has a responsibility to provide robust 
and effective ethics training. As General Mattis has said, “A tragedy is when one 
of your beloved young sailors or Marines, who will literally die to carry out your 
orders, does something, and now you have to court-martial him. That is the last 
thing you ever want to do, because you failed to talk your people through it, to il-
lustrate for them what it’s going to be like.”29 Ethics training for bureaucrats based 
on ethical habits developed for everyday life in Mediocristan will not avert the 
tragedies to which General Mattis refers.
Yet simply saying that we need more and better ethics training is an inap-
propriate response. Effective ethics training must overcome two challenges: the 
scarcity of attention resources and the rules-based compliance model. Ethical 
fitness provides a framework for developing an ethical training regime that meets 
both these challenges.
Scarcity of Attention
As Herbert Simon has pointed out, in a time of nearly unlimited information, the 
critical limiting factor is attention.30 Even as the increasing complexity of Navy 
Weapon 
Conditions Weapon Status
Likelihood Weapon  
Use Required
Condition 1 Magazine inserted, round in 
chamber, slide forward, and 
decocking/safety lever on
High
Condition 2 Not applicable Medium
Condition 3 Magazine inserted, chamber 
empty, slide forward, and  
decocking/safety lever on
Medium
Condition 4 Magazine removed, chamber 




NWC_Autumn2016Review.indb   102 9/15/16   12:47 PM
108
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/1
 HA L L E T T  1 0 3
tasks demands additional training, attention resources available to focus on train-
ing decrease. As a result, the reliance on more training to solve organizational 
problems creates its own ethical challenges. As Leonard Wong and Stephen J. 
Gerras point out in their Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession, 
the well-intentioned effort to provide more training to deal with problems can 
have “detrimental effects on training management due to the suffocating amount 
of mandatory requirements imposed upon units and commanders.”31
Similar tensions exist in the Navy. Therefore the training dedicated to ethics 
must be sensitive to this attention-constrained environment instead of simply 
adding more training as the answer to every challenge. Effective training will 
provide the minimum effective dose of ethics training in a way warriors find 
useful. A list of dos and don’ts is unlikely to meet this need. While compliance 
with rules is essential, it is not sufficient. Thus, warrior ethics training must go 
beyond a compliance-based set of rules on what to do and not do. It must provide 
principles that not only explicitly guide action but intuitively inform the moral 
operating system that animates the orientation of decision making. This enables 
warriors to make value-based judgments that are always in accordance with the 
highest ethical standards.
The How-To
So how do we capture the warrior’s attention and provide the minimum effective 
ethics training and education dose in time-constrained, complex environments?
Effectively capturing the warrior’s attention requires that training and educa-
tion be delivered not by an outsider but by a leader who is on the field of Mars 
with the warrior. Just as a team coach provides expert advice on techniques and 
training for the sport, so the military has coaches: senior leaders with expertise 
in navigating ethical situations. These coaches, serving as role models, provide 
positive tools to enhance the warrior’s competency to move through the OODA 
loop ethically.
Coaches facilitate warrior ethical competencies by developing their ethical 
decision-making mental models through the pathways of life experience and 
education, similar to the development of physical competency through drills 
in the weight room and on the sports field. As Klein writes, “Mental models 
are developed through experience—individual experience, organizational ex-
perience, and cultural experience.”32 By guiding reflection on experience and 
discussing imaginative experience gained through training and educational ac-
tivities, coaches facilitate development of the ethical competencies that together 
constitute ethical fitness, just as a physical coach guides a workout. Coaches do 
not simply point out mistakes; they are sensitive to tacit knowledge derived from 
understanding the context of an action, and help to sensitize those they coach to 
the weak signals emerging from the shadows.
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Coaching takes many forms, including “workouts” that cultivate ethical com-
petency. Admiral Carter articulates possible coach-provided ethical training and 
education content:
[S]potlight examples of good ethical choices and behavior; as well as examples that 
favorably represent the naval profession. . . . [I]nstitutionally reward good decisions 
and actions that reinforce Navy Core Values and the Navy Ethos. Tend to the moral 
development of our Sailors—i.e., helping them develop habits for making the right 
ethical choices and utilizing proper discretionary judgment. . . . [P]rovide opportuni-
ties for facilitated dialogues, peer discussions, and open roundtables around topics of 
motivation, reasoning, and processing of moral choices. Capitalize on existing training 
and education that present opportunities to instill ethics discussions and learning.33 
[italics in original]
Ethical fitness workouts can vary significantly in length and intensity. Exam-
ples include plan of the day (POD) notes requiring a minute to read;34 complex, 
multiactor scenarios as capstone events in schools; asides in lectures; boxed texts 
in doctrinal manuals; and commentaries on recommended texts. Such material 
exists: Steven Pressfield’s The Warrior Ethos, Karl Marlantes’s already-mentioned 
What It Is like to Go to War, Nicholas Monsarrat’s The Cruel Sea, E. D. Swinton’s 
Defense of Duffer’s Drift, and many others; it need only be placed in the appropri-
ate package for sailor use. The lessons literature need not focus on mistakes; es-
pecially for those beginning their ethical fitness workouts, providing positive role 
models for making ethically fit decisions in complex, chaotic situations provides 
outstanding value. For example, Steven Pressfield’s book The Lion’s Gate offers 
multiple positive examples, such as the way Ran Ronen dealt with his mistake in 
combat during the Six-Day War: by taking more risk on himself and his squad by 
flying his plane under the other Mirage formations (so low, in fact, that he created 
a wake on the Mediterranean Sea below) so as to avoid transferring that risk onto 
others through failure to hit his targets at the assigned time.35
Ethical fitness can be achieved only by engagement—by wrestling with ethical 
issues in a wide variety of environments. Its relationship to rules (rules are neces-
sary but not sufficient and not always available) makes ethical fitness difficult, 
both for practitioners and for those working to train and educate warriors aspir-
ing to ethical fitness. The ethically fit must decide and act both in compliance 
with explicit rules and dynamically in accordance with core values.
This article offers the ethical fitness concept as a contribution to implementing 
previous calls to enhance the Navy’s approach to ethics training and education. 
The addition of an active growth and exercise component to ethics training and 
education, based on an analogy to the physical demands of combat (sprinting, 
climbing through warped hatches, lifting ammunition, etc.), provides a readily 
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comprehensible, accessible, and actionable methodology for engaging in ethical 
decision making both in the extremes of combat and in everyday life. Ethical fit-
ness therefore provides a way to think about ethics training and practice that goes 
beyond exhortations to “be good.” The goal is to provide sailors with practical, 
actionable ethical decision-making skills. Importantly, the ethical fitness con-
cept adds to the rich set of images, such as “moral compass,” “golden rule,” and 
“straight and narrow,” that already shape ethics education and practice.36
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WARS AND RUMOURS OF WARS
 On three occasions between 1593 and 1637, the incumbent rulers of Japan gave serious consideration to sending military expeditions against the Span-
ish rulers of the Philippines. None of these proposed invasions ever set sail, but 
an examination of the plans made and the reasons they were not put into effect 
sheds considerable light on Filipino-Japanese relations during the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries. As all three ventures foundered partly because 
of a lack of naval capacity, these little-known schemes also provide important 
information about Japan’s military capabilities at this time in its history.
Spanish colonists first arrived in the Philippines in 1564 as a result of an ex-
pedition from the Americas under Miguel López 
de Legazpi, and on 23 July 1567 in a letter to King 
Philip II, this “very humble and faithful servant 
who kisses your hands and feet” notes that Chinese 
and Japanese came to trade on the larger islands, 
bringing with them “silks, woolens, bells, porce-
lains, perfumes, iron, tin, colored cotton cloths, 
and other small wares.”1 The letter is the first ac-
knowledgement of peaceful encounters between 
the Spanish and the Japanese.
It was not long before there were interactions of 
a very different kind, involving marauding bands 
of wakō, the pirate gangs who were usually per-
ceived to be Japanese even when they included an 
international component. In 1572, Juan de Salcedo 
fought Japanese junks off the coast of Pangasinan 
113
Naval War College: Autumn 2016 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 1 0 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
and Pablo Carrion drove Japanese pirates from an enclave at the mouth of the 
Cagayan River.2 It is in the accounts of such operations that we find the first 
descriptions in any European language of Japanese military techniques and mar-
tial customs, from death-defying charges to acts of ritual suicide. So impressed 
were the Spanish by these warriors that they began to recruit mercenaries from 
pacified wakō and also from within the expatriate Japanese community. However, 
even though Japanese bravery was recognised and valued, there was a noticeable 
undercurrent of fear that one day these independent-minded warriors might rise 
up against their employers. In its most extreme form, that fear envisaged a local 
uprising in support of an invasion of the Philippines from Japan—an event that 
was by no means a remote possibility.
HIDEYOSHI AND THE PHILIPPINES, 1592–98
The earliest written mention of fears of a Japanese invasion in the broadest sense 
of the word appears in a Memorial to the Council of 1586, in which there is specu-
lation within Manila that the Japanese wakō might have greater ambitions beyond 
mere plunder: they “make a descent almost every year, and, it is said, with the 
intent of colonizing Luçon [Luzon].”3 That never happened, but in 1591 the first 
proper invasion scare began when the Philippines entered the consciousness of 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–98). By means of a series of brilliant military cam-
paigns, Hideyoshi had reunified Japan after the chaos of a century of civil war, 
and he now set his mind on overseas expeditions. The addition of the Philippines 
to his megalomaniac aims was credited to a certain “Farandaquiemon [Faranda 
Quiemon]—a Japanese of low extraction,” who induced Hideyoshi “to write in 
a barbarous and arrogant manner to the governor, demanding submission and 
tribute, and threatening to come with a fleet and troops to lay waste the country.”4
Farandaquiemon was a Japanese Christian merchant from Sakai called 
Harada Kiemon. He had visited Manila on several occasions, most recently in 
1591, and, having looked at its defences, he returned to Japan convinced that 
the city could be taken easily.5 Together with his colleague Hasegawa Sōnin, de-
scribed as a “court favourite,” Kiemon persuaded Hideyoshi to write his arrogant 
letter to the governor of the Philippines.6 Hideyoshi’s military strength and his 
unification of Japan had become known in Manila, so the bombastic letter begins 
with a reference to these military triumphs and his miraculous birth that had au-
gured Hideyoshi’s destiny to rule other nations. The threats appeared later in the 
missive: “If an ambassador is not sent, I shall unfurl my banner and send an army 
against that country to conquer it with a multitude of men; so that that country 
will repent at not having sent me an ambassador.”7
The Spanish sent back a reply dated 1 May 1592 that was delivered to Hideyo-
shi by the Dominican friar Juan Cobo. Cobo traveled to Japan with a Chinese 
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Christian called Antonio López, who appears to have been sent as a spy. Cobo and 
López met Hideyoshi at Nagoya Castle, the military base in Kyushu built for the 
invasion of Korea. “Cobo showed the king of Japon [Japan] the kingdoms of our 
king on a globe. He gave this to the king, with the names of the kingdoms written 
in Chinese characters, with the distances between them.”8 Harada Kiemon then 
took personal charge of a second Japanese embassy to Manila. The Japanese del-
egation and Cobo’s embassy left for the Philippines in two separate ships, which 
was fortunate in view of the disaster that would overcome the embassy, because 
Cobo’s ship was wrecked off Taiwan and he died at the hands of aboriginal head-
hunters. Antonio López arrived safely in Japan aboard Harada’s vessel.9
Harada Kiemon began his address to the council in Manila by stating that 
Hideyoshi had laid on a magnificent reception for Juan Cobo because he “knew 
that the Spaniards are a warlike nation.”10 Impressive though Kiemon was, the 
council gave much more attention to debriefing Antonio López, who certainly 
knew how to gather information. On 1 June 1593, López was questioned closely 
under oath about what he had seen and done in Japan, with most of the questions 
relating to his knowledge of any Japanese plans for an attack on the Philippines. 
López said first that he had heard that Hideyoshi had entrusted the conquest to 
“Kunquyn,” which probably refers to Harada Kiemon.11 There was also a possible 
motive, because “[i]n Japon there is universal talk of the abundance of gold in 
this land. On this account, the soldiers are anxious to come here; and are coming, 
as they do not care to go to Core [Korea], which is a poor country.”12 López also 
stated that the Japanese had interrogated him about the military strength of the 
Philippines. He seems to have tried misinformation on that point, even though 
his initial reply had caused some arrogant amusement: “The [Japanese] laughed 
when they heard Antonio say that these islands contained four or five thousand 
Spaniards. They said that the defense of these islands was merely a matter for jest, 
for one hundred of the Japanese were worth two or three hundred of us.”13
López also mentioned that three large ships were being built in Japan, although 
he did not know their purpose, and he warned his hosts that in his opinion the 
Chinese community in Manila could not be trusted.14 López also had overheard 
the Japanese discussing the likelihood of the Philippines being reinforced when 
under attack. “[F]our months are needed to go from Mexico to Luçon,” said 
López, “and on this account but few soldiers could come from Mexico. Japan is 
not more than twenty days’ journey distant, and therefore it would be well for us 
to appreciate this fact.”15 In terms of Harada Kiemon’s personal ambitions, every-
one López had met believed that when the Philippines were conquered he would 
become the governor.16
More interesting details then emerged about the size of the invading army, al-
though the figures were very vague. López heard in “Hunquin’s house” (probably 
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referring to Hasegawa Sōnin) that one hundred thousand would be sent, but 
when López (modifying his earlier figures) told them that the Philippines only 
contained five to six thousand soldiers, of whom no more than three to four 
thousand guarded Manila, the Japanese said that ten thousand would suffice. His 
host later told him that they had decided further that no more than five to six 
thousand men would be needed, conveyed on ten large ships.17
The final point López covered was the invasion route: “[T]hey will come by 
way of Liuteui [the Ryukyu Islands, modern Okinawa Prefecture].”18 An invasion 
route via the Ryukyus and then Taiwan was the sensible one; it avoided open seas 
for the maximum amount of time, and it is only five hundred miles from Taiwan 
to Luzon. This was exactly the route the Japanese chose in World War II, when 
they attacked the Philippines from Taiwan, with additional forces landing farther 
south on Luzon from Amami-Ō-shima.
The threat was sufficiently serious for the Spanish to take specific defensive 
precautions, and López’s information, limited though it was, probably proved 
helpful. A document entitled “Luzon Menaced by Japanese” by Governor Gómez 
Pérez Dasmariñas ordered the citizens to stockpile food and arms. All ships com-
ing from Japan were to be searched. Twenty vessels would be stationed in the 
river below the artillery of the fort, with all other boats being moved upstream. 
The invaders could not then use the latter to build defences, and the seacoast 
would be kept clear for fighting. No ship was to leave without permission lest 
its crew be caught and interrogated, nor should any gold or silver be moved out 
of Manila. It also was recommended that the Japanese residents of Manila be 
moved to a settlement outside the city, and Japanese servants monitored closely.19 
Then a review was held of the available troops, including retired men who still 
held weapons. It was estimated that the defence of Manila alone required one 
thousand men, or six hundred at the least. The latter figure was the one included 
in the document, which implies that six hundred men were all they had. Other 
strongpoints required fewer, and there would be twenty-five soldiers on board 
each of four vessels to guard the coasts. The total strength available to withstand 
a Japanese attack was put at a disappointing 1,517 men, only a quarter of the 
number about which López had told the Japanese in Nagoya. Spanish defenders 
were outnumbered four to one, using his lowest estimate of the invading forces.20
The Philippines remained on high alert for four years after Harada’s visit, and 
during that time the Spanish authorities closely monitored Hideyoshi’s military 
expedition against Korea. It was launched during the summer of 1592 and rapidly 
changed from being a blitzkrieg success to a long and painful retreat. The Korean 
campaign revealed a major Japanese weakness in naval warfare and support, and 
one of the main reasons for Japan’s eventual defeat was that the Korean navy 
severed Japan’s lines of communication between Busan and the Japanese island 
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of Tsushima.21 The encouraging lesson was not wasted on Manila. If Hideyoshi 
could not control the Tsushima Strait, how could he ever contemplate sending an 
invasion fleet as far as Luzon?
As his Korean incursion dragged on, Hideyoshi grew increasingly suspicious 
concerning the activities of Portuguese and Spanish missionaries in Japan. An 
active persecution of Christianity followed, and Japan’s first martyrs died in 
February 1597. One of them, Fray Martin of the Ascension, wrote a letter to the 
governor of the Philippines as he was on his way to his execution. It includes what 
he had heard about Hideyoshi’s intentions toward the Philippines. “It is said that 
next year he will go to Luzon, and that he does not go this year because of being 
busy with the Coreans.”22 Martin also commented on the invasion route, whereby 
“he intends to take the islands of Lequios and Hermosa [Ryukyus and Taiwan], 
throw forces from them into Cagayan, and thence to fall upon Manila, if God 
does not first put a stop to his advance.”23
Manila gave some consideration to a preemptive Spanish occupation of Taiwan 
but, as Fray Martin had envisaged, God put a stop to Hideyoshi’s plans. Hideyoshi 
died in 1598, the troops in Korea were recalled, and no fleet sailed for Manila. A 
Spanish reconnaissance of Taiwan may well have been carried out at this time, but 
no attempt was made to exert control over the island. That had to wait until 1626, 
when the Spanish established Fort San Domingo (modern Keelung).24
THE PHILIPPINES AND THE MATSUKURA FAMILY, 1630–31
Japanese naval weakness would come up again as a crucial factor when an inva-
sion of the Philippines was considered for a second time, in 1630.25 Japan was 
now under the rule of the Tokugawa family.
The persecution of Christians had intensified since the time of Hideyoshi, and 
now the only contact Japanese Christians had with the outside world was a hand-
ful of brave priests who entered Japan secretly. The Japanese authorities believed 
they spread sedition and encouraged disobedience, and most of them came by 
way of Manila, so an invasion of the Philippines would be a heavy-handed way of 
closing the loophole once and for all.26
However, trade between the two countries was acceptable to both sides. Silver 
was an important commodity, and Japanese mines yielded perhaps a third of 
global silver production during the period covered by this article.27 As Antonio 
de Morga wrote, “[I]t is well to keep the king of Japon friendly by this means. For 
if he were not so he would be the greatest enemy that could be feared, on account 
of the number and size of his realms, and the valor of the people therein, who are, 
beyond comparison, the bravest in all India.”28
The 1630 invasion scheme was associated almost completely with a single 
enthusiast: Matsukura Bungo-no-kami Shigemasa (1574–1630), the daimyō 
NWC_Autumn2016Review.indb   111 9/15/16   12:47 PM
117
Naval War College: Autumn 2016 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 1 1 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
(great lord) and notorious tyrant of Shimabara in Hizen Province, whose cruel 
treatment of the people and persecution of Christians is very well recorded.29 The 
Philippines entered Shigemasa’s consciousness in 1624 when two ships belonging 
to the Matsukura were blown off course and ended up on the islands. On return-
ing to Japan, their captains spoke enthusiastically about the considerable mercan-
tile activity that existed between Japan and the Philippines and how Shigemasa 
might be able to gain control of it by means of a military expedition.30 Shigemasa 
took no immediate action, because it would have been without precedent for any 
daimyō to act in such a manner purely on his own initiative, rather than by direc-
tion of the shogun. But then an incident occurred that provided him the opportu-
nity for an authorised expedition to the Philippines—to avenge an insult to Japan.
The affront had its roots in Macao, where in 1622 the Portuguese heroically 
had beaten off a Dutch attack. A handful of Japanese mercenaries had served on 
the Dutch side.31 The attempt caused such alarm in Manila that the Spanish sent 
reinforcements to Macao in case of a renewed incursion. The Spanish troops were 
ordered to stand down in 1624, but instead of sailing straight home to the Philip-
pines their leaders chose to engage in a leisurely piratical expedition.32
Among their targets was Siam, where they preyed on the local freight vessels 
“carrying as merchandise, rice, considerable pepper, and some cloth. The last 
named was much needed by the infantry, who already had no shirts on account 
of the long voyage.”33 One of the ships they attacked and burned belonged to the 
king of Siam, but the Spanish pirates really exceeded their brief when they at-
tacked a Japanese “red seal” ship—an authorised trading vessel. It had been sent 
to Siam by the machidoshiyori (town elder) of Nagasaki, Takaki Sakuzaemon.34
The Spanish account of the affair is very shamefaced; it admits that “[o]ne 
[ship] was Japanese, and carried drugs and merchandise. It was captured in good 
faith, but the justification of this act is being discussed. It is thought that the Japa-
nese will be remunerated for the injury received, as they ought not to have been 
harmed.”35 The most serious aspect of the incident was the appropriation of the 
red seal—an act that amounted to an attack on the shogun’s personal authority.36 
A profound apology subsequently was conveyed to Nagasaki.
No acknowledgement came from the Japanese side, and at its meeting in Ma-
nila on 16 January 1629 the council decided to take the matter no further, while 
minuting four reasons why relations between Spain and Japan were at such a low 
level. The first was that Spanish trade had been embargoed, not for commercial 
reasons, but because of its links to Christianity. The second point was that the 
Japanese had refused to receive any Spanish ambassadors. The third referred to 
the “old time robberies” of the Hideyoshi era and his threats of invasion, a theme 
echoed in the Spaniards’ understanding of the current situation in their fourth 
point: 
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Because . . . the Japanese had news of the richness of these islands, they have always 
tried to conquer them, by endeavoring to get a foothold on the island of Hermosa, in 
order to make it a way-station for the conquest of Luzon. That has caused the gover-
nors of Philipinas to make great expenditures and vast preparations during the past 
few years; and but recently it is learned that discussions of this kind are rife in Japon 
and that their reason for not doing it is not the lack of malice but of power.37
Matsukura Shigemasa possessed both malice and power. He realised the op-
portunity that had fallen into his lap, and he addressed the rōjū (the shogun’s 
senior advisory council) in Edo as follows:
Luzon is governed by the Western country [Spain], and that country in conjunction 
with Namban [Portugal] is ever looking for an opportunity to invade this empire. 
For that reason there is a fear that our country will be disturbed. All who come from 
Spain to Japan touch at Luzon. Therefore if I shall conquer that country with my own 
troops, place my own agents there, and thus destroy the base of the Westerners, this 
country will be secure for years to come. If I be permitted I will cross over to Luzon 
and conquer it. I pray that the vermilion seal of the Great Lord, giving me an estate of 
100,000 koku there, may be granted me.38
To his own desire for territorial expansion and personal wealth Shigemasa 
therefore had added as justification the possibility of invasion of Japan by Spain. 
While holding back from a binding commitment to send Japanese troops to Ma-
nila, the shogun gave Shigemasa permission to investigate it as a potential target 
and to make military preparations. On 14 December 1630, with the cooperation 
of the Nagasaki bugyō (commissioner) Takenaka Umene, Shigemasa sent two 
retainers called Yoshioka Kurōemon and Kimura Gonnojō to Manila to spy out 
the Spanish defences.39 They were disguised as merchants and their cover story 
was that they wished to discuss the development of trade. Each had ten ashigaru 
(foot soldiers) under his command, but during a stormy return crossing all ten 
of Kimura’s men perished.
While they were away, Shigemasa continued his military preparations. The 
paucity of sources for what appears to have been the most serious attempt to 
invade the Philippines is regrettable, although the omissions may indicate simply 
that certain crucial aspects were never considered. All that is known for certain 
is that Shigemasa amassed three thousand bows and muskets for his army.40 As 
these are foot-soldier weapons, one might envisage an additional 1,500 foot-
soldier spearmen and half that number of samurai with noncombatant support 
troops, making the total numbers in Shigemasa’s army about the same as the 
five to six thousand reported by Antonio López in 1593. There is no mention 
of naval support in the very meagre sources, nor is any indication given that 
Shigemasa knew that the important way station of Taiwan had acquired a Span-
ish fort since the time of Hideyoshi. Finally, no consideration was given to the 
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need for artillery against the walls of Manila, but that omission possibly could 
be explained by the fact that Shigemasa was awaiting the arrival of his spies with 
the relevant information.
The men returned to Japan in July 1631. No records of the intelligence they 
brought back with them have survived, but their information is unlikely to have 
been either profound or accurate, because they were a far cry from the ninja of 
Japanese martial fantasy. The authorities on the Philippines knew exactly who 
they were and the real purpose of their visit, as is confirmed by the unsigned 
“Events in Filipinas” of 2 July 1632:
In Japon they are still pricked with the thorn of the ship which some years ago our 
galleons captured and burned on the bar of Sian. To avenge this, notable councils 
have been held in Japon, in order to come and wage war against this land; in order 
beforehand to have it well explored, they sent last year in January two merchant ships, 
under cloak of trade and traffic. Although in Manilla warning of this double object 
had been received, this was not made known; and they were received and regaled as 
ambassadors from the Tono of Arima and Bungo. A ceremonious reception and very 
handsome present were given to them; but the city was put in readiness for whatever 
might happen.41
A separate Jesuit source suggests that a deliberate attempt was made to impress 
on the spies the futility of attempting to take Manila by force. It comes in a report 
sent to Spain on 29 July 1631 by Hernando Pérez. In it he stated unambiguously 
that Yoshioka and Kimura were “sham envoys sent to investigate our situation 
in order to have an easy conquest of our country.” Pérez confirmed that presents 
were given and banquets were held. “However, although on the surface there was 
a warm reception, in reality there was a display of military strength in accordance 
with a situation of war. As the envoys passed through the town the army units 
were lined up from the seashore to the governor’s residence.” Pérez concluded 
that the envoys were “amazed” by what they saw.42 Their undercover mission 
therefore came to nothing.
The mission was nullified anyway by the unexpected death of the invasion 
commander, Matsukura Shigemasa.43 He had died suddenly in a bathhouse in 
Obama while his spies were still in Manila. Murder was suspected.44
THE DUTCH AND THE FINAL INVASION PLANS, 1637
No further considerations were given to an expedition against the Philippines 
for another five years, but while Christian refugees from Japanese persecution 
continued to arrive in Manila, so also continued the much smaller reverse flow 
of secret priests to Japan. The last of the line, Father Sidotti, would arrive in 
Japan in 1708. It may have been only a trickle, but it was enough evidence of 
a continuing Christian problem to ensure that the idea of an invasion of the 
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Philippines rumbled on after Shigemasa’s death. Shigemasa was succeeded by his 
son Matsukura Nagato-no-kami Katsuie, who proved to be as much of a tyrant 
and enemy of Christianity as his father, and it is during Katsuie’s reign as daimyō 
of Shimabara that we encounter the hatching of the final scheme to invade the 
Philippines. Once again there was concern about the lack of Japanese naval 
capacity—a deficiency that possibly could be made up by Japan’s loyal trading 
partners from the Dutch East India Company (the Company).
The instigator of the 1637 invasion plans was neither Matsukura Katsuie nor 
his master, the shogun Tokugawa Iemitsu, even though the Dutch were con-
vinced the shogun was to blame.45 Instead it appears to have been the brainchild 
of the two current bugyō of Nagasaki, Sakakibara Hida-no-kami Toshishige and 
Baba Saburōzaemon Motonao, who hoped thereby to curry favour with their 
superiors. The matter was raised at a meeting held toward the end of September 
1637 with François Caron of the Company.46 Caron long had been insisting that 
all Japanese trade should be shifted from the Portuguese to the Dutch, and one 
plank of his argument had been to contrast the Portuguese willingness to flout 
Japanese laws with the Dutch attitude of docile obedience.47
The bugyō listened respectfully to Caron, then changed the subject to 
help from the loyal Dutch to destroy the Iberian bases of Manila, Macao, and 
Keelung.48 Of these three potential targets, the bugyō believed Manila was the top 
priority because its status as the source of supply for Catholic priests would be the 
best bargaining counter to use with their superiors in Edo when the time came to 
gain official permission to invade.
That was of course essential, but so was an army—and the bugyō were civil-
ian officials, not commanders of samurai. The invading army would have to be 
supplied either by the shogun or by a daimyō, such as Matsukura Katsuie, acting 
on the shogun’s behalf. As for numbers, apparently an expeditionary force of ten 
thousand men was envisaged, although this is only a supposition based on com-
ments made after the expedition had been canceled.49 That figure would have 
been twice the estimated number that Matsukura Shigemasa had planned for 
1630, so other daimyō would have had to be involved as well. The bugyō were, 
however, astute enough to realise that once again naval power would be a seri-
ous weakness, so a guarantee of Dutch naval support would ensure that the army 
could be transported. It also would reduce the costs of the operation, which was 
another positive point to place before the shogun.
The bugyō did not approach the matter as supplicants. Instead they broached 
the subject in an assertive manner by challenging the Dutch to explain why, 
if they had the command of the sea, as they so often claimed, Manila had not 
become theirs already. Was it not also true that they had made an attack on Ma-
cao in 1622 and had been repulsed? Caron replied with a long and not entirely 
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accurate account of the 1622 expedition that sidestepped the reasons for the de-
feat. The inclusion of Japanese mercenaries in the Dutch attacking force was not 
mentioned; the bugyō were unlikely to have heard of it, and the Dutch would not 
have admitted that Japanese were involved on the losing side.50
As for attacking Manila in 1637, it was by then one of the most heavily forti-
fied places in East Asia. Caron had no desire to assault it, nor even to transport 
samurai to do so, and he finished by suggesting meekly that the Dutch were now 
more merchants than soldiers. Besides that, he said, their fleet was already fully 
committed to existing responsibilities. One of the bugyō seemed to accept Caron’s 
excuses, while the other kept shaking his head, but neither was inclined to give 
up. The next day Heizō Ietsugu, the daikan (magistrate) of Nagasaki, presented a 
document for the Dutch to sign that would commit them in no uncertain terms 
to supporting an invasion:
Recently we have understood that the people of Manila are breaking the emperor’s 
prohibitions and are sending priests, who are forbidden in Japan. As a result, they are 
viewed as criminals by Your Honours. If the High Authorities decide to destroy this 
place, the Hollanders, who bring a good number of ships to Japan every year, are al-
ways ready, in time or opportunity, to present our ships and cannon for your service. 
We ask that Your Honours trust and believe that we are, in all matters without excep-
tion, ready to serve Japan.51
The text of the document contained such a firm commitment to act that Caron 
could not have signed it there and then; it would have to be passed up the Com-
pany’s chain of command. The bugyō were not surprised by that response, but be-
fore taking their leave they took pains to remind the Dutch that their reputation 
for loyalty was regarded as akin to the fidelity pledged to the shogun by his own 
daimyō. That point was not lost when the document came to be discussed by the 
Dutch at a higher level, where the choice was clear. They had to decide between 
abandoning their reputation as servants of the shogun, with all the implications 
for trade such a move would have, and the huge dangers of committing men and 
resources to an overseas military expedition that could result in the destruction 
of the Company’s entire fleet. They chose danger, and agreed to convey the Japa-
nese army of invasion to the Philippines on six Dutch vessels.
Dutch support having been pledged, the matter was placed before the sho-
gun, who agreed that the invasion should go ahead. His decision may have been 
influenced by the recent arrival of another group of missionaries from Manila 
under Father Marcello Mastrilli.52 No mention was made of who would supply 
the invading army.
Matsukura Katsuie was the obvious candidate, but he soon became involved in 
a serious development that would sound the death knell for the entire expedition. 
An uprising on the nearby Amakusa Islands quickly spread to the Matsukura 
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territory of Shimabara. The predominantly Christian rebels barricaded them-
selves inside Hara Castle, the dilapidated fortress that Matsukura Katsuie’s father 
had replaced with Shimabara Castle. The quelling of what became known as the 
Shimabara Rebellion soon proved to be beyond the capabilities of Matsukura 
Katsuie. It sucked in all the military resources of the Tokugawa shogunate for well 
over a year, and the Dutch naval support promised so loyally for the Philippines 
expedition was used instead for a reluctant and largely ineffective bombardment 
of the rebel castle.53 There was no spare military capacity for an invasion of the 
Philippines, and even less of a stomach for one.
When the shogun’s advisers reviewed the Shimabara Rebellion a few months 
later, a comparison was drawn between the efforts needed to take flimsy Hara 
Castle and the plans to transport a similar-sized army with similar naval support 
many hundreds of miles through occupied territory to take on the European for-
tifications of Manila. The comment was made that the ten thousand men they had 
earmarked for the Philippine invasion should have been one hundred thousand 
—the number of troops that had to be deployed against Hara to overcome one-
third that many rebels.54 Yet such a calculation was now only an academic point, 
for no further attempt would be made against the Philippines for over three 
hundred years.
The shock caused by the Shimabara Rebellion then brought about the worst 
fears for the remaining Portuguese in Japan: the shogun decided they should 
follow the Jesuits in being deported. With the Sakoku Edict of 1639, all contact 
was cut off from Catholic Europe, and even the loyal Dutch were confined to the 
artificial island of Deshima in Nagasaki Bay.
Of the three schemes for invading the Philippines between 1593 and 1637, the 
vast armies at Hideyoshi’s disposal in his 1593 plan could well have succeeded 
against the meagre garrison of Manila had he not been humiliated already in 
Korea by a woeful lack of naval support. Two seaborne attempts against Taiwan 
in 1609 and 1616 were also failures, and an annexation of the Ryukyus in 1609 
was to be contemporary Japan’s only overseas gain.55 
The 1630 effort against the Philippines was to be led by someone who was 
committed to the scheme, but there was apparently no improvement in the sea-
borne capacity. The chances of success also were reduced because the defences of 
Manila were by then stronger than in 1593 and Taiwan had a Spanish fort on it 
instead of a Japanese one. These points alone may well have led to the cancella-
tion of the project if the Matsukura spies had ever had the chance to report back 
to Shigemasa.
The popular view of the 1637 attempt gives the impression that a fleet was 
ready to set sail and was stopped only by the Shimabara Rebellion, but this does 
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not appear to have been the case. The Dutch made a commitment to provide 
naval support and the shogun approved the scheme, but there is no evidence 
that Matsukura Katsuie was waiting for the go-ahead. It is more than likely that 
the invasion plans had advanced no further than the two Nagasaki officials with 
their ill-informed “back of an envelope” calculations. The subsequent experience 
at Hara Castle then betrayed a huge Japanese deficiency in siege artillery.56 The 
walls of Manila would have been safe even if the Japanese had succeeded in get-
ting beyond fortified Taiwan.
The issue of Japanese naval capacity would not be resolved until the twentieth 
century, so when the Shimabara Rebellion forced the cancellation of the 1637 
Philippines expedition it marked a point in time when Japan turned its back on 
the notion of an overseas empire for three hundred years. As for the problem 
of Christianity, an invasion of the Philippines would have cut off the supply of 
subversive secret priests, but the flow was always only an ideological annoyance, 
never an armed flood. Instead Japan responded to this minor threat by its dra-
matic and fateful decision in 1639 to isolate itself from European nations.
Throughout the decades under discussion, the Spanish took the Japanese 
threats seriously and always responded on the basis of good intelligence. Their 
exposure of Matsukura’s spies shows that their considered response to a notional 
Japanese threat was managed as carefully in 1630 as it had been in 1593. Their 
preparations always involved the monitoring of a potential fifth column of Japa-
nese residents in Manila, but even when brief uprisings occurred, other Japanese 
could be found fighting loyally for their Spanish masters elsewhere, so the Span-
ish never feared any great threat from that quarter. Their defensive actions were 
prompted only by rumours of war, not war itself.
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David Kohnen, with contributions from Nicholas Jellicoe and Nathaniel Sims
THE U.S. NAVY WON THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
n 1914, the European empires muddled into a world war of unprecedented scale, 
which destroyed the global economic and diplomatic system. Initially remem-
bered as the “Great War,” the First World War would influence concepts of strat-
egy and professional education within the U.S. Navy.1 While the United States 
remained neutral, the war dominated strategic discussions at the Naval War Col-
lege in Newport, Rhode Island. U.S. naval professionals monitored the conflict 
from afar, using the innovative “chart maneuver” methods of Captain William 
McCarty Little and information from all available sources to reconstruct battles.2 
Following the earlier battles of the Falkland Islands and Dogger Bank, the epic 
battle of Jutland of 31 May and 1 June 1916 particularly sparked major debate 
within the ranks of the U.S. Navy about the future of naval warfare. This article is 
the first to analyze the USN studies of the battle of Jutland that were conducted 
within weeks of the actual battle in 1916.
Battleships remained the predominant focus within the Navy Department, but 
Captain William S. Sims advocated for the continued development of a “balanced” 
American fleet.3 He believed the U.S. Navy also required lighter armored battle 
cruiser designs that offered firepower similar to that of battleships, combined 
with speed and endurance.4 Yet the British battle cruisers had suffered withering 
losses at Jutland. The poor performance of British battle cruisers prompted Navy 
Secretary Josephus Daniels to consider cancelling further American investment 
in battle cruisers. Sims strongly disagreed, warning Daniels to avoid drawing false 
conclusions from newspaper accounts about Jutland. Sims acknowledged having 
“read carefully the American press accounts of the action,” but claimed special 
insight gained from a “considerable number of clippings received from England 
which give a much fuller account.”5
I
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Sims applied Naval War College methods of analysis 
to reconstruct the battle of Jutland in detail. He then 
offered a strikingly accurate assessment of the strate-
gic consequences of Jutland in an 8 July 1916 report to 
Daniels. Sims also enjoyed unique access to information 
provided by his longtime friend Royal Navy admiral Sir 
John Jellicoe—the commander of the Grand Fleet during 
the battle of Jutland. Shortly after the battle, in June 1916, 
Jellicoe sent a packet to Sims that included an advance 
copy of his official report, appended to another study of 
the battle by British journalist Arthur Pollen. Few outside 
the Admiralty had access to such information at the time.
These documents enabled Sims to begin framing the 
basic chronology of the battle of Jutland.6 Of special note, 
Sims filed other reports in a paper folder marked in his 
hand as “Admiral Jellicoe’s Report of the Battle of Jutland Bank.”7 The body of 
information Sims compiled in the summer of 1916 demonstrates the importance 
U.S. naval professionals placed on the battle at the time. However, after the pub-
lication in 1942 of the only comprehensive biography of Sims, Admiral Sims and 
the Modern American Navy by Elting Morison, these particular records fell into 
general obscurity within the historiography.8
Yet it was over the course of this half a year—from the time of the battle of Jut-
land to the end of 1916—that domestic and external events and the efforts of Sims 
(and others) combined to set precedents for naval officer education, historical 
and strategic study, USN fleet organization, and concepts of combined and joint 
command that informed American naval strategic thinking through the Second 
World War and into the Cold War era. A century ago, Sims and his associates set 
the course that led to the U.S. Navy of the twenty-first century.
THE JELLICOE CONNECTION
A century after the battle of Jutland and other battles of the First World War, 
contemporary naval professionals may gain fresh insight on questions of strategy 
and command by revisiting pertinent original documentary sources.
There have been recent studies of Jutland, many centering on Jellicoe’s decision 
making. The admiral’s grandson Nicholas offered a provocative analysis by ad-
dressing popular myths surrounding the battle in Jutland: The Unfinished Battle; 
A Personal History of a Naval Controversy. James Goldrick provided important 
context to the battle in his study Before Jutland: The Naval War in Northern Eu-
ropean Waters, August 1914–February 1915. In another analysis, The Rules of the 
Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, Andrew Gordon suggested that the 
Captain William S. Sims, USN. Circa 1910. 
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bureaucratic culture of the Royal Navy contributed to strategic mistakes during 
the battle. The edited publication of the original British naval staff appreciation, 
as compiled by William Schleihauf and Stephen McLaughlin, highlighted the 
bitter debates within the Admiralty, as many questioned decisions Jellicoe made 
during the battle of Jutland.9
However, among such published histories of the battle, few researchers ex-
amined the obscure role of the U.S. Navy in efforts to understand what actually 
happened at Jutland. The key to unlocking this major gap in the historical record 
may be found within the close correspondence between Jellicoe and Sims. Their 
collaboration began in China after the Boxer Rebellion in the early 1900s and 
continued to flourish thereafter. Jellicoe’s exploits in China, as reported by news-
papers throughout the British Empire, had earned him international renown as 
a naval hero. He was presented as a figure reminiscent of Horatio, Lord Nelson, 
even as the Royal Navy prepared to mark the centennial, in 1905, of the battle of 
Trafalgar; the first sea lord, Sir John “Jackie” Fisher, explicitly referred to Jellicoe 
as the “future Nelson.”10 Jellicoe carried the millstone of Nelson for the remainder 
of his career, suffering the burdens of unanticipated popularity.11
Jellicoe’s fame on the international naval stage greatly impressed Sims, while 
Jellicoe recognized Sims as a unique figure in the U.S. Navy. (They also shared 
similar interests in the technical field of naval gunnery.) As Sims earned fame 
within the ranks for fighting the bureaucracy of the Navy Department, Jellicoe 
initiated correspondence with him. Sims demonstrated acute political sense, 
gaining access to the highest levels of American command as the naval aide to 
President Theodore Roosevelt. Through Roosevelt’s good offices, 
Sims secured command of the battleship USS Minnesota (BB 22)—
as a junior commander. This appointment sparked controversy 
within the service, as commanding officers of battleships typically 
were full captains.12 However, Rear Admiral Jellicoe, then third 
sea lord at the Admiralty in London, warmly encouraged Sims. “I 
congratulate you and the United States Navy. . . . I hope if you do 
come over [to Britain] I shall see you.”13
As skipper of an American battleship, Sims then symbolically 
sailed into the limelight of the international media: six years before 
the battle of Jutland, Jellicoe and Sims celebrated an undeclared 
Anglo-American alliance. The Royal Navy hosted the USN battle-
ships of the Atlantic Fleet’s 3rd Battle Squadron for Thanksgiving 
of 1910. As skipper of Minnesota, the flagship, Sims reveled in the 
spirit of Anglo-American collaboration. In early December, Sims 
and his crew attended a series of events at Guildhall in central 
London. Commenting on the traditional maritime connections 
Admiral John Rushworth Jellicoe, RN, 
Grand Fleet commander at Jutland, as 
a captain. Circa 1905. His appearance 
on a cigarette package highlights the 
superstar status he held in the Royal 
Navy—before Jutland. 
Wikipedia, s.v. “John Jellicoe, First Earl 
Jellicoe,” en.wikipedia.org/
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between Britannia and the Americas, Sims was quoted as saying that if the “Brit-
ish Empire is seriously menaced by an external enemy, it is my personal opinion 
that you may count upon every man, every dollar, every drop of blood, of your 
kindred across the sea.”14
The empires of Germany and Japan flooded the American Departments of 
State and the Navy with strongly worded official complaints about the remarks 
Sims had offered in London. President William H. Taft removed Sims from 
command.15
“CHEER UP” AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Sims received orders to the Naval War College for temporary duty in 1911, which 
later resulted in an extended assignment to the College’s “Long Course.” Sims 
hoped the Naval War College appointment would end up being a mere waypoint, 
writing that maybe “things will blow over to such an extent that I may get some 
duty that I would like better than the War College—something in closer touch 
with practice and less on the theoretical side.”16
Sims regarded the assignment as a complete setback, far from the sort of duty 
that would lead to higher command within the ranks of the U.S. Navy. Given the 
seagoing priorities of the service, the College remained modestly equipped, un-
derstaffed, and inadequately funded. Since its establishment in 1884, the College 
had struggled to survive as a unique venue for professional naval education. War 
games conducted on the third floor of Luce Hall inspired U.S. naval profession-
als to gain fresh perspectives by examining historical events, using methods of 
decision analysis to develop naval tactics and to consider transcendent strategic 
factors applicable to planning future operations. Following the controversy sur-
rounding the Guildhall remarks, many supporters encouraged Sims to treat as-
signment to the College as an opportunity to “tone down his ideas.”17 Typically, 
Sims instead pursued a radical course, refining his radical views about the future 
strategic role of the Naval War College in relation to the operational forces of the 
U.S. Navy.
Sims used the Naval War College to open a fresh front in his campaign against 
USN bureaucracy. During his studies, he produced a series of provocative essays 
for publication in the Naval Institute Proceedings about the importance of educa-
tion, doctrine, and strategic studies of history.18 Sims treated the assignment to 
study at the College as an opportunity to work with the institution’s founders, 
retired rear admirals Stephen B. Luce and Alfred Thayer Mahan. Other officers 
affiliated with Sims at the College included Commander William V. Pratt, Lieu-
tenant Commanders Dudley W. Knox and Arthur MacArthur III (Douglas’s 
brother), Lieutenants William S. Pye and Royal E. Ingersoll, and Marine captains 
Earl “Pete” Ellis and Frederick Delano (the cousin of Franklin Delano Roosevelt). 
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Personal associations established during their studies at the Naval War College 
fueled a competitive spirit among graduates to read, write, and fight for the vision 
of a U.S. Navy “second to none.”19
On graduation, Sims secured command of the then-named Atlantic Fleet 
Destroyer and Torpedo Boat Flotilla. In this role, he assembled a unique team of 
younger officers to apply the Naval War College approach to examining questions 
of strategy and tactics for practical application to operations at sea. Sims referred 
to his flotilla skippers as a Nelsonian “band of brothers.”20 He recruited Pratt to 
serve as his chief of staff and Knox as aide. With Sims establishing temporary 
headquarters in the flagship USS Dixie (AD 1), at anchor off Newport, Lieuten-
ant Commander John V. Babcock served as the staff operations officer. Destroyer 
skippers serving under Sims in the flotilla developed lasting ties that later proved 
crucial in wartime, including Lieutenant Commanders Ernest J. King, Harold R. 
Stark, Harry E. Yarnell, and William F. Halsey Jr.21
Working for Sims could be draining. Sims relied heavily on the advice of his 
staff in organizing the flotilla into a cohesive team. He decided to shift from Dixie 
to the cruiser USS Birmingham (CL 2), and leaned on Pratt, Knox, and Babcock 
to oversee the work involved with refitting Birmingham. This took its toll on 
Knox; he developed ulcers, then collapsed under the stress. However, even after 
King took his place, Knox continued acting as an adviser to Sims throughout an 
extended medical convalescent leave ashore.22 It was at Knox’s recommendation 
that Sims in the summer of 1914 recruited King to serve as aide. Sims and Pratt 
arranged early detachment orders for King as skipper in USS Terry (DD 25) dur-
ing operations off Veracruz.23 Surprised by his reassignment, King was perplexed 
to receive orders for duty as skipper in USS Cassin (DD 43);24 at the time, Cassin 
was sitting in dry dock at the Boston Naval Shipyard, undergoing an extended 
refit.25
In a wireless message, Sims advised King to recognize the orders to Cassin as 
an opportunity to build a reputation within the ranks. Then, shortly after King 
took command of Cassin in Boston, he received additional orders to report to the 
flagship Birmingham for duty immediately under Sims on the destroyer flotilla 
staff. King wished to avoid staff duty and preferred to remain in command of 
Cassin, although he sent a deferential letter stating that “I am ready to come to 
the Birmingham if, in your opinion, I ought to come.”26 Sims recognized King 
as an officer with great potential, and left King to make the choice on whether 
to remain in command of Cassin. “I can quite understand your desire to get 
some experience in command [and will] try and get a man to take Knox’s place.” 
However, Sims pointedly told King that, as “the efficiency of the whole flotilla of 
course comes ahead of that of any one boat or individual, I may have to ask you 
to help us out.”27 Thus, while Sims allowed King to make the decision whether to 
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remain in Cassin, he at the same time appealed to King’s sense of teamwork by 
referring to the broader mission of the flotilla.
“Captain Sims himself was an officer of extraordinary energy,” King recalled; 
Sims exhibited decisiveness as a commander in that “all matters were clear white 
or dead black.”28 King remained skipper in Cassin and simultaneously accepted the 
additional duty under Sims on the flotilla staff. On a daily basis, King traveled be-
tween Boston and Newport, balancing his responsibilities to both the Cassin crew 
and the flotilla staff.29 Reflecting on this experience, King maintained that he was 
“never one of the group of Sims’s devoted disciples and followers.”30 Nevertheless, 
Sims remained a mentor to King as the latter ascended the ranks to higher com-
mand, and later in his career King would employ an approach similar to Sims’s 
in organizing fleets and meeting the higher responsibilities of naval command.31
Because destroyers largely were relegated to secondary status compared with 
the battleships and battle cruisers of the Atlantic Fleet, Sims and the destroyer 
flotilla often operated with significant independence. Sims organized tabletop 
war games, chaired professional discussions, and engaged in debates about eso-
teric points of maritime history.32 Through these discussions, Sims and his staff 
developed totally new tactics for maneuvering destroyers in unison. In the waters 
of Narragansett Bay, under the very shadow of the Naval War College, Sims used 
the smaller destroyers to test theories. He maneuvered his warships in simulated 
combat exercises off Newport, employing wireless instead of the traditional 
semaphore and light signals, using a communications system of no more than 
thirty-one words. Sims and his destroyers successfully demonstrated the “War 
College afloat” concept.33
All this activity provided much entertainment to the many skeptical observers 
among the larger line-of-battle warships of the Atlantic Fleet. But Sims, with his 
destroyer skippers, was pioneering new tactics that had potential for application 
to larger fleet operations, while saving considerable expense by using destroy-
ers instead of battleships. Together, Sims and the destroyer flotilla completely 
rewrote existing U.S. naval doctrine and tactical procedures.
One of the innovative tactics was the “ripple maneuver.”34 Using a single 
wireless signal, Sims and his destroyers executed simultaneous turns in unison. 
Traditionally, fleet commanders had run the risk of collision while maneuvering 
a number of warships together in combat. While Sims’s methodology seemed ba-
sic, conducting such maneuvers with wireless and in the absence of visual signals 
proved revolutionary.35
German naval strategists apparently noted the success of Sims and the now-
named Atlantic Fleet Destroyer Flotilla. During the battle of Jutland, the German 
fleet executed the very difficult maneuver of turning simultaneously away from 
the British Grand Fleet. After the war, Sims invited some of the German skippers 
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to deliver lectures for the educational benefit of the U.S. Navy. In one lecture on 
Jutland, German rear admiral Paul Behnke told Naval War College students that 
the German High Seas Fleet commander, Admiral Reinhard Scheer, executed 
the “ripple manoevre” as perfected by Sims and the Atlantic Fleet destroyers.36 
Although Behnke may have been attempting to ingratiate himself with former 
American enemies, Sims, the War College afloat concept, and the tactics de-
veloped by the Atlantic Fleet Destroyer Flotilla clearly resonated among naval 
thinkers on the international stage.
Despite the educational benefits the Naval War College offered, Navy Secre-
tary Daniels questioned the cost of maintaining it. Notwithstanding the particular 
Newport focus on maritime aspects, the strategy and doctrine covered appeared 
comparable to that studied at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. 
In discussions with the newly appointed Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Ad-
miral William S. Benson, Daniels proposed organizing a unified army and navy 
war college, which could be established in closer proximity to the capital. As the 
first to hold office as CNO, Benson recognized the politics inherent in the idea. 
Given Daniels’s point of view, Benson gave serious consideration to the idea of a 
joint war college.37
However, it seemed outrageous to Sims to consider closing the Naval War 
College while the U.S. Navy was navigating the difficult waters of neutrality. He 
considered the College’s location an advantage, because he valued the intellectual 
Atlantic Fleet Destroyer Flotilla in action in Narragansett Bay in 1914. 
U.S. Navy Photograph (NH 93694)
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objectivity enhanced by the distance between the political arenas of Washington 
and the classroom battlefields of the war colleges. In this discussion, Sims regard-
ed the mission of the Naval War College as strategic in nature, and he defended 
the separateness of America’s war colleges on the basis of the differences between 
the land and sea services. Sims viewed the Naval War College as foundational for 
shaping the future of the U.S. Navy.38 On behalf of the College, he fought against 
the entrenched bureaucracy of the Navy Department. “The Naval War College 
should be made one of the principal assets of the Naval Service,” he opined. If cost 
savings were necessary, he argued that the service should place warships “out of 
commission in order to avoid decreasing the efficiency of the education of our 
officers.”39
Sims alternately scolded fellow U.S. naval professionals and sought to enlist 
their support in the fight. He challenged them to seek perspective from his-
tory, arguing that they should recognize the fundamental role historical studies 
played in framing contemporary plans for the future. Sims published an article 
in Proceedings under the provocative title “Cheer Up!! There Is No Naval War 
College.” The piece offered a counterfactual argument that allowed him to make 
“plain that he [was] a thorough and enthusiastic advocate of the college, and that 
he deplore[d] the failure of many officers to understand its vital importance to 
the efficient conduct of our fleet.” “When I went to the college,” Sims exclaimed, 
“the service was very generally ignorant of its purposes and the great practical 
value of its teachings.” Sims chastised critics of the Naval War College, suggest-
ing that they suffered from “wholly unpardonable ignorance”; he railed against 
complaints from within the seagoing ranks that many needed a “dictionary to tell 
them the meaning of the commonest terms.” Sims and his associates believed that 
the U.S. Navy suffered under officers of the highest rank who were “‘educated’ 
only in preparation for the lowest commissioned grade.” 40
NEUTRALITY AND WAR
In this fight to maintain the Naval War College, the European conflict amplified 
Sims’s assertions. War among the European empires inevitably spread beyond the 
poisoned trenches of the western front, immediately affecting affairs within the 
American sphere of influence. British, French, and Dutch targets attracted Ger-
man warships into American waters.41 The reverse occurred as well; for example, 
the German auxiliary cruisers SMS Kronprinz Wilhelm and Prinz Eitel Friedrich 
drew Royal Navy and French warships into American waters. Under the interna-
tional laws of the time, President Woodrow Wilson allowed these German com-
merce raiders to seek sanctuary in American ports, but British and French war-
ships maintained a steady presence off the U.S. coast in case the German vessels 
attempted to escape their internment.42 British and German warships also battled 
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off the Falkland Islands—which brought warfare into the Western Hemisphere, 
albeit far away. Clearly, these actions challenged the assertions of the Monroe 
Doctrine of 1823 and the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904.
As the European navies fought for control on the high seas, the U.S. Navy 
conducted separate operations against Mexican insurgents in the Veracruz cam-
paign.43 American forces in the Asiatic theater also stood watch as Japanese forces 
seized German-claimed territories in China and the Pacific. With the First World 
War thus raging in both Europe and Asia, the distracted Wilson administration 
struggled to keep foreign wars from spreading farther into the Americas. Both 
Germany’s commerce-raiding operations at sea and its clandestine terrorist at-
tacks in New York further amplified tensions: the 1915 sinking of RMS Lusitania 
off the Irish coast by a German submarine coincided with a terrorist campaign 
by German navy captain Franz von Rintelen inside the United States. Rintelen’s 
activities inspired German saboteurs to bomb USN facilities on Black Tom Island 
off the New Jersey coast in July 1916. The resulting explosion damaged the Statue 
of Liberty and scarred the New York City skyline.44
Headlines about the Black Tom explosion and those about the battle of Jutland 
appeared contemporaneously. Having recently won reelection on a platform of 
neutrality, President Wilson directed Navy Secretary Daniels to examine the na-
val options against imperial Germany. By 1916, Wilson and Daniels had largely 
accepted the ideas of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
embracing the notion of employing the U.S. Navy as a buffer against foreign 
naval operations in American waters. To these ends, Congress passed the Naval 
Expansion Acts of 1915 and 1916, which advocated an American navy “second 
to none.”45 As the U.S. Navy stood fast in anticipation of war with Germany, the 
battle of Jutland seemed very close in the minds of many Americans.
JELLICOE, SIMS, AND THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
Jellicoe, as commander of the Royal Navy Grand Fleet at Jutland, had faced a 
difficult decision: to seek a smashing victory akin to Trafalgar, or to ensure the 
preservation of the Grand Fleet so as to maintain the ability to fix the imperial 
German High Seas Fleet in place. During the action in the North Sea approaches 
to the Skagerrak, British battle cruisers under Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty had 
charged ahead of the Grand Fleet, into the teeth of the battleships of the High 
Seas Fleet—and sustained heavy losses. Heroic accounts of the British battle 
cruiser action at Jutland made it appear comparable to the charge of the light 
brigade at Balaclava or the dramatic last stand at the Little Bighorn—at Jutland, 
battle cruisers seemed to have been completely inadequate compared with battle-
ships. Within minutes of Beatty making contact with the German battle cruisers, 
under Vice Admiral Franz von Hipper, the Germans sank two battle cruisers 
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under Beatty’s immediate command. As the Grand Fleet under Jellicoe closed 
with Beatty and the remaining battle cruisers, and as the Germans maneuvered 
to the sanctuary of port, the latter continued inflicting heavy damage on the for-
mer. While the Germans lost one battle cruiser, four light cruisers, one predread-
nought, and five torpedo boats at Jutland, the British lost three battle cruisers, 
three armored cruisers, and eight destroyers. Within seventy-two hours, an esti-
mated 2,551 Germans and 6,094 British sailors were killed in the battle of Jutland.
The Grand Fleet at Jutland ultimately achieved its actual mission—forcing the 
Germans to withdraw from the battlefield. Jellicoe successfully maintained the 
integrity of the Grand Fleet, ensured Royal Navy superiority in European waters, 
and retained for Britain the strategic advantage at sea. But the German High Seas 
Fleet remained a potent threat after the battle. Critics castigated Jellicoe for be-
ing indecisive, while his subordinate Beatty blamed the Grand Fleet for failing 
to support the battle cruisers at Jutland. British newspapers also highlighted the 
losses the Royal Navy had sustained under Jellicoe, which seriously damaged his 
reputation as a “future Nelson.”46 Facing the media, Jellicoe fueled perceptions of 
a Pyrrhic victory at Jutland. He emphasized the strategic necessity of preserving 
the superiority of the Royal Navy so as to keep the German High Seas Fleet in 
check. Jellicoe also believed that Beatty had acted on his own initiative, charging 
headlong with the Battle Cruiser Fleet into the mist.
Jellicoe was frustrated by the severe price he paid in the popular media for 
failing to deliver a spectacular victory akin to that at Trafalgar. While he grappled 
with that imperfect victory, Jellicoe turned to his old American friend, Sims. 
Additionally, from the British perspective, Jellicoe recognized the importance of 
fostering ties between the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy.
On the other side of the Atlantic, reports of the stunning losses of the British 
battle cruisers inspired members of Congress to make official inquiries. Within 
the Navy Department, Secretary Daniels considered the option of cancelling con-
struction of USN battle cruisers because of the British losses at Jutland. Learning 
of these discussions, Sims warned Daniels to avoid making false assumptions 
about the lessons of Jutland.47 As early as 8 July 1916, Sims applied Naval War 
College methods of analysis to construct a detailed study of what actually had 
happened during the battle of Jutland, which he then submitted to Daniels.48 
By refuting Daniels’s assertions about battle cruisers, Sims sparked even greater 
interest within Congress to understand the consequences of Jutland. Congress 
launched an official inquiry to determine whether the U.S. Navy should continue 
constructing battle cruisers. In response, Sims produced two highly detailed re-
ports in July 1916.
First Sims provided an astonishingly accurate account of the battle of Jutland, 
suggesting that “the action in question was in reality a skirmish.”49 He then 
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defended Jellicoe’s actions by placing responsibility for the ambiguous results of 
the encounter squarely on Beatty’s shoulders. In a six-page report, Sims suggested 
that
of course the Germans knew that Admiral Beatty would come after them with his 
battlecruiser squadrons. Doubtless, also, they assumed, from his supposed reputa-
tion for impetuosity and ambition for distinction, that he would attack at once and 
try to head them off at their base. He apparently did so, and the battleships came up 
and pounded him between the two forces, with the inevitable result that he got the 
worst of it until the British battleships [of Jellicoe] came to his support and forced the 
Germans to retreat.50
Evaluating all available evidence, Sims concluded on 31 July 1916 that Jellicoe had 
acted correctly and Beatty had mishandled the battle cruisers at Jutland by ignor-
ing the “fundamental principle that involves bringing against the enemy a greater 
force than he has at [emphasis in original] the point of contact.”51 Sims argued 
that Jellicoe had acted in the better strategic interests of the Royal Navy, whereas 
Beatty had violated the basic rule of using “just plain common sense unrestricted 
by any sentimental fool traditions of the glory type.”52 Sims concluded that “con-
trol of the sea is accomplished when the enemy’s fleet is defeated or ‘contained’; 
and the German fleet has been contained since the beginning of the war, is now 
contained, and doubtless will remain so.”53
Sims strongly cautioned American policy makers against abandoning the 
construction of battle cruisers. “There is nothing,” Sims argued, “in the incidents 
of the [Jutland] fight to justify any argument against the necessity of battlecruis-
ers.”54 According to Sims’s conclusions, Beatty had employed his battle cruisers 
improperly. Sims also rushed to the defense of his friend Jellicoe. By implication, 
Sims argued that Jutland actually resulted in as decisive a British victory as that 
of Trafalgar more than a hundred years earlier.
To prove these points, Sims used war-gaming and chart-maneuver methods 
to produce objectively detailed studies of the battle of Jutland. Fighting the sepa-
rate battle for the future of professional education within the U.S. Navy, he also 
organized a war-game study of Jutland at the Naval War College. This took place 
a short two months after the actual battle, in September 1916.
JUTLAND WITH “TOYS” IN 1916
Jellicoe maintained regular correspondence with Sims, which provided unique 
means for the U.S. Navy to evaluate the broader significance of the battle of Jut-
land. During the summer of 1916, while at sea off the American east coast super-
vising shakedowns as skipper in USS Nevada (BB 36), Sims again employed the 
War College afloat method. Sailing off the Virginia Capes for gunnery exercises 
in August 1916, he organized Jutland war games in Nevada’s wardroom.55 Sims 
6900_Kohnen.indd   133 9/20/16   1:54 PM
139
Naval War College: Autumn 2016 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 1 3 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
wrote of his observations about Jutland to his protégés Pratt and Knox, now at the 
Navy Department, and encouraged them to gather newspaper accounts, personal 
letters from their foreign contacts, and U.S. naval attaché reports from London, 
Paris, Rome, and Berlin.56
Given the political stakes involved, USN studies of Jutland had significant 
strategic ramifications for the future of American naval policy. Following Sims’s 
lead, the faculty and students at the Naval War College took great interest in the 
battle. Sims pooled his information with that of his Naval Academy classmate 
Captain Albert P. Niblack, who was completing studies at the College. Niblack 
shared the information Sims supplied with Lieutenant Commander Harry E. 
Yarnell and Lieutenant Holloway H. Frost, among others. Using the Sims mate-
rial as a basis, Niblack, Yarnell, and Frost amassed additional information from 
other sources.57 They then conducted a war game to replicate the battle of Jutland 
in September 1916.
As with their Naval War College studies of Civil War battles, U.S. naval pro-
fessionals recognized that the scope and complexity of Jutland offered useful 
foundations for examining transcendent questions of command, the answers 
to which would have application to future operations. The pioneering methods 
of McCarty Little, whose service on the Naval War College faculty began in the 
1880s, inspired Sims and his associates to recognize that “tactics is the servant of 
strategy [and] every tactical problem should have a strategic setting, or at least 
keep in view the master idea which it is intended to subserve [sic]. That is the 
reason why tactics left to develop by itself is like servants without a master.” In 
examining historical battles such as Trafalgar, McCarty Little had emphasized 
the importance of evaluating decisions made in combat by first considering the 
strategic context to gain a holistic understanding of the tactical details.58
Seeking to attain an objective, firsthand understanding of historical wars, Mc-
Carty Little used nautical charts and tiny model ships to replicate situations faced 
on the battlefield. The curious practice of wargaming past battles appeared trite 
to some—at first glance. Similarly to many Naval War College graduates, Ernest 
J. King joked about the practice of using “toys” and “play things” in the serious 
studies involved with decision analysis and war gaming.59
Nonetheless, in the fall of 1916 faculty members and students at the Naval 
War College played out the Jutland scenario with toy ships, chalk, and measuring 
sticks. Drawing on newspaper accounts and naval attaché reports, the Naval War 
College undertook one of the earliest detailed studies of the battle of Jutland. In 
September 1916, Sims and Knox traveled to Newport to assist the students and 
faculty at the College, whose members included their close associates Niblack, 
Yarnell, and Frost. Working together, they adapted one of the historical battles 
already in use within the Naval War College curriculum—they used the rules for 
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the battle of Trafalgar of 1805 to reconstruct the more recent battle of Jutland of 
1916.60
Following the war-game reconstruction of Jutland, Frost took the lead in pro-
ducing an official Naval War College report on 26 November 1916.61 Coincident 
with the strategic study of Jutland at the College, Sims received orders to testify 
about the battle before Congress.
At that time, Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske also told Sims of the latter’s tentative 
selection for promotion to rear admiral. “They could not have done otherwise,” 
Sims understood, “without precipitating a storm that would have wrecked the 
keeping of selection in navy hands.”62 Under restrictions established by congres-
sional appropriations, Sims now stood thirty-first on a roster limited to thirty 
rear admirals; according to the Naval Register, his status was “awaiting commis-
sion” in the rank of captain.63 Given congressional interest in the battle of Jutland, 
Sims recognized that his opportunity to discuss the subject in Congress consti-
tuted a unique opportunity to make a lasting impression and thereby to secure a 
fruitful assignment in the rank of rear admiral in the near future.64
On 19 December 1916, Sims explained to Congress the strategic consequences 
of Jutland. In answering queries about the tactical role of battleships and battle 
cruisers in the context of that particular engagement, Sims more broadly outlined 
Examining the battle of Jutland on the third floor of Luce Hall, Naval War College. Circa 1916. 
Naval War College Collection
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the potential influence of wireless communication, intelligence, submarines, and 
aircraft on naval warfare.65 When discussing the strategic priorities of the U.S. 
Navy, Sims specifically referred to the Naval War College report about the battle. 
“There is a typewritten copy of an analysis made at the Naval War College,” Sims 
explained in testimony, “simply compiled from official and semiofficial published 
reports.”66
GERMANY INTRUDES
Within the same context of his remarks concerning the battle of Jutland, Sims also 
answered congressional queries about recent visits to American ports by Ger-
man submarines. Between July and November 1916, the German submarines U-
Deutschland and U-53 visited the ports of Baltimore, New London, and Newport.
Of particular interest, U-53’s skipper specifically targeted the Naval War Col-
lege for an unannounced visit. On 7 October 1916, Lieutenant Hans Rose sailed 
U-53 into Narragansett Bay and brazenly anchored under the shadow of the Na-
val War College. He appeared on shore in proper dress uniform, wearing white 
starched collar, bowtie, and cap—cocked at an angle. Rose casually walked from 
the Naval War College pier up a hill, knocked on the front door of Luce Hall, 
and introduced himself to the President of the Naval War College, Rear Admiral 
Austin Knight.67
The appearance of a German submarine coincided with the College’s efforts 
to compile the official report on Jutland. Clearly, Knight avoided discussing these 
Lieutenant Thomas Symington, USN, aide to Commander, Atlantic Fleet Destroyer Flotilla, shakes hands with Lieutenant Hans Rose, IGN, on board U-53 
at buoy two at the Naval War College, 7 October 1916. 
U.S. Navy Photograph
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studies in conversations with Rose. Rose later recalled that he “was received in 
the roomy naval station,” but that “[Knight] was not quite sure what he ought to 
do.”68 After the brief meeting in the office of the President, Rose hosted a number 
of USN officers for drinks in U-53. During these conversations, the Germans 
joked about speaking in English (the language of the enemy) by claiming, “I 
speak American.”69
Despite the bonhomie, Rose’s targeting of the Naval War College had dem-
onstrated the capacity of German submarines to reach American waters. When 
U-53 departed for operations in the Atlantic, local Newport yachtsmen trailed 
behind. Rose took station near the Nantucket lightship in the approaches to Nar-
ragansett Bay—just beyond American territorial waters. On 8 October 1916, the 
day after his visit to the College, he sank five vessels, three from Britain and one 
each from Norway and the Netherlands—an implied challenge to the warships of 
the Atlantic Fleet sitting at anchor a mere boat hail from the College.70
Such acts of German aggression fueled tensions within the Wilson adminis-
tration, as did British disclosure of the so-called Zimmermann telegram, which 
revealed a German plot to support Mexican and Japanese attacks on the United 
States, information the British shared with American journalists as early as 
January 1917.71 The cybernetic implications of the Zimmermann telegram would 
coincide with Germany’s reintroduction of unrestricted submarine warfare in 
February 1917. These developments ultimately forced the Wilson administration 
to make strategic preparations for war against imperial Germany.72
Falling as it did chronologically between the Jutland war game and Frost’s 
report on the Naval War College’s analysis of the battle of Jutland, U-53’s visit 
to the College brought home more forcefully the importance of thinking deeply 
and carefully ahead of time about what might be involved in fighting the Ger-
man navy. As the U.S. Navy anticipated war with Germany, the battle of Jutland 
remained the focus of heated discussion regarding the prospective focus of 
American strategy in the spring of 1917.
NO EQUAL IN HISTORY
Early USN studies of Jutland focused on Jellicoe’s operational decisions by exam-
ining the battle through the separate lenses of strategy and tactics. Among other 
major tactical findings, Frost concluded that “Jellicoe was well served by his divi-
sion commanders [who] brought the battle line in order despite his confusing 
and conflicting signals.”73 Frost found that “Beatty committed numerous errors 
. . . and did not show tactical skill [whereas] Jellicoe executed a poor concep-
tion of war excellently.” 74 Drawing debatable analogies, Frost found Jellicoe 
most closely comparable to Union Army general George B. McClellan from the 
American Civil War. This critique perhaps reflected a predetermined conclusion 
6900_Kohnen.indd   137 9/20/16   1:54 PM
143
Naval War College: Autumn 2016 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 1 3 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
on Frost’s part; previous studies of Civil War battles may have tainted Frost’s 
objectivity in examining Jellicoe’s decisions. Sims, taking a different approach, 
recognized that Jellicoe had made all the correct strategic decisions by focusing 
on the ultimate objective: containing the High Seas Fleet.75
Having examined British and German naval operations at Jutland in detail, 
Sims drew a variety of conclusions for future application within the U.S. Navy. 
He refuted critics of Jellicoe by suggesting that “there is no reason to believe that 
the Germans have ever intended to risk their fleet in a decisive action against a 
greatly superior British fleet[;] . . . they accomplished what they intended, namely, 
the trapping and pounding of the British battle cruisers.” Sims then hastened 
to press the point that “to the surprise of Naval critics, and doubtless to the 
Germans, was the extraordinary resistance battle cruisers can sustain and the 
extraordinary amount of damage they can inflict, even against battleships which 
indicates a greatly enhanced value when they are employed in their proper role 
in a general naval engagement.”76
Seizing on Sims’s assertions, Assistant Navy Secretary Roosevelt fostered a 
political alliance with Virginia senator Claude A. Swanson. Together, Roosevelt 
and Swanson circumvented Daniels in their effort to continue the construction 
of battle cruisers for the U.S. Navy.77 In the winter of 1916, Roosevelt used Sims 
and the findings of the Naval War College war-game report on Jutland to frame 
future American naval policy.
Following his testimony on Jutland in Congress, Sims received orders to the 
Naval War College. In February 1917 he assumed duty as the President of the Col-
lege. Sims then received secret orders to sail for London with verbal authorization 
to assume rank as a rear admiral on 21 March.78 Concurrently, Navy Secretary 
Daniels and CNO Benson directed Sims to act as the Navy Department liaison 
to the Admiralty in London.79 The United States declared war on Germany while 
Sims was at sea in April. Shortly after their first meetings in London, Sims and 
Jellicoe built on their personal friendship to facilitate the broader collaborative 
relationship between the Royal Navy and U.S. Navy.80 
By the manner in which the Admiralty headquarters synthesized operations 
at sea with intelligence, Jellicoe enabled Sims to assume a more strategic role in 
framing combined strategy and in conducting U.S. naval operations at the front. 
As Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe after April 1917, Sims pioneered 
new American concepts of combined and joint command. He also set a new 
precedent when he assumed temporary command over Royal Navy forces with 
the arrival of USN destroyers in Queenstown (Cobh), Ireland.81 Having thus 
pioneered new concepts of combined and joint naval command, Sims returned 
from wartime service for duty as President, Naval War College in April 1919.82
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Sims overhauled the Naval War College curriculum by recruiting veterans 
of the London headquarters to the faculty. Among them, Sims appointed Knox 
to serve as chief of staff. Knox also reorganized the Department of Command, 
within which he organized the Historical Section, under Lieutenant Tracy Bar-
rett Kittredge, U.S. Naval Volunteer Reserve. During their watch, the Naval War 
College archives served as the repository for the USN records of the First World 
War. Sims also approved the titles that Knox and Kittredge selected to expand the 
library from fewer than 7,000 to more than 45,000 volumes.83 Carl von Clause-
witz and Henri de Jomini remained required reading, along with Colmar von 
der Goltz and other Franco-German military thinkers. Looking outward from 
the lectures of Stephen B. Luce and the quasi-historical studies of Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, Sims expanded the reading curriculum to include the works of foreign 
naval strategic thinkers, including Sir John Knox Laughton, Spenser Wilkinson, 
and Sir Julian Corbett.84
Along with other faculty in the Sims era, Knox helped expand the role of 
historical studies in framing critical discussions of contemporary doctrinal 
Rear Admiral Sims, standing at center, pioneered new concepts of U.S. naval organization in wartime as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe and 
as senior naval representative of the American Expeditionary Force on the Supreme Allied Naval Council between 1917 and 1919. 
U.S. Navy Photograph (NH 52790)
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assumptions about future wars. While maintaining the traditional focus on bat-
tles such as Trafalgar and the American Civil War studies of the Union blockad-
ing strategy, Sims and Knox placed the battle of Jutland at the center of the basic 
curriculum on strategy and tactics after 1919.85 Through the 1920s and ’30s, stu-
dents attending the Naval War College examined Jutland in ever-greater detail. 
The influence of Jutland on the U.S. Navy appeared within the studies completed 
by Naval War College students in the generation of William D. Leahy, Ernest J. 
King, Harold R. Stark, Chester W. Nimitz, and William F. Halsey Jr.
By intermixing strategic discussions of history with decision analysis recon-
structions of past battles, the U.S. Navy arguably “won” the battle of Jutland in 
the classrooms and on the war-gaming floors of the Naval War College. Because 
of Jellicoe and Sims, the battle of Jutland influenced the perspectives of countless 
U.S. naval officers. For example, Commander Chester W. Nimitz mused in his 
Naval War College “Thesis on Tactics” that the battle of Jutland had “no equal in 
history [and that] it is doubtful if the total forces engaged in the battle of Jutland 
will be exceeded[,] at any rate during our time.”86 Nimitz recalled studying the 
battle in such detail that he knew every commander intimately and every deci-
sion they made “by heart.”87 Twenty years later, Nimitz commanded battles that 
far exceeded in scope the battle of Jutland, such as at Coral Sea, Midway, and 
Leyte Gulf. Arguably, education at the Naval War College provided the critical 
foundations that enabled him and his contemporaries to secure decisive victory 
in the Second World War.
THE CENTENNIAL
Through such deep and careful study, the U.S. Navy won the battle of Jutland in 
the classrooms and on the war-gaming floors of the Naval War College after the 
First World War. To highlight this rich history and to mark the centennial of Jut-
land, the Naval War College replicated the war game that Sims and his associates 
conducted in the battle’s immediate aftermath. In May 2016, the College revisited 
the battle on the historic war-gaming floors of Pringle Hall. Jellicoe’s grandson 
Nick provided a video with a narrative animation of the epic battle, while Sims’s 
grandson, Nat, observed the battle’s replication. Among other participants in the 
Jutland war game, Rear Admiral Sam Cox, USN (Ret.), the director of naval his-
tory, filled the role of Jellicoe, while the President of the Naval War College, Rear 
Admiral P. Gardner Howe III, USN, assumed the role of the German High Seas 
Fleet commander, Admiral Reinhard Scheer.
The Jutland war game of 2016 allowed faculty and student participants to gain 
fresh insight not only into the original battle of a century ago but also into the 
war game as conducted at the Naval War College later in 1916. By emphasizing 
the historical influence of Jutland on the curriculum of the College, the war game 
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evoked how the battle resonated through the history of the U.S. Navy over the 
intervening hundred years. The College intends to stage a series of similar events 
and educational programs between 2017 and 2023 as the U.S. Navy marks the 
centennial of its involvement in the First World War and its aftermath.
During the century since Jutland, the Naval War College has maintained the 
study of history and war-gaming analysis as central components in the profes-
sional education of American strategic thinkers. When Sims attended the long 
course with the class of 1913, he examined the 1805 battle of Trafalgar more than 
a century after the actual battle. Using the same methodology, he applied the War 
College afloat method to reconstruct the battle of Jutland within weeks of the 
actual battle. He helped compile the official report on the Jutland war game and 
decision analysis, published in November 1916. Sims then used this study to in-
form Congress on questions of American naval strategy, just three months before 
the American declaration of war against Germany in April 1917. After the First 
World War, Sims again referred to Jutland in overhauling the College curriculum, 
producing the course of study that educated the strategic minds of the American 
naval professionals who would win decisive victory in the Second World War.
Over the two hundred years since Trafalgar and the one hundred since the 
battle of Jutland, the strategic perspectives gained from studying this rich history 
remain relevant to contemporary strategic thinkers as the U.S. Navy charts a fresh 
course through the twenty-first century and beyond.
Naval War College faculty and students revisiting the battle of Jutland on the historic war-gaming floors of Pringle Hall, May 2016.
Naval War College Collection
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jutland: acrimony to resolution
Holger Herwig
Jutland: The Naval Staff Appreciation, ed. William Schleihauf. 
Barnsley, U.K.: Seaforth Publishing, 2016. 316 pages. $34.95.
The Jutland Scandal: The Truth about the First World War’s 
Greatest Sea Battle, by J. E. T. Harper and Sir Reginald Bacon. 
Barnsley, U.K.: Frontline Books, 2016. 252 pages. $24.99.
Jutland: The Unfinished Battle, by Nicholas Jellicoe. Barnsley, 
U.K.: Seaforth Publishing, 2016. 402 pages. $35.95.
Shortly after 2 PM (GMT) on 31 May 1916 the Danish tramp steamer N. J. Fjord 
blew off steam and came to a halt in the North Sea just west of the Skagerrak, 
the maritime strait between Denmark and Norway. To the northwest, its captain 
spied the British light cruiser HMS Galatea; to the southeast, the German light 
cruiser SMS Elbing. Thus was established the first contact in what the British 
would call the battle of Jutland, and the Germans die Schlacht vor dem Skagerrak: 
151 ships of 1,700 guns and 60,000 sailors under the command of Admiral Sir 
John Jellicoe, and 100 ships of 900 guns and 45,000 sailors under the command 
of Vice Admiral Reinhard Scheer. In the ensuing twelve hours, there took place 
several battles: the initial battle cruiser engagement; the British Battle Cruiser 
Fleet’s “run to the north”; two main fleet engagements; and finally several violent 
and confused night actions by light cruisers and destroyers. About 6,800 British 
and 3,000 German sailors died or were wounded. The Royal Navy lost three 
battle cruisers, three armored cruisers, and eight 
destroyers of 115,025 tons; the High Sea Fleet, 
one battle cruiser, one predreadnought, four light 
cruisers, and five destroyers of 61,180 tons.
Holger H. Herwig is professor emeritus at the Uni-
versity of Calgary.
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REVIEW ESSAYS
Conventional wisdom has it that the battle was a German tactical victory but 
a British strategic victory. There should have been little controversy about the 
only great sea battle of World War I, but controversy there was. Roughly 458,000 
Google hits for the entry “battle of Jutland” attest to the ferocity of the “real war” 
waged, especially in Britain in the 1920s between the supporters of Admiral Jel-
licoe, commander in chief of the Grand Fleet, and Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty, 
commander of the British Battle Cruiser Fleet. The four books in the three vol-
umes under review will give the reader an appreciation of that acrimony—and, it 
is hoped, offer resolution.
Why was Jutland not a second Glorious First of June 1794? The nation de-
manded an answer—but it got none. In fact, the Germans won the opening 
round in the public relations campaign over Jutland when its admiralty staff, on 
the morning of 1 June 1916, issued a formal press communiqué listing the heavy 
British losses while downplaying their own. A terse British Admiralty statement, 
which hit the newspapers on 3 June 1916, seemed merely to confirm the German 
accounts of the battle. The “magic of Trafalgar [1805],” Kaiser Wilhelm II crowed, 
“has been broken.”
To mitigate the continuing public relations disaster, in January 1919 the 
first sea lord, Rosslyn Wemyss, appointed Captain John Harper to “prepare a 
record” of “what actually happened in the battle.” Harper and his team worked 
fast, completing their report early in October of that year. It was cold, clinical—
and devastating. Beatty, having been promoted to full admiral and appointed 
Wemyss’s successor, was livid. The “Harper Record” threatened to tarnish Beatty’s 
public image as the hero of the battle of Jutland. For, in the first phase of the 
battle, Harper noted, it was “extremely unpalatable” that Beatty with a force of 
four battleships and six battle cruisers “failed to defeat a weaker enemy who made 
no effort to avoid action” (Vice Admiral Franz von Hipper’s five German battle 
cruisers), “but in the space of 50 minutes, suffered what can only be described as 
a partial defeat.” Moreover, Harper charged that Beatty on HMS Lion repeatedly 
had kept Jellicoe on HMS Iron Duke ignorant of the enemy’s position, that when 
closing up with the Grand Fleet his battle cruisers “puzzlingly” had performed 
a complete circular turn, and that Beatty’s signaling during the battle had been 
abysmal. Unsurprisingly, the new first sea lord made certain the “Harper Record” 
never saw the light of day; it was consigned to the shelves of the British Library 
archives.
Still, not even David Beatty could kill the nation’s interest in Jutland. In No-
vember 1920, as pressure from within the service mounted to set the Jutland 
record straight, the first sea lord asked Captains Alfred and Kenneth Dewar, both 
strong supporters, to write up a staff appreciation of the battle of Jutland. In 1922, 
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the Dewars published the Naval Staff Appreciation—the most “grotesque account 
of the battle,” in the words of official historian Sir Julian Corbett (History of the 
Great War, Naval Operations, vol. 3).
Beatty was the hero; Jellicoe was the villain. With regard to the first phase of 
the battle, the Dewars laid the blame for the ten-mile separation between the 
Battle Cruiser Fleet and the 5th Battle Squadron squarely on the latter’s com-
mander, Rear Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, for having failed to follow Beatty’s 
signal to close up. They declined, however, to mention that Beatty had failed 
to signal Evan-Thomas by searchlight after wind and smoke had obscured flag 
signals. Nor did they mention that faulty signaling resulted in a mistaken distri-
bution of fire, leaving SMS Derfflinger undisturbed. Again, there was no mention 
of Beatty’s steaming in a complete circle with Lion, Princess Royal, Tiger, and 
New Zealand after the “run to the north”; nor of his failure to communicate the 
whereabouts of Scheer’s Main Fleet between 5 and 5:30 PM. Front and center, on 
the other hand, was the Dewars’ criticism of Jellicoe’s decision to deploy on his 
port wing (to the south) at 6:54 PM, which, in their view, moved him away from 
the guns of the High Sea Fleet and denied him a “second Trafalgar.” In fact, the 
deployment on a southeast-by-east course put Jellicoe between Scheer and his 
bases, gave the gunners of the Grand Fleet the best light, and exposed the High 
Sea Fleet to the fire of the maximum number of British ships.
Perhaps the most mischievous statements in the Naval Staff Appreciation were 
that the Grand Fleet “was only occasionally in action,” that its actual firing was 
“confined to two intervals of about [a] quarter of an hour each,” and that after 
Scheer’s brilliant “battle turn away” to the west, “no attempt was made to follow” 
on Jellicoe’s part. The “idea of attack was lacking.” This smacked of incompetence, 
if not downright cowardice. Finally, the Dewars detected the Nelsonian touch 
in Beatty’s dramatic signal at 7:47 PM, “Submit that the van of the battleships 
follow me; we can then cut off the whole of the enemy fleet.” Seeing that “alone 
and unsupported he could not engage the whole of Scheer’s Battle Fleet,” Beatty 
had called on Jellicoe finally to join the fight. Instead, the commander in chief 
had altered course “two points away from the enemy.” After the High Sea Fleet 
had swept safely across the stern of the Grand Fleet during the night, the latter 
returned home “with two killed and five wounded. It had never been seriously 
in action.”
Rubbish. John Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet at Jutland fired 1,539 shells from the main 
batteries, scoring 57 hits; David Beatty’s Battle Cruiser Fleet loosed 1,469 shells 
for 21 hits. Put differently, the battleships were the source of 35 percent of the 
heavy-caliber gunfire and scored 46 percent of the hits the British fleet obtained.
But in critiquing the Royal Navy’s hallowed single-line deployment and the 
embodying doctrine of centralized command, the Dewars had gone too far: 
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Beatty immediately called back all copies of the book, and in 1928 his successor, 
Admiral Charles Madden, ordered all copies destroyed. Four survived, and they 
formed the basis for William Schleihauf ’s critical and annotated 2016 reprint of 
Jutland: The Naval Staff Appreciation.
Nonetheless, the Dewars’ damning indictments were taken up quickly by pub-
lic writers. First off, in 1923 Winston Churchill took up the cause in The World 
Crisis, volume 3, 1916–1918. Recognizing that he had “only the vaguest idea of 
what had taken place” at Jutland, the former first lord of the Admiralty called on 
David Beatty for assistance. The first sea lord could help: he recommended none 
other than Kenneth Dewar! The result was predictable: Churchill’s graphic prose 
and Dewar’s mean-spirited attack on Jellicoe. The latter had been obsessed with 
the system of centralized command. He had shackled his commanders. He had 
refused to show initiative. He had possessed a “defensive habit of mind.” He had 
been “ponderous.” He had clung to the old single-line formation. Churchill’s oft-
repeated comment that Jellicoe was the only man who could have lost the war in 
an afternoon was not meant as praise; its corollary was that Jellicoe was the only 
man who could have won the war in an afternoon.
Churchill was not regarded as a true “navy man,” and hence his World Crisis 
treatment of Jutland caused only a minor uproar among Jellicoe’s supporters. The 
same could not be said of Filson Young, the author of a glowing 1921 account of 
Beatty entitled With the Battle Cruisers. In the Sunday Express in 1924 and in the 
Daily Express in 1925 Young published articles in which he claimed that Admiral 
Scheer in an interview in effect had confessed “how I escaped at Jutland.” Scheer, 
of course, was furious. But Young went on to state that, in Scheer’s view, Jellicoe, 
with his cautious approach to the battle, had squandered a perfect opportunity to 
annihilate the High Sea Fleet. It was now Jellicoe’s turn to be furious. All this was 
but the prelude to two knights in shining armor riding to Jellicoe’s defense: Rear 
Admiral John Harper and Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon.
Livid at Young’s treatment of Jellicoe, Harper in 1927 dusted off his unpub-
lished and virtually banned “Harper Record” and published it as The Truth about 
Jutland. It has been reprinted in The Jutland Scandal (2016), with only minor edi-
torial corrections. Harper, no longer bound by Admiralty oversight, gave full vent 
to his deepest emotions. Beatty, the putative hero of Jutland, was unmasked. In 
the first phase of the battle, he had made the initial “fatal and elementary mistake 
of dividing his forces.” Moreover, by stationing Barham five miles distant, Evan- 
Thomas could not read Beatty’s flag signals, with the result that the 5th Battle 
Squadron was soon some ten miles distant. This, and this alone, Harper argued, 
had brought about the loss of the battle cruisers Indefatigable and Queen Mary. As 
well, Beatty had failed in his primary role: reconnaissance. Jellicoe was reduced 
to visual signals: “Where is enemy’s battle fleet?” With the two fleets closing at 
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thirty-five to forty miles per hour, time was critical; yet one hour passed without 
Beatty sighting Hipper’s battle cruisers. And hours passed before Beatty informed 
his commander in chief of the critical losses to his Battle Cruiser Fleet. Harper’s 
final verdict was damning: “Beatty did not maintain contact with the enemy, he 
lost touch shortly after his turn to the northward, and sent no reports to Jellicoe 
during the time when accurate information would have been of inestimable value 
to him.” To those in the service who had read the internal “Harper Record,” only 
the harsh tone of The Truth about Jutland came as a surprise.
The same could not be said about a second defense of Jellicoe in the face of the 
Churchill/Young attacks: Admiral Bacon’s The Jutland Scandal, first published in 
1925. It also is included in the 2016 reprint, The Jutland Scandal. Like Harper, 
Bacon sharply criticized Beatty for dividing his forces at the start of the battle, 
for not closing up with the 5th Battle Squadron sooner, for not keeping Jellicoe 
informed about the location of Scheer’s High Sea Fleet, and for steaming 360 
degrees around the Main Fleet after his “run to the north.” But Bacon saved his 
most savage attack for Vice Admiral Beatty’s signal at 7:50 PM for Jellicoe’s battle-
ships to follow his battle cruisers and “cut off the whole” of Vice Admiral Scheer’s 
battle fleet. “As a matter of fact,” Bacon acidly remarked, “there was nothing from 
which the battle cruisers could cut the German battle fleet off! They had already 
been cut off from their harbours.”
It came as no surprise that First Sea Lord Beatty was annoyed by “that bloody 
Bacon book,” and that it had only added to his “despondency” concerning his 
waning influence with the government and the navy. Churchill, likely embar-
rassed by his amateur treatment of the battle of Jutland in The World Crisis, in 
February 1940 vetoed the Royal Navy’s suggestion to name its new King George 
V–class battleships Jellicoe and Beatty.
It now has been one hundred years since the battle of Jutland. Beatty and Jellicoe 
both rest in the crypt of Saint Paul’s Cathedral in London. Armies of naval histo-
rians have dissected every aspect of the battle, and have come up with intriguing 
names such as “Flawed Victory,” “Distant Victory,” “Jutland Scandal,” “The Riddle 
of Jutland,” “The Truth about Jutland,” “The Jutland Epic,” “The Blindfold Game,” 
“The Rules of the Game,” “The Smoke Screen of Jutland,” “Sins of Omission and 
Commission,” and “Our Bloody Ships or Our Bloody System,” among countless 
others.
Thankfully, we now have a superb analysis, Jutland: The Unfinished Battle 
(2016), from Nicholas Jellicoe—the admiral’s grandson. This source at first sight 
might seem to be prejudiced, but that is not the case. Obviously aware of the 
possible suspicion of bias because of his last name, Nicholas Jellicoe has gone 
out of his way to offer both the general reader and the naval expert a balanced, 
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measured, and yet nuanced account of the greatest sea battle of World War I. 
He weighs and measures. He offers conflicting accounts and interpretations. 
He evaluates sources. He compares British and German eyewitness and official 
accounts and statistics. He judiciously examines the accounts by John Harper, 
Reginald Bacon, and the Admiralty discussed above. And then he offers his own 
best opinion. Along the way, he provides the layman with text boxes and sidebars 
to explain the complex naval systems in place at Jutland, and he further includes 
countless diagrams to explain ship locations and movements.
Nicholas Jellicoe apportions praise and criticism in equal amounts. Tactically, 
Jutland was a German victory and a “bad blow” for both the Royal Navy and the 
nation. Hipper’s leadership of the German battle cruisers had been “brilliant,” 
Scheer’s two “battle turns away” and his ultimate escape “remarkable.” German 
signals and communications had been “exemplary,” those of the British “lamen-
table.” Jellicoe’s system of command had been rigid, a “vestige of the Victorian 
past.” Beatty’s reconnaissance and reporting had been a “failure.” Beatty’s obses-
sion with rapid firing and the resulting storage of cordite next to the gun turrets, 
rather than improper flash protection, had caused the loss of the battle cruisers. 
The role of the new weapons of the day—mines, torpedoes, and aircraft—had 
been overrated before the battle, and negligible in its outcome. Both navies had 
fought the battle unexpectedly and discovered it to be highly complex, and had 
fought under difficult conditions of wind, rain, smoke, heavy seas, and fading 
light. Both sides regarded it as an “unfinished battle.”
Strategically, Nicholas Jellicoe joins the bevy of historians who have argued 
that Jutland was a British victory. “The issue at stake,” he writes, “had been sea 
power.” One side exercised it; the other sought to gain it. Afterward, the arteries 
of seaborne commerce, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s maritime highways, remained 
open to Britain and closed to Germany. Reinhard Scheer, the putative “victor 
of the Skagerrak,” accepted this reality when, in his after-action report of 4 July 
1916 to Wilhelm II, he forsook future “Jutlands” in favor of “the defeat of British 
economic life” by way of unrestricted submarine warfare “against British trade.” 
The High Sea Fleet, in Churchill’s stinging remark of February 1912, indeed had 
been but a “luxury” fleet.
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strategy, operations, and the margin of victory
Dov S. Zakheim
Margin of Victory: Five Battles That Changed the Face of 
Modern War, by Douglas Macgregor. Foreword by Robert 
M. Citrino. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016. 288 
pages. $34.95.
Douglas Macgregor, a decorated Army tank commander who has gone on to be-
come a leading iconoclastic—and prescient—military intellectual, has produced 
an ambitious evaluation of five key twentieth-century battles and the strategic 
and operational assumptions that led up to them. Margin of Victory examines in 
great yet readable detail the strategic 1914 battle of Mons and the strategic with-
drawal that followed it; the 1937 Japanese battle for Shanghai; the 1944 Soviet 
destruction of the Wehrmacht’s Army Group Center in and around the Belorus-
sian swamps; the Israeli counterattack across the Suez in the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War; and the crushing American defeat of Saddam Hussein’s forces in the 1991 
battle of 73 Easting. Taken together, Macgregor argues, these battles have much to 
offer those who formulate contemporary American strategy and plan its military 
operations. Indeed, he goes further: those who ignore the lessons of these battles 
do so at their peril. As he states in his introductory paragraph, “Hell . . . can be 
defined in three words: defeat in war. Margin of Victory is about avoiding hell.”
Macgregor devotes a chapter to each of the five major battles he has chosen as 
object lessons for current civilian and military policy makers. His account of the 
battle of Mons is actually a panegyric to Richard Haldane, Britain’s secretary of state 
for war from 1905 to 1912. Facing unstinting opposition from a hidebound officer 
corps wedded to operational concepts that had failed miserably in the Boer War 
and confronting budget constraints that prioritized the modernization of the Royal 
Navy, Haldane nevertheless managed to create a general staff, transform the army 
into a capable expeditionary force, organize a trained reserve, emphasize realistic 
training, and inaugurate a regimen of professional military education. His reforms, 
Macgregor states, would be called today “disruptive innovation.” As a result, the 
seriously outnumbered British Expeditionary Force was able both to force the in-
vading German forces to alter their plans for the at-
tack on Paris and to slow them sufficiently to enable 
the Allies to mount the defenses that stopped the 
attackers at the battle of the Marne, thereby prevent-
ing an attack on the French capital. As Macgregor 
concludes, “by the standards of the early twentieth 
Dov S. Zakheim was Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) from 2001 to 2004 and Deputy Under 
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century, Haldane’s reforms achieved miracles.” They also prevented what other-
wise might have been a quick German victory in what became known as World 
War I.
Macgregor’s account of the battle of Shanghai is essentially a discussion of 
what happens when a modernizer’s efforts are ignored or overridden. General 
Kazushige Ugaki, Japanese minister of war from 1924 to 1927 and 1929 to 1931, 
identified the Soviet Union as Japan’s primary potential adversary and recognized 
that, as Macgregor puts it, “in the future the IJA [Imperial Japanese Army] would 
need the mobility and firepower to conduct sweeping flank attacks, enveloping 
or encircling the Russian enemy.”
Ugaki also challenged the prevailing Japanese view that budgetary priority 
should be assigned to naval force modernization and expansion. Few of his re-
forms to realize his objectives outlasted his terms in office, however. As a result, 
Japan conducted a bloody and far too costly campaign to seize Shanghai from 
Chiang Kai-shek’s more numerous but vastly outgunned and poorly trained 
troops, only succeeding thanks to firepower support from Japanese naval and 
air forces. Japan then successfully conquered eastern and southern China, but, 
as Macgregor points out, “Japan’s war with China not only delayed and disrupted 
the IJA’s modernization; it also fatally crippled Japan’s northern strategy to defeat 
the Soviet Union, while putting Japan on a collision course with Britain and the 
United States. Thus, where Haldane succeeded, at least in part, to the benefit of 
his country’s forces, Ugaki failed completely, to the costly detriment of Imperial 
Japan.”
Ugaki’s failures pale by comparison with the mad strategy that propelled Hitler 
into invading the Soviet Union and then refusing to implement a planned with-
drawal that could have saved huge numbers of his troops. It was true that during 
the 1930s the Germans had increased their tactical fighting power by focusing on 
attacks at the point of impact. Nevertheless, the Soviet military, recovering from 
Stalin’s purges, centrally driven from the top, with unity of command, and indif-
ferent to massive personnel losses, successfully focused on “integrating and con-
centrating combat power on the operational level for strategic effect.” The results 
of Hitler’s mistakes and the Soviet transformation played out in 1944, when the 
Red Army was able to destroy the German Army Group Center. Until it was clear 
all was about to be lost, Hitler vehemently opposed any withdrawal in the face 
of the advancing Soviet troops, insisting that his soldiers “fight to the last man.” 
His generals, many of whom were nonprofessional party hacks, were unable or 
unwilling to challenge his decision. Even when he finally consented to an orga-
nized withdrawal to more-defensible positions, Hitler insisted that forces remain 
behind to defend the various towns from which they had operated. As a result, 
the Soviets were able to bypass what Hitler termed “fortified places,” encircle and 
destroy the retreating army group, and take the towns as well. In Macgregor’s 
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words, the Soviet transformation, encompassing changes in “command structure, 
organization for combat, and supporting doctrine for the application of military 
power in the form of strike—artillery, rockets, and airpower—with operationally 
agile maneuver forces created a margin of victory that changed the course of 
European and world history.”
Macgregor’s fourth case study, that of the Israeli counterattack across the 
Suez Canal, is meant to demonstrate how a culture that fosters flexibility and 
independent initiative and leadership enabled the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 
to offset intelligence misreadings of Egyptian preparations to cross the canal. He 
also points to Israel’s merit-based promotion system and the IDF’s recognition 
that “one size does not fit all”—in other words, its diversity of capacity. Macgregor 
allows that Ariel Sharon went beyond mere initiative and flagrantly disobeyed 
orders. But Macgregor also notes that Sharon’s admittedly costly efforts to sur-
prise, and contribute to the encirclement of, Egypt’s Third Army were a major 
factor in the success of the Israeli counterattack. Macgregor credits Anwar Sadat 
with the foresight to recognize that only by redeeming Egypt’s honor, which had 
been crushed in the Six-Day War, could Cairo finally achieve peace with Israel, 
one that has stood the test of the region’s endless crises and wars for the better 
part of four decades.
Macgregor led a tank battalion in the battle of 73 Easting, a major American 
triumph in the 1991 war with Saddam Hussein and another source of lessons for 
achieving a “margin of victory.” Macgregor has written about this battle before: in 
2009 he devoted an entire volume, entitled Warrior’s Rage: The Great Tank Battle 
of 73 Easting, to the events of 26–27 February 1991. The book offers an account of 
the actions of the 2nd Squadron of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (“Cougar 
Squadron”), which surprised and crushed an Iraqi Republican Guard armored 
brigade by charging out of a sandstorm during Operation DESERT STORM in what 
became the U.S. Army’s largest tank battle since World War II. Macgregor’s pur-
pose in repeating the tale is to argue that President George H. W. Bush ordered a 
cease-fire prematurely, while Norman Schwarzkopf, who commanded Operation 
DESERT STORM, essentially let fifty thousand Republican Guards escape virtually 
unscathed, only to be rearmed by Saddam to fight another day. Macgregor is 
also bitterly critical of the American military’s failure truly to integrate its forces, 
so that the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines continue to seek service self-
sufficiency, at a cost to overall operational effectiveness.
Macgregor’s description of each of the foregoing battles is gripping and fast 
paced. It is unfortunate that the maps that accompany his prose often do not 
include the towns, and at times the rivers, to which he refers, so the reader loses 
track of the tactical ebb and flow of battle. Macgregor’s editors also should have 
ensured a consistent approach to the spelling of towns and other locales whose 
names are central to the battles. For example, at times the book simply misspells 
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names, as in Chongming Island (which Macgregor spells Changming). Macgregor 
also is not consistent in his use of romanized forms of the place-names he cites: 
Chinese place-names employ pinyin, the system introduced by the Communists 
in 1949, although he is writing about battles that took place when the Wade-Giles 
system was still in use. On the other hand, he mentions Cheju-do Island, spelled 
as it was in 1937; the current Korean spelling is Jejudo.
One might quibble with other elements of Macgregor’s history. He writes of 
Field Marshal French’s argument with Lord Kitchener in Paris without explain-
ing when French got there, since French last had been mentioned in the context 
of the battle of Le Cateau. At one point Macgregor erroneously calls Shanghai 
the capital of Nationalist China. He does not mention that Germany was able 
to provision the Wehrmacht with considerable matériel thanks to Jewish, Pol-
ish, and other slave labor. Nor does he mention the diversion of resources from 
Wehrmacht fighting power owing to Hitler’s mad preoccupation with the ex-
termination of Jews, even as the fortunes of war turned against his forces. And 
Macgregor does not note that the fact that Sadat ordered his forces to cross the 
canal on Yom Kippur, when Israelis were preoccupied with the holiest day on 
their religious calendar, certainly contributed to the Egyptians achieving strategic 
and operational surprise.
All told, however, Macgregor has written another powerful critique of the 
American way of planning and developing strategy for war. His lesson for 
policy makers and strategists alike is that “whenever new military concepts and 
technologies appear, the complex interaction of national culture, bureaucratic 
interests, and economic power does not automatically work to support them. . . . 
[W]hen conditions change and the margin of victory suddenly narrows, frailties 
and vulnerabilities concealed from view inside the armed forces . . . suddenly 
produce catastrophic failure.” He asserts that Washington needs to focus on its 
long-standing and still primary strategic concern, namely, prevention of a hostile 
power from dominating the Eurasian lands. He argues that the American military 
must increase its force levels, notably those of the Army. And he advocates for 
the creation of what he terms a “national defense staff ” (in other words, a gen-
eral staff) “to guide the application of American military power,” encompassing 
integrated capabilities across service lines.
Not everyone will agree with Macgregor’s prescriptions. Often he has been a 
lonely voice in the wilderness. Yet as America transitions to a new administra-
tion, it would do well at a minimum to pay close attention to what Macgregor has 
to say. Because one thing is certain: America’s next war certainly will not be like 
those it is fighting today, and those who make the all-too-frequent error of fight-
ing tomorrow’s war with today’s assumptions and experience surely will regret 
doing so, as Macgregor has demonstrated so ably yet again in his latest volume.
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economics as a source of national power
John A. Cloud
War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft, by Robert 
D. Blackwill and Jennifer Harris. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of 
Harvard Univ. Press, 2016. 384 pages. $29.95.
In War by Other Means, Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris are striving to put 
the e (for economics) back into the playbook of American power. They argue that 
the “military-heavy approach” the United States has taken over the past fifteen 
years is inappropriate to respond to the challenges we face today, which they 
see coming not from terrorism but from what they call “geoeconomics.” In fact, 
Blackwill and Harris argue that the “current tools of U.S. statecraft, dominated by 
traditional political-military might, are uniquely unsuited” (p. 7). For example, 
on an issue on which I have written previously,* they note that there has been “no 
comparable discussion in Washington of returning Ukraine to economic viability 
as a way to check . . . Putin” (p. 2). They appear to agree with many of our military 
leaders, who argue that we need to use all our tools of national power (usually 
described as DIME, for diplomacy, information, military, and economics) to meet 
future challenges.
Blackwill and Harris focus on the use of economic power to achieve geopoliti-
cal, not economic, objectives. This is what they term “geoeconomics.” The book is 
replete with examples of not only how the United States used to use geoeconom-
ics but how our so-called near-peer competitors, particularly China and Russia, 
are using it today as an asymmetric method to accomplish their foreign policy 
objectives. The authors argue that the United States has neglected this area since 
Vietnam. While they see it as essential that we become more skilled in the use 
of geoeconomics, they acknowledge that we will not necessarily be as nimble as 
China and Russia, given the greater control the Chinese and Russian regimes 
have over their respective economies.
In taking this position, the authors demonstrate the courage to be out of step 
within the current political debate. While both 
parties’ nominees are critical of trade deals and of 
using economics for noneconomic ends, Black-
will and Harris strongly promote exactly that. 
For example, they argue for the ratification of the 
* John A. Cloud, “Ukraine’s Next Big Battleground,” The 
National Interest, 4 June 2015, nationalinterest.org/.
Ambassador John A. Cloud (Ret.) is a professor of 
national security affairs at the Naval War College. 
During his diplomatic career, he served as U.S. am-
bassador to Lithuania and as senior director of inter-
national economics on the National Security Council 
staff (2001–2003).
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Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the successful conclusion of the Transatlan-
tic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP).
In another area in which the authors defy conventional wisdom, Blackwill and 
Harris press for the United States to move significant (but unspecified) budgetary 
funds from the U.S. military to the State Department and other agencies involved 
in geoeconomics. At a time when the political class is arguing for more money 
for the military, they argue that “the United States too often reaches for the gun 
instead of the purse in its international conduct.” They further ask, “[W]hat, in 
power-projection terms, is the United States getting for all of this military spend-
ing?” (p. 221).
Blackwill and Harris are up-front in claiming that China is “America’s most 
important foreign policy challenge” (p. 179). They see China as the “leading 
practitioner of geoeconomics” (p. 11). Their chapter “Geoeconomics in Chinese 
Foreign Policy” is particularly compelling as it outlines five different uses of geo-
economic tools by China to advance its interests in Taiwan, North Korea, Japan, 
and Southeast Asia and in its relationships with Pakistan and India. They note 
that “nations do not fear China’s military might; they fear its ability to give or 
withhold trade and investments” (p. 94).
The authors spend considerable time discussing the energy revolution and 
the effects of high commodity prices. It is unclear to me how the recent decline 
of both energy and commodity prices affects their argument. However, I would 
agree that the use of innovative ways to recover petroleum products—if a suf-
ficient equilibrium price can be found—should have profound implications for 
the potential for the United States to use geoeconomics.
Blackwill and Harris argue that the United States no longer uses geoeconom-
ics. On the basis of my experience, I disagree. If that were the case, most of the 
George W. Bush trade negotiations would not have happened. The authors do 
acknowledge that the trade agreements with Bahrain, Kuwait, and Morocco had 
counterterrorism goals (p. 175). I would argue that all these agreements had geo-
political as well as economic goals. In fact, it was not until the agreement with 
South Korea that we had an agreement with significant economic purpose, even 
though this agreement had important geopolitical goals as well.
Blackwill and Harris also argue that the TPP “was conceived primarily as 
an economic project” (p. 181). I again disagree. Where I would agree with the 
authors is that the geoeconomic aspects of these agreements are prominent at 
their conception and at the end; they are of lesser import in the middle. While 
the National Security Council system and staff were deeply involved in picking 
the countries and launching the negotiations, once launched the negotiations 
quickly devolved to being run by the responsible departments, and the organiza-
tional behavior of these departments took over. At that point, the agenda of the 
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Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the Departments of Agriculture 
and Commerce, their respective congressional committees, and USTR’s congres-
sionally mandated advisory committees took precedence over our geopolitical 
goals. This is, in part, because of the narrow congressional majorities that have 
supported these agreements in the recent past. Our trade negotiators cannot af-
ford to alienate any interest group that could tip the scales against an agreement. 
It was only in the endgame that the geopolitical aspects became prominent again.
Another example would be U.S. assistance to eastern Central Europe during 
the administration of George H. W. Bush—an issue in which Ambassador Black-
will was deeply involved. The United States used economic tools to help integrate 
these countries into the West and, indirectly, into the European Community. It 
was only later that the military and NATO became our major tool of integration.
The authors, in their review of the history of U.S. use of geoeconomics, date its 
decline to Vietnam. I would argue that it was Congress’s creation of the Special 
Trade Representative in the Trade Act of 1962 that precipitated this decline. At 
that time, Congress removed the trade negotiating lead from the State Department 
—an agency with geopolitical responsibilities—and put it in the White House. 
This was done, according to Blackwill and Harris, because “congressional leaders 
complained that the State Department neither understood nor represented U.S. 
economic interests” (p. 169).
Blackwill and Harris attribute this change not to Congress but to economic 
insecurity and to U.S. policy makers who “began to see economics as its own dis-
tinctive realm, to be protected from the whims of statecraft” (p. 153). The authors 
argue that U.S. economists have succeeded in separating economic policy from 
national security policy (p. 6). I suspect that this statement surprises no one more 
than U.S. economists. Yes, U.S. economists argue for wise economic policies. 
They argue against geoeconomic measures that could undermine the fundamen-
tal strength of the U.S. economy. As we learned during the Clinton administra-
tion, they are mindful of the import of bond traders and others who influence the 
economy. But in my experience, economists do not see economic policy as a dis-
tinct area in which national security goals have no legitimacy. I frequently found 
that when policy makers were averse to using economic tools it was because those 
tools were either bureaucratically difficult or their implementation, timing, and 
effect were believed to be less certain than those of other means.
Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris have written a timely and compelling 
book that provides an important contrary perspective for U.S. national security 
policy making. It will be fascinating to watch whether and how these ideas get 
incorporated into the next administration’s national security policy.
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BOOK REVIEWS
FROM THE MED TO THE WORLD
Seagoing Ships and Seamanship in the Bronze Age Levant, by Shelley Wachsmann. College Station: 
Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2008. 448 pages. $40.
Homeric Seafaring, by Samuel Mark. College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2009. 272 pages. $60.
Byzantine Warship vs Arab Warship, 7th–11th Centuries, by Angus Konstam. Oxford, U.K.: Osprey, 
2015. 80 pages. $18.95.
These three books reviewed together are 
not an obvious historical match for each 
other as comparable scholarly studies; 
the only chronological thread linking 
them is their coverage of an era extend-
ing from the Bronze Age to the medieval 
period—a considerable portion of the  
maritime past. Yet all do focus, mostly, 
on the eastern Mediterranean.
The first book, Seagoing Ships and 
Seamanship in the Bronze Age Levant, is 
a monograph of the Institute of Nautical 
Archaeology at Texas A&M University. 
The institute, founded by George Bass in 
1973, is the flagship for underwater and 
maritime archaeology programs in the 
United States; its publications reflect that 
fact, as does its extensive global outreach 
resulting from its finds of shipwrecks  
and other items relating to maritime  
history covering the past ten thousand  
years.
As a world pioneer in nautical archaeol-
ogy, Bass also wrote the foreword to 
the book. Author Shelley Wachsmann 
is the maritime archaeologist—now 
a professor for the institute at Texas 
A&M—whose research on the “Sea 
of Galilee boat” conducted for the 
Israel Department of Antiquities and 
Museums produced his earlier popular 
book of that name (New York: Perseus, 
2000) on a single two-thousand-year-
old landlocked freshwater find.
This comprehensive tome published 
under the auspices of the institute exam-
ines a wide swath of past Mediterranean 
cultures whose maritime activities 
led to their evolution as Bronze Age 
powers. This book explores economic 
development, by way of Mediterranean 
Sea trade; how seaworthy ships were 
built, down to the smallest details; and 
what technological advances made 
possible voyages longer than mere coast-
hugging itineraries. It also addresses 
how ships and states dealt with piracy 
and—extrapolating from epigraphic 
evidence—what kind of agreements 
constituted Bronze Age maritime law.
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Although such a broadly themed 
approach makes difficult any organiza-
tional scheme for demarcating possibly 
overlapping domains, this excellent 
book is divided into two main sections 
over seventeen chapters: (1) “The Ships: 
Review of the Evidence,” covering 
Egyptian to Cypriotic, Aegean, Minoan, 
Sea Peoples, and Homeric beaked ships, 
as well as extant shipwreck archaeology; 
and (2) “Aspects of Maritime Activity,” 
ranging from ship construction to types 
of anchors, methods of propulsion 
(e.g., sails, oars, or both), navigation, 
trade, and law. These are followed by 
conclusions, appendices, endnotes, 
glossaries, bibliography, and index. The 
ample illustrations (at least 450) in this 
book are rich: very few pages are bereft 
of images, up to the conclusions of 
chapter 17. They include archaeological 
fieldwork photos of sites and artifacts, 
illustrations, maps, drawings, site 
plans, and reconstructions. There are 
also tables containing texts and their 
translations. One of the best results of 
this monograph is the consideration of 
nearly every kind of possible historical 
evidence for Bronze Age seafaring. For 
example, nearly every known Minoan 
seal or ceramic shard with a ship image 
is examined closely for information. 
The same is true for the Medinet Habu 
Sea Peoples reliefs in Egypt and the 
exhaustive analyses of excavated ship 
anchors. Thus the book is a huge asset 
for anyone studying maritime history of 
the Bronze Age eastern Mediterranean.
The second book, titled Homeric 
Seafaring, also published by the Institute 
of Nautical Archaeology at Texas A&M, 
is much more specific to a defined time 
and place. The work is much indebted 
to a poetic yet historically rich body of 
epic literary references, especially that 
of Homer in his famous “Catalogue 
of Ships” in Iliad 2. Yet if it were 
limited to that epic, the work would 
not add much to existing philological 
studies across centuries of painstaking 
analysis. Author Samuel Mark begins 
by pointing out (p. 11) that Homer can 
be a frustrating “siren song,” one to 
which archaeologists and historians, 
trained in data-mining purviews very 
different from those of philologists and 
literary scholars, will apply competing 
hermeneutics. But Mark reminds us 
(p. 15) that a skilled storyteller such as 
Homer (whoever the author behind that 
name might have been) “was careful 
to make his characters and events as 
lifelike as possible,” despite whatever 
chronologically diverse oral redactions 
changed the text along the way. This 
book also begins where the pioneer 
maritime historian Lionel Casson left 
off in attempting to reconcile the textual 
with the archaeological details, although 
not always weighting them equally.
Some of the perhaps surprising 
conclusions Mark contributes to the 
available literature include that seafaring 
was a very common activity even in 
agronomy-based societies, and that coast 
hugging can be more treacherous than 
open-sea sailing because of rocks, shoals, 
and currents. (Think Strabo’s warning 
in Geography 8.6.20 about rounding 
Cape Malea off the Peloponnesus: 
“When you double Cape Malea, forget 
your home.”) Mark also concludes that 
sea battles were more common than 
prior opinion allowed; that Homeric 
ships were more for sailing than for 
rowing; and that the helmsman was a 
sailor’s best hope for a safe return.
The alphabetic Greek glossary is very 
useful, as is the textual index of all 
passages on seafaring from at least 
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thirty-five classical author sources 
in addition to Homer. This is even 
an enjoyable read for anyone ready 
for a different and fresh approach 
to traversing Homer’s “wine-dark 
seas” and other Greek epics as well 
as encounters with Herodotus and 
encyclopedists such as Theophrastus 
and Pliny. It is well to remember that 
rarely in ancient Greece could you be 
more than fifty miles from the sea.
The third and last book is Angus 
Konstam’s Byzantine Warship vs Arab 
Warship, 7th–11th Centuries. Osprey 
Publishing in Oxford is the prime book 
source of past military histories. Lavish 
color illustrations are a constant in 
Osprey books (of which this reviewer 
owns more than a dozen) and concise, 
clear texts are to be expected—and are 
found here. Angus Konstam is a prolific 
author, with scores of published books, 
mainly for Osprey, comparable to this 
one. He is a former naval officer who is 
also familiar with museum collections as 
a curator, so his publishing template and 
understanding of resources for historical 
naval warfare are well established.
This book is part of the Osprey Duel: 
Engage the Enemy series, in which two 
competing systems, generally enemy 
forces, are compared across multiple 
parameters. In the medieval Mediter-
ranean chronology of the post–late 
antique world, in which Rome is no 
longer viable and Constantinople has 
replaced it, the two main fighting 
vessels under consideration are the 
Byzantine dromon and the Arab 
shalandi, which made up the bulk of the 
official navies of the opposing powers.
Shared or copied methods and tactics 
of naval engagement (according to 
contemporary treatises such as the 
Greek Taktika and the Naumachika 
of Emperor Leo VI [r. AD 886–912] 
or the Arabic Al-Adilla al-rasmiyya) 
are covered here, from grappling with 
grapnels, to boarding, to hand-to-hand 
combat, as well as the maneuverability 
of both ships by sails, rudders, or oars. 
Very specific types of weaponry are 
annotated: bows, cheirotoxobolistrae or 
tzangrae (crossbows), catapults, ballista 
bolts, caltrops, pikes, corseques (trident 
stave weapons), and—the most feared 
of all—the unquenchable flaming oil 
known as “Greek fire.” (Any of several 
Greek phrases [e.g., pyr thalassion, “sea 
fire,” and pyr kolletikon, “sticky fire”] 
could convey the incendiary nature 
of this substance forcefully expelled 
from deck-mounted siphons.)
Ultimately, both opposing forces used 
nearly the same weaponry. Konstam 
consulted artifactual material, historical 
documents, and extant manuscripts 
revealing many technical specifications 
for outfitting both Greek and Arab 
ships, including design features, how 
the combatants fought, and specific 
battle outcomes for this fascinating 
single-subject book. We also should 
credit Arab navigators who used the 
measured night stars, hundreds of which 
still retain names derived from Arabic.
One quirky legacy of the Arabic side of 
naval warfare comes to us in our English 
word admiral, meaning sea commander, 
from the later Moorish Arabic term 
amir al-rahl, meaning something akin 
to “ruler of outfitted [ships],” since 
the word amir or emir already meant 
a type of leader or ruler functioning 
as war commander. Our word admiral 
thus derives from this seminal time 
when the Arabic naval command first 
came to be seen as distinct from a land 
general’s command during the rapid 
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spread of Islamic hegemony across 
not just the land but also the sea.
In a world where information has not 
always been easy to come by, Konstam’s 
small but highly esteemed book does 
justice to the world of competing 
Arab-Byzantine interests. It covers the 
specifics of the fierce at-sea dueling that 
went on within the larger competition 
that spread over a sea claimed by both 
Byzantine Greek and Arab powers, 
anticipating by half a millennium the 
Ottoman conflict that would include 
both the fall of Constantinople and 
the ensuing battle of Lepanto.
PATRICK HUNT
Mayday: The Decline of American Naval Suprem-
acy, by Seth Cropsey. New York: Overlook, 2014. 
348 pages. $29.95 (paperback $17.95).
Mayday is an extended argument for 
the expansion of the U.S. naval fleet to 
confront Chinese ambitions in the South 
China Sea, secure U.S. global interests, 
and ensure America’s future as a great 
power. The author, Mr. Seth Cropsey, 
has considerable experience in defense 
and government, having served as a 
Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy in 
two administrations, in addition to other 
roles; he is associated with various think 
tanks. He demonstrates an in-depth and 
well-developed understanding of the 
strategic issues the Navy faces as he  
traces the development of U.S. sea power,  
assesses its current state, and examines a 
number of proposals before offering his 
own prescription for the Navy’s future.
In many ways this book is a reapplica-
tion of pre–World War I naval theory 
espoused by the Naval War College’s 
own Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. The 
author uses Mahanian thought exten-
sively in his analysis of the historical 
development of American sea power 
into its current incarnation, explaining 
that, because of the U.S. Navy’s current 
build rates and mismatched strategies, 
it is on a downward trajectory that 
will result in the loss of U.S. sea power. 
This, in turn, will result in a loss of U.S. 
influence and global stability worldwide. 
This channeling of Mahan is generally 
well executed, with one exception: at 
several points within the text, Mahan’s 
equation of naval strength with the 
size of the national shipping fleet is 
referenced, without a solid explana-
tion of how that relates to the current 
U.S. reliance on foreign carriers. The 
proposed repeal of the Jones Act (which 
mandates the use of U.S.-produced, 
-flagged, and -crewed carriers for cargo 
moved between U.S. ports) appears 
almost out of nowhere, and while 
a repeal definitely would improve 
competition and lower shipping costs, 
Mr. Cropsey fails to explain how this 
would be beneficial to the Navy or assist 
in correcting the strategic issues it faces.
The chapters on China’s naval expansion 
and the ongoing gap between the U.S. 
Navy’s force requirements and the 
number of hulls that its shipbuilding 
plan and budget can deliver are very 
informative and well reasoned. When 
observed through the Mahanian lens 
that Mr. Cropsey provides, it is not 
difficult to see how the People’s Libera-
tion Army Navy has embraced the idea 
that naval power is key to China’s ability 
to influence the region and secure its 
interests from the African littorals 
to the deep waters of the Pacific.
The book runs a bit thin in the delivery 
of economic arguments regarding 
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the American deficit, national debt, 
and entitlements, and the occasional 
departures into partisan rhetoric do 
not really serve the overall thrust of the 
book. Some of the arguments it contains 
are inconsistent or undeveloped. An ex-
ample is the suggestion to build smaller, 
single-mission hulls, which is followed 
later by a diametrically opposite 
recommendation to build multimission 
frigates with antiair, antisubmarine, 
and antisurface warfare capabilities. 
Additionally, his proposal to relegate 
much of the Army to National Guard 
or Reserve status is probably politically 
infeasible because of the dire effects this 
would have on the communities around 
major Army bases. All that aside, it is 
difficult to disagree with the fundamen-
tal tenets of Mayday—that a sufficiently 
sized and equipped Navy is crucial 
for our continued national security 
and the maintenance of international 
order—and on these bases his arguments 
for a naval expansion are sound.
Mayday provides an excellent case for 
reversing the piecemeal downsizing of 
the Navy, a return to pragmatic platform 
design, and consistent funding of a 
shipbuilding program to deliver and 
maintain a fleet sized to secure our 
interests and achieve our international 
objectives. Although the quote is not 
mentioned specifically, this book recalls 
President George Washington’s observa-
tion in his letter of 15 November 1781 
to the Marquis de Lafayette: “[W]ithout 
a decisive naval force we can do nothing 
definitive, and with it, everything 
honorable and glorious.” Mr. Cropsey’s 
recommendations are pragmatic and 
worth consideration by senior Navy 
leadership and policy makers alike.
JOSH HEIVLY
Realpolitik: A History, by John Bew. New York: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 2015. 408 pages. $27.95.
John Bew, a historian at King’s 
College London, provides the first 
comprehensive intellectual history of the 
often-misunderstood term Realpolitik. 
Drawing on the experience gained 
from his acclaimed biography of Lord 
Castlereagh, the Napoleonic-era British 
foreign secretary, Bew traces Realpolitik 
from its obscure, nineteenth-century 
origins in revolutionary Germany to the 
term’s use and misuse in contemporary 
Anglo-American foreign policy debates. 
Scholars and practitioners seeking to 
gain a more nuanced understanding of 
the evolution of Western foreign policy 
thinking over the last century, particu-
larly before 1945, would be well advised 
to consider Bew’s compelling narrative.
In the often-glib foreign policy 
discussions that characterize public 
understanding of the discipline’s key 
terms and points of contention, realism 
is often supposed to be interchange-
able with Realpolitik. Bew’s greatest 
contribution is his voluminous research 
into the term’s early history, beginning 
with the 1853 book Foundations of 
Realpolitik by the little-known German 
philosopher Ludwig von Rochau. This 
original formulation, distinct from 
later uses in both Germany and the 
Anglosphere, was a creature of its time 
and place: a disunited Germany torn 
between the liberal impulses of the 
1848 revolutions and the conservatism 
of its traditional ruling class, as 
personified by Otto von Bismarck.
Rochau’s Realpolitik was not an ideol-
ogy at all; it was a lens for viewing the 
political circumstances of Germany’s 
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bourgeois liberals at a time of conserva-
tive reaction. Rather than continue to 
build “castles in the sky,” as Rochau 
believed the failed revolutionaries of 
1848 had done, he argued for a specific 
focus on the essential truth that ideas 
have little currency without some 
acquaintance with power. To have any 
hope of success, Germany’s liberals had 
to understand the underlying social, 
economic, and political context of how 
power was wielded and the limita-
tions that existed on their freedom of 
action. A fervent believer in German 
unification for liberal ends, Rochau 
supported much of Bismarck’s foreign 
policy under the guise of Realpolitik. 
A sober appraisal of the domestic 
political situation meant that German 
unification, even under the leadership 
of a reactionary conservative such as 
Bismarck, provided the best long-term 
prospects for German liberalism.
It was Rochau’s unsentimental ac-
ceptance of the facts of the situation, 
as he interpreted them, that defined 
the original Realpolitik. Bew’s essential 
mission is to chart the course from 
Rochau’s relatively benign concept to the 
fraught foreign policy debates of today, 
with intermediate stops in Wilhelmine 
and interwar Germany. In his zeal to 
demonstrate the laudable breadth of 
his research on the term’s multicentury 
evolution, Bew occasionally overwhelms 
the reader with quotes and anecdotes 
from relatively obscure academics whose 
opinions of Realpolitik and its various 
permutations have only tangential 
relevance. His point, seemingly inargu-
able given the clarity of Rochau’s writing, 
is that the term quickly lost its essential 
benignity and was co-opted by German 
intellectuals advocating something 
very different from Rochau’s cold-eyed 
analysis of the facts on the ground.
Realpolitik’s introduction to British and 
American audiences at the beginning 
of the twentieth century was in a far 
different form. Namely, after Germany’s 
nationalist academics transformed the 
term into an amoral ideology of “might 
makes right,” Anglo-American opinion 
came to regard it as a synonym for 
German militarism and ultranational-
ism. Bew is particularly elegant in his 
parsing of Rochau’s original work and 
the contrast with much of the ultra-
nationalist proselytizing that came to 
define Anglo-American understanding 
of Realpolitik before the First World War.
Bew’s narrative shines particularly  
brightly during his analysis of the 
interwar period, notably the use of 
“Realpolitik” by British prime minister 
Neville Chamberlain to justify his 
appeasement of Nazi Germany. The 
counterreaction to the perceived failures 
of Woodrow Wilson’s liberal internation-
alism precipitated a reappraisal of the 
term in London during the 1920s and 
1930s, with it coming to be seen more 
positively as a steady adjustment to facts, 
as opposed to Wilson’s starry-eyed ideal-
ism. Bew, seeing the appeasement debate 
as a critical node in the term’s evolution 
to its ultimate place in the twentieth-
century realist paradigm, is convincingly 
dismissive of Chamberlain’s co-option 
of the term. Quoting at length from 
contemporary sources, Bew notes that 
Chamberlain’s Realpolitik lacked many 
of the essential elements of commonly 
accepted foreign policy realism and 
instead relied on a world-weary pes-
simism that left Britain unprepared for 
the Nazi challenge. Winston Churchill’s 
blend of tactical realism, in the form 
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of advocacy for a British rearmament 
policy, and ideological opposition to 
Nazism serves as a powerful contrast to 
Chamberlain’s flawed use of Realpolitik.
Bew breaks less original ground in 
the post-1945 period, as Realpolitik in 
the postwar United States is decidedly 
intertwined with the much-discussed 
“realist” school of foreign policy 
exemplified by academics such as Hans 
Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. The 
term’s Germanic origins and use by 
discredited proponents of the Second 
and Third Reichs undoubtedly contrib-
uted to a period of limited use, even by 
self-proclaimed realists. Bew’s narrative, 
post-1945, begins to merge into the 
broader discussion of the different 
schools of American foreign policy that 
emerged during the Cold War—an area 
of much previous research without room 
for the compelling scholarship offered 
in this book’s early chapters. Like all 
who study “realism,” Bew is drawn to an 
extended meditation on Henry Kissinger 
and his influence on U.S. foreign policy. 
Refreshingly, Bew is cognizant of the 
subtlety and nuance of Kissinger’s world-
view and refuses to paint that enigmatic 
figure with an overly broad brush.
Realpolitik: A History is an important 
contribution to international relations 
scholarship, not least for resurrecting 
Ludwig von Rochau and the origins of 
Realpolitik. Bew is to be credited with 
tracing the term’s evolution in multiple 
countries with different political cultures 
with relative ease and skill, showing time 
and again the slow metamorphosis of the 
term into something far different from 
what its creator intended. Particularly 
in the interwar appeasement debate, 
Realpolitik found itself misused toward 
ends that were anything but realist. More 
broadly, the term has been twisted to 
mean any policy that is believed to lack a 
moral foundation or, from the contrary 
viewpoint, is seen as grounded in realis-
tic levelheadedness. As Bew’s narrative 
ends and the term is gradually subsumed 
into the broader tradition of American 
realism, the reader is reminded of the 
inherent flimsiness of the structure of 
so many of the terms endemic to the 
debate over American foreign policy. 
Professor Bew’s new book is a helpful 
antidote to such rhetorical laziness.
ALEXANDER B. GRAY
Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice, by Wil-
liam C. Martel. New York: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 2015. 548 pages. $115.
“The main goal of this book,” Martel 
writes, “is to provide contemporary 
policy makers and scholars with a 
rigorous historic and analytic framework 
for evaluating and conducting grand 
strategy” (p. ix). Acknowledging that 
the term itself is “relatively new,” 
although its concepts certainly can 
be found throughout history, Martel 
credits academics during World 
War II (particularly “the founder of 
modern grand strategy, Edward Mead 
Earle”) with being the first to focus 
on a nation’s “highest political ends,” 
employing all elements of national 
power—“diplomatic, informational, 
military, economic”—to achieve global, 
long-term security goals (pp. 23, 25, 30). 
He thus elevates grand strategy above 
“strategy,” “operations,” “tactics,” and 
“technology” while acknowledging that 
for most of history “strategy”—how to 
achieve overall military victory—was 
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largely identical with “grand strategy” 
when the other components of national 
power were inconsequential. Thus, 
until the twentieth century, the Royal 
Navy—not English ambassadors nor 
the East India Company nor the 
inventors of steam power—dominated 
Britannia’s grand strategy because it 
determined Great Britain’s strategy, i.e., 
its means of winning important wars.
Martel’s theoretical presentation 
explains strategic thinkers from Sun 
Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, 
and Locke through Jomini, Clausewitz, 
Smith, Hamilton, and List. From the 
sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, 
Martel reviews Philip II, Frederick II, 
Napoleon, Bismarck, and Metternich, 
then examines the apogees and declines 
of the British and Ottoman Empires.
“Revolutionary” thinkers—Marx, Lenin, 
Trotsky, Mao, Hitler, and Ho—are also 
covered because of their impact on 
the contemporary world. However, 
“[w]ith the advent of thermonuclear 
weapons, classic approaches to strategy 
[for military victory] became largely 
irrelevant, having lost any practical 
meaning in the face of intolerable urban 
destruction, if not the annihilation 
of societies and humanity itself. This 
development effectively shifted strategy 
from its historical foundations of how to 
win wars to how to avoid wars” (p. 121).
Turning in the second half of this 
book to American history, Martel 
asserts that the nation’s grand strategy 
fundamentally has been that of neither a 
“status-quo” state nor a “revolutionary” 
one; it consistently has been that of a 
“gradualist” state, always seeking change 
but never rapid and radical change. 
“Restraining Sources of Disorder” is the 
chapter title for American foreign policy 
from Theodore Roosevelt through 
Franklin D. Roosevelt. Since 1945, the 
United States has opposed revolutionar-
ies but supported democratic-leaning 
reform. (Critics certainly would argue 
specifics, pointing to instances of 
American to-the-hilt backing of 
undemocratic rule when specific 
economic, political, or military priorities 
submerged sensitivity to social justice.)
The heart of Martel’s descriptive review 
of American grand strategy and his 
prescriptive conclusion on the future 
of that strategy rest on three principles 
that Martel argues always must be 
balanced. The first is that the domestic 
foundations of American economic, 
military, diplomatic, and social power 
have to be strong. (It is illuminating 
to view two centuries of American 
foreign policy from the internal 
perspective of the influence of slavery, 
territorial expansion, isolationism, and 
economic development rather than the 
usual wars, crises, and treaties. On the 
other hand, when Martel’s “domestic 
foundations” of national strength 
extend to “education, health care, and 
retirement systems,” questions about 
prioritization naturally arise [p. 355].)
The second principle, of leading efforts 
to restrain “sources of disorder that 
present direct threats to U.S. vital 
interests,” is complicated by Martel’s 
assertion that “America needs to stand 
for and defend principles that promote 
human rights and dignity, equality for 
all peoples—men and women—freedom 
of expression, free enterprise, and fair 
elections” (pp. 357–58). Thus, realist 
attempts to distinguish American “vital 
interests” from Wilsonian idealism are 
rejected. But how then are extensive 
economic relations with China or 
Saudi Arabia to be weighed in light of 
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blatant human rights violations if all are 
“American vital interests”? Yes, it can be 
done—but the argument is less clear.
Martel’s final principle is that the 
nation must strengthen alliances 
and partnerships to promote shared 
responsibilities effectively to solve global 
problems. Recognizing that American 
power is limited, Martel counsels against 
temptations toward either American 
overreach or American withdrawal on 
key global and regional problems.
Martel applies these principles to 
“current” foreign policy issues to 
illustrate their utility; the inevitable 
drawback to such relevance is the danger 
of “shelf life” interest, i.e., how long 
will readers care about or even recall 
foreign policy specifics from 2014? 
Conversely, some topics that seem 
important at the time of this writing 
(e.g., violent Wahhabism, Russian 
aggressiveness) receive little attention.
A weakness of generalized, historically 
centered summaries of policy decisions 
is the tendency to see, in retrospect, 
clear choices and definite paths, but 
to underestimate the uncertainty and 
angst that decision makers suffered. By 
contrast, specific case studies (e.g., the 
Cuban missile crisis, Vietnam, the 2003 
Iraq war, the 2008 economic crisis) al-
ways show the confusion and fear. Mar-
tel’s sweeping review gives surprisingly 
little attention to the fact that nearly 
all grand strategy decisions are made 
while under risk or amid uncertainty by 
those who are fraught with anxiety and 
apprehension, and constitute gambles on 
guesses rather than calm choices about 
how best to balance good principles and 
achieve optimal outcomes. Martel—who 
certainly understood the policy-making 
process—might have replied that the 
purpose of his final book was to advise 
policy makers and scholars on how such 
decisions should be made, rather than to 
describe how they will feel while doing 
so. But readers might have benefited 
from at least an acknowledgment of 
this apprehension, the way Bill Martel 
used to offer a cheerful but sympathetic 
smile to friends and students struggling 
with problems he had posed to us.
The date of this book’s release—12 
January 2015—was the day its author 
died at the age of fifty-nine after a 
yearlong battle with leukemia. Bill 
Martel was for ten years a professor 
of international security studies at the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 
at Tufts University (where he received 
the James L. Paddock award for teaching 
excellence) and an adjunct electives 
professor at the Naval War College. 
Previously, he had taught in the College’s 
National Security Decision Making 
Department for half a dozen years, 
following a similar period as founding 
director of the Air Force’s Center for 
Strategy and Technology at the Air War 
College. He also had served as an adviser 
to the National Security Council and the 
Romney 2012 presidential campaign. 
This reviewer was one of his many 
colleagues and students who counted 
themselves blessed by his friendship.
THOMAS GRASSEY
The Struggle for Sea Power: A Naval History of 
the American Revolution, by Sam Willis. New 
York: W. W. Norton, 2016. 608 pages. $35 (Kindle 
$16.05).
Sam Willis describes (p. 5) the war for 
American independence as “the most 
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intriguing naval story in history.” To 
support this contention, Willis has 
written a book aimed primarily at a gen-
eral audience and based on a narrative 
approach, first chronicling the maritime 
conflict between Britain and its rebel-
lious American colonies, then address-
ing the ensuing global maritime war.
Although the book is written as a 
chronological narrative, Willis identi-
fies five underlying themes that knit 
the maritime story of the war into a 
broadly defined seapower thesis.
The first theme involves the author’s 
assertion (p. 5) “that sea power can exist 
without navies.” Although lacking Brit-
ain’s established naval infrastructure, the 
colonists, Willis argues, still developed 
and exploited sea power. This theme 
dominates the text during the early years 
of the war, but regrettably becomes but a 
minor story line after the French entry.
The second theme argues (p. 6) that 
naval historians generally “make a 
false distinction between” saltwater 
and freshwater navies in places such 
as Lake Champlain. Willis claims that 
contemporaries made no such distinc-
tion. Certainly, Willis is correct to point 
out similarities between the types, but 
the differences are more significant 
than Willis admits, particularly in the 
instruments used and the obstacles 
faced. Even more than the first theme, 
this one is episodic and hardly 
merits being elevated to a theme.
Willis’s third theme focuses on the 
global nature of the war. Willis clearly 
demonstrates that much more was 
at stake than the independence of 
thirteen of Britain’s North American 
colonies. This theme is addressed 
quite effectively after 1778 through a 
traditional narrative of naval operations.
The global nature of the war meant 
that numerous campaigns occurred 
simultaneously, and events in one region 
influenced what occurred elsewhere. 
This is Willis’s fourth theme. Willis 
provides insightful commentary on 
such interactions when explaining fleet 
movements and campaigns, but devotes 
too little attention to the decision 
making in London and Paris. To 
understand truly the interaction among 
theaters, Willis needed to explain more 
effectively how leaders in Paris, London, 
and Madrid prioritized among compet-
ing options. For example, Willis fails to 
grasp the nuances of Britain’s strategic 
position, including the calculus used in 
determining the distribution of fleets 
between home and foreign waters, and 
particularly the essential role of Gibral-
tar in Britain’s strategic architecture.
The fifth and final theme is the most 
far-reaching. It addresses how sea power 
affected the broader war—whether 
through diplomacy, campaigns on 
land, the politics of the states involved, 
or particularly the decisions of the 
military and political leadership. “As 
always,” Willis maintains (p. 292), 
“the impact of sea power must be 
measured in more ways than one.”
Willis aptly argues that sea power was 
a significant element in the American 
Revolution that should not be over-
looked. It influenced events from the 
war’s origin to its end. Yet although he 
often supports his arguments with a high 
degree of skill, the book fails to entirely 
meet its potential. Willis is not the first 
to address sea power and its relation to 
this war, but he does not place his thesis 
into the context of previous works on 
the subject. This is particularly glaring 
with regard to Alfred Thayer Mahan. 
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Willis cites only Mahan’s book on the 
American Revolution; he does not cite 
The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 
1660–1783, Mahan’s most significant 
work and the one that put the term “sea 
power” into widespread use. Consider-
ing that Willis has written a book about 
sea power and even uses (p. 6) the 
phrase “the influence of sea power,” the 
omission is evident. Although Willis 
defines sea power more broadly than 
does Mahan, many of The Influence of 
Sea Power’s themes echo powerfully in 
his work. Like Willis, Mahan considers 
the global maritime war spawned by the 
struggle for American independence to 
be the most intriguing of naval wars.
The second, related weakness involves 
the quality of the scholarship. Although 
Willis uses archival and published 
primary sources, he often relies on other 
historians. This is particularly true 
regarding memorable quotations from 
those who were present. Rather than 
consistently consulting original sources 
for both the accuracy and the historical 
context of the quotes, Willis relies on 
the legwork of previous historians.
Overall, Willis has written an intriguing 
appraisal of sea power in the American 
Revolution. It is a sweeping narrative 
that benefits greatly from Willis’s 
eloquence as a writer and his superb 
ability to tell a story. However, the 
book is not without its weaknesses. 
Some of the author’s themes require 
development, the source base could 
be strengthened, and Willis needed to 
develop stronger links between naval 
operations and the decision making 
by those at the highest positions in 
government. The book is on its surest 
ground in the early chapters when ad-
dressing the development of American 
sea power, and later in the text when 
recounting major naval operations.
KEVIN D. MCCRANIE
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
Captain Thomas Grassey, USNR (Ret.), is a graduate of Villanova University and received a doc-
torate in philosophy from the University of Chicago. He served on the faculty of the Naval War 
College and is a former editor of the Naval War College Review.
Alexander B. Gray is senior adviser to a member of the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee 
on the Armed Services.
Lieutenant Commander Josh Heivly, USN, is a Supply Corps officer assigned to USS Harry S. 
Truman (CVN 75). He holds master’s degrees from the Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the 
University of Michigan and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts.
Patrick Hunt is an archaeologist and historian and has taught at Stanford University since 1993. He 
earned a PhD from the Institute of Archaeology, University of London. National Geographic Soci-
ety’s Expedition Council sponsored his Hannibal expedition in 2007–2008. He was director of the 
Stanford Alpine Archaeology Project from 1994 to 2012 and is a fellow of the Royal Geographical 
Society (London).
NWC_Autumn2016Review.indb   169 9/15/16   12:47 PM
175
Naval War College: Autumn 2016 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 1 7 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Kevin D. McCranie received a BA in history and political science from Florida Southern College, 
and an MA and PhD in history from Florida State University. Before joining the faculty of the Na-
val War College, he taught history at Brewton-Parker College in Mount Vernon, Georgia. In 2001, 
he held a fellowship at the West Point Summer Seminar in Military History. Specializing in warfare 
at sea, navies, sea power, and joint operations during the age of sail, he is the author of Admiral 
Lord Keith and the Naval War against Napoleon (2006), as well as Utmost Gallantry: The U.S. and 
Royal Navies at Sea in the War of 1812 (2011). His articles have appeared in Naval History, Journal 
of Military History, and Northern Mariner.
NWC_Autumn2016Review.indb   170 9/15/16   12:47 PM
176
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/1
IN MY VIEW
WAVE OF THE FUTURE: THE NAVY SHOULD DO MORE NOW TO  
CONFRONT THREATS JUST OVER THE HORIZON
Sir:
Try to visualize the global innovations that could emerge within the next thirty 
years to challenge the U.S. Navy’s dominance: Stealthier, autonomous ballistic-
missile submarines (Bryan Ericsson, “Drone Boomers: How Satellite Detection 
and the Push for Autonomy May Lead to Unmanned SSBNs,” International Af-
fairs Review [29 March 2016]). City-sized aircraft carriers capable of deploying 
swarms of miniature armed drones for precision-strike combat missions (Denise 
Chow, “US Navy’s New Aircraft Carriers Will Be Massive ‘Floating Cities,’” Live 
Science [18 October 2013]). Hydrogen-powered, blue-water sloops brandishing 
directed-energy projectiles (Naval Research Laboratory, “Scale Model WWII 
Craft Takes Flight with Fuel from the Sea Concept,” news release, 7 April 2014). 
Underwater robots specializing in naval mine removal and undersea warfare 
(“Future US Navy: Robotic Sub-Hunters, Deepsea Pods,” Daily Mail, 28 March 
2015).
Ostensibly, the Department of Defense (DoD) is on top of it. It has created 
plans to introduce autonomous vehicles, rail guns, and a host of other advanced 
systems into the Navy’s arsenal to maintain its competitive edge. After all, the 
Navy is the best funded of all the services. It is forward deployed and constantly 
under way. For the past several years, its readiness has been unrivaled by that of 
the navies of other world powers.
Yet the Pentagon has failed to consider another crucial factor when forging 
its future budget and planning cycles: a more complex geopolitical environment 
emerging in tandem with these technological advances. During this thirty-year 
time frame, the international security environment will change dramatically. The 
U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) assessed in 2012 that by 2030 power 
will have shifted to “networks and coalitions in a multipolar world” (National 
Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds [December 2012]). 
Balances of power will shift and expand, much to the detriment of U.S. interests. 
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Washington’s overseas influence will wane and other countries’ will fill the 
vacuum. Power—and with it individual access to technologically advanced naval 
platforms and conventional weapons—will disperse across the world.
This will compound the Navy’s difficulties in achieving its mission. It is not 
simply a matter of the great advancement in weapons, autonomous systems, and 
platforms themselves; who has access to which ones and the total to which they 
have access are also of utmost concern. Pentagon policy makers, congressional 
leaders, and other decision makers in the U.S. government must recognize how 
the confluence of these two developments—an increasingly complex geopoliti-
cal landscape and the profusion of more-capable weapons dispersed across it—
threatens U.S. interests.
Navy and DoD leadership can begin to address the problem in two ways. First, 
naval planners must concoct longer-term and more-specific plans. Unlike cur-
rent planning evolutions, defense planners should begin anticipating strategic 
surprise beyond twenty-year windows. Just after that time window is when the 
threat might grow out of proportion to the Navy’s ability to counter it. Of course, 
longer-term planning runs the risk of misapplying critical resources. The mid-
twenty-first century will be highly variable. However, relying on quick-action 
planning cycles could leave policy makers bewildered and the Navy trailing far 
behind its strategic rivals.
Second, the Navy, already hamstrung by budget, should avoid planning on the 
basis of political considerations. Despite an $848 million deficit on the Navy’s 
current operations and maintenance accounts, Congress is driving investments 
in larger, more-powerful naval ships (Christopher P. Cavas, “US Navy Faces $848 
Million Ops & Maintenance Shortfall,” Defense News, 26 May 2016). But future 
naval wars will not be fought on the high seas. They will be fought in the Strait 
of Hormuz and the South China Sea, where technological mastery, autonomy, 
willpower, and the ability to counter asymmetric swarm attacks will be pivotal 
to victory at sea (Caitlin Talmadge, “Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat 
to the Strait of Hormuz,” International Security 33, no. 1 [Summer 2008]). These 
wars will be fought in archipelagoes, choke points, and the most isolated regions 
on earth, where the enemy can use asymmetric warfare, mosaic defense, and ter-
rain to his advantage.
No doubt, the world is a complex place even today. Terrorism, Russia, China, 
and Iran pose enduring, direct threats to the Navy. But the increase in complex-
ity will not abate. Planners must account for these evolutions in international 
security before it is too late.
MATTHEW F. CALABRIA
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A QUESTION OF SERVICE
Sir:
As one of my final duties in the Navy, I was honored to be assigned as chairman 
of the direct commission boards for Naval Reserve Intelligence Area 19, Wash-
ington, DC. Along with two other captains, I interviewed five to ten enlisted and 
civilian candidates per drill weekend for direct commissions in the Naval Reserve 
Intelligence Program. This privilege allowed me the opportunity to provide direct 
input into the makeup of the future generation of reserve intelligence officers and 
my Navy.
But I found this function also gave me the perspective to reflect on my own 
time in the Navy as it was coming to an end. Twenty-five-plus years in the Navy, 
comprising active duty, reserve duty, and recall, had compiled a history for myself 
that I had not appreciated fully.
All this was brought into focus with one question. I concluded each interview 
by allowing the candidate ten minutes to ask questions of the board members. 
With about eighty years of diverse Navy experience among the members of the 
board, there usually was little we could not answer. Sometimes we learned more 
about candidates from their questions of us than our questions to them. I know I 
learned still more about the Navy and my time in it from these questions.
Often we would get the usual, expected questions: about benefits; about what 
the candidate could expect if selected. Some candidates had a list of questions; 
one candidate’s indexed and tabbed three-ring binder even had a separate tab for 
questions. Believe it or not, once in a while a candidate had no questions for us.
But I must admit that one petty officer asked the most insightful question of 
any of the hundreds of candidates I interviewed. Simply, “What was your best day 
in the Navy; and what was your worst day in the Navy?” I found this question 
very simple in its presentation but very profound in its complexity. It bypassed all 
the extraneous issues and drilled directly at the nature of one’s service.
I, for one, really had to think about my answer; so, being the coward that I am, 
I passed the question to one of the other captains to answer first. Then I began 
to reflect on all the good and bad things that had happened during my Navy 
service. Although there were a few highlights, I could not pick out any one really 
good day. There also had been some very exhilarating days that I wish I could 
relive. And there had been some “thrilling” times that I would not trade for the 
world—but that I also would never want to go through again. Correspondingly, 
I could not pick out any one really bad day (among more than a few). There had 
been some disappointing days, and a few for which I would have liked a “do over.”
NWC_Autumn2016Review.indb   173 9/15/16   12:47 PM
179
Naval War College: Autumn 2016 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 1 7 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
But, alas, the other two members of the board by now had given their answers 
and it was my turn. So, it occurred to me that my best day was that on which I 
reported for duty at Officer Candidate School. I remember coming across the 
bridge into Newport, Rhode Island, and seeing the “Navy” sign on two blue water 
towers. I had no idea what I was in for, but that day was the first step in a career 
that constantly presented challenges that brought out the best in me. I felt as if I 
belonged there, that I was a member of the team—and I never looked back.
And, at that time, my worst day had not come yet. That was the day on which 
the Navy said I had to go home. I knew I was a part of something I did not want 
to give up; but I also knew that some day I would have to look at my Navy service 
in the rearview mirror. I always felt the Navy would make that decision for me. 
Well, that day did come. The Navy told me it was time to take off the uniform and 
hang it in the closet, to leave the service to a younger generation. The day came, 
as it had for countless others who served before me, and as it will for those who 
came after me. No more “adventures” to look forward to, no more opportunities 
to serve, no more friends to be made. Plaques on the wall, knickknacks on the 
shelf, and trinkets in dust-covered boxes all hold cherished meanings that only 
you can fondly remember. Memories recall history to us in the form of stories 
that were, at one time, current events, and whose retelling may start with the 
words “In my Navy . . .”
But I have found something else. In my interaction with friends and asso-
ciates, I find that the Navy built within those who served a bond of kinship that 
the general population lacks. I also have found that our service developed within 
us the ability to recognize the crux of an issue, rapidly assess available informa-
tion, make an informed decision, and follow through on that decision. The Navy 
instilled in us an intangible quality that is not always outwardly apparent but is 
nevertheless present. We carry a pride of service, but have no reason to flaunt it.
My path never again will cross with that petty officer’s; but if it did, I would 
thank him for asking the question that brought into focus for me my time in the 
Navy.
CAPTAIN JOHN DEMAGGIO, USNR (RET.)
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-
ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.
n January 2016 Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John Richardson, 
USN, laid out his vision for the Navy when he released “A Design for Maintaining 
Maritime Superiority.” (See Naval War College Review 69, no. 2 [Spring 2016].) 
Months later, he shared some of his thoughts about improving the intellectual 
skills of all sailors in the June 2016 issue of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, in 
which he and coauthor Lieutenant Ashley O’Keefe, USN, published a succinct but 
important article (“Now Hear This—Read. Write. Fight”) about the importance 
that sailors participate in an ongoing discussion of topics important to our Navy.
They wrote (in part): “Warfare is a violent, intellectual contest between think-
ing and adapting adversaries. Usually, the team that can think better and adapt 
faster will win. Today, as we prepare for operations and war with an increasingly 
complex set of potential adversaries, we must do more to sharpen our thinking, 
learn the lessons from history, and expand our minds. The margins of victory will 
be razor-thin—we cannot be complacent. What we do in peace will be decisive 
in war.”
They go on to address directly those naysayers who believe they have no time 
to read, write, and prepare to fight, noting: “I realize that it takes dedication to 
devote time to reading, but it is fundamental to growth as a naval professional. As 
recently retired Marine General James Mattis, one of our best-read leaders, once 
wrote, ‘The problem with being too busy to read is that you learn by experience 
(or by your men’s experience)—i.e., the hard way.’ If, through a lack of research, 
we relearn the lessons of history each time we go to war, we will needlessly pay 
the price in sunken ships and greater loss of life. We must all study voraciously to 
prepare ourselves for the ultimate responsibility of leadership in war.”
They continue this theme by noting:
“Reading can teach us the fundamentals of our business. Thucydides, Clause-
witz, Mahan, Corbett . . . these masters wrote works of the highest quality that 
have stood the test of time. . . . 
I
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“There is great value in testing conventional wisdom and exploring new ideas. 
A good idea will get better through this intellectual challenge. Newspapers, peri-
odicals, and blogs can provide us different perspectives on issues of the day—and 
these contributors can also challenge our thinking. Focused forums such as the 
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, the Naval War College Review, the Marine Corps 
Gazette, and more recently, online blogs, have hosted professional conversations. 
Thoughtful, well-researched articles can offer useful insights and, when needed, 
can help us change our minds. . . .
“Just about everywhere we look, our problems are becoming more complex 
and challenging. It is imperative that we, individually and as a Navy, are ready—
morally, physically, and mentally. The nation will call on us to get under way and, 
if necessary, fight. 
“By reading and writing now, we are improving ourselves and the Navy. We 
are preparing for when we are called into battle. Read and write professionally 
with that singular purpose: to confound our enemies and make our Navy more 
powerful. We must think hard and do better. It is time to break out the books and 
sharpen our pens.”
The program manager at the Naval War College is in the final stages of re-
designing the CNO Professional Reading Program website into a CNO Profes-
sional Learning site, with increased content and functionality. In addition to 
recommending and facilitating access to selected e-books, the site will offer study 
guides to help readers get the most out of each book, videos and articles that 
amplify key points addressed in each book, and a process by which readers can 
exchange ideas about the books they have read.
The written word is a powerful tool that both illuminates the lessons of the 
past and shines a spotlight on issues of the future. All sailors, at all grades, ranks, 
and levels of seniority, are encouraged to read, write, and fight!
JOHN E. JACKSON
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